Vol. 5, No. 16, November 2009

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

Comprehending the Significance of Intellectual Ownership in the Process of NATO’s New Strategic Concept Development
Mihail Naydenov

NATO`s New Strategic Concept: Lessons to Learn for the Decision Making Process
 Antoniya Shalamanova

Views from Georgia about NATO Eastward Enlargement
Nino Kukhianidze

Views from Central Asia to NATO’s Strategies in Afghanistan and the New Alliance Strategic Concept Development
Oybek Makhmudov

 To Our Readers

This is the 16th issue of the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch Newsletter. It continues the Bulgarian debate about NATO New Strategic Concept and extends this debate with some international opinions from Georgia and Uzbekistan. We believe that in this way a  better understanding for the security sector transformation in its global sense and the new challenges and threats in the 21st century will be achieved. As usual we have noted some important events related to the security sector transformation.

From the publishers

 Comprehending the Significance of Intellectual Ownership in the Process of NATO’s New Strategic Concept Development

Mihail Naydenov^*

The initiative of the George C. Marshall Associations - Bulgaria to gather the intellectual contributions of the Bulgarian experts’ community about NATO public debate on NATO’s New Strategic Concept is more than indispensable and hence commendable.

Nowadays, this conclusion acquires additional validation in order to maintain such an activity particularly at the level of the state institutions, which are directly involved in the security and defense area.

The initiation of a “live” national debate should not be perceived as an end in itself. It is a precondition for successfully providing an adequate national experts’ contribution to the elaboration process of NATO’s New Strategic Concept development. This is the guiding strategic document that will outline the vision of how the Alliance will look alike in the next decade.

Taking into account the current security environment within the context of the irreversible process of growing interdependence in a globalizing world, the Bulgarian input to this fundamental conceptual document should be not less than two-dimensional: on the one hand, it should reflect and promote the interests of NATO as a whole entity, and, on the other - a genuine expression of the specific security concerns of our country as a NATO member. The latter is of vital importance for being a pro-active ideas-contributing member, not only a country that follows with a keen interest the results of the intellectual work done by other member states.

Being an active Alliance member country in the present ongoing security debate - both at the level of state institutions and civil society - this will be the first step to take the advantage of our NATO membership in this allied intellectual endeavour. So, we must understand that the ownership of every NATO member state in shaping the future of the Alliance should not be taken for granted. Such an ownership results now, more than ever, from the level of individual national participation into the public debate on the NATO’s New Strategic Concept development.

 To shape the security environment

 In order to understanding and have the agreement of our society about the difficult decisions to be taken in the name of our common security, first of all, we should have a shared vision on what NATO will do in the future and hence how it should look alike.

Before being able to achieve the sufficient level of understanding on the NATO security identity by the non-NATO countries, it is of key significance, first of all, to have our shared allied vision thereupon.

The basis of the aforementioned vision could be the Alliance responsibility to shape the security environment, not only to react to the security challenges, which undoubtedly will become more and more complex and variable. The adoption of a pro-active approach to security serves the purpose of reducing to the minimum possible level of the unpredictability, and, as a consequence - own vulnerability.

Being pro-active, rather than reactive, could be the new image of NATO in the next decade. An image imprinted, first and foremost, in our own minds and then in the perception of the rest of the world. However, being pro-active does not mean to become a global policeman, which is an indubitable waste of resources – human, financial, material and, last but not least, in collision with the Alliance democratic values of freedom respect. Being ready to collectively shape the security environment in a world where unpredictability and dynamics reign means that we are required to have at our disposal both the decision and the capacity to meet the security challenges whenever and wherever they might arise. Bulgaria could follow such an attitude, and thus contributing to the formation of the NATO pro-active democratic identity.

To be together means to be capable

The Article 5 is the core of NATO solidarity. The clear reliance of every individual member state that, in case of an external aggression of whatever nature, the other allies will unquestionably come to provide their full support is the strongest glue that holds the Alliance members together. But credibility depends on ability and ability depends on capacity. Building-up the right capabilities that will continue to make us credible depends first on the political will and democratic values and freedoms. The latter is led by the correct assessment of the security situation in the next 20 years. In this case, the Multiple Futures project could be of significant benefit.

The capacity of Bulgaria to execute its Article 5 obligations depends on our efforts in building capabilities for expeditionary operations. This should be our foremost priority with a view to the present and the predictable future security environment as well as our limited resources in the conditions of a lasting economic recession. Timely deployable and interoperable armed forces are the key to attain an adequate defense system.

At the same time, our potential for territorial defense should not be underestimated, but kept at a sufficient level. Given the budget restrictions, our expeditionary capability should not be impeded by the diversion of funds for forces structured for less probable scenarios, such as massive territorial invasion. Even if such a scenario proves realistic at some time in the next years to come, we should be prepared to readapt our system in time. That is why NATO has to keep and further promote its capacity to analyze the future security environment and to detects risks and threats at the earliest possible stage and, finally, to be ready to prevent and pre-empt any potential challenge that, if left unaddressed, one day could threaten our own countries and vital interests. Once again, this is a matter of building-up the necessary capacity to deploy forces outside the NATO national territories as long as necessary.

But even in case of a return to any kind of situation, where an armed territorial aggression might look probable to whatever extent, here again the solution is not to rely solely on individual efforts, but to continue to count on the potential of the Alliance as a whole. So, expeditionary capabilities are at the center of our capacity to act. To be able to collectively counter any aggression of whatever kind, nature, duration and source directed against any member state signifies that we must be credible - not only in the eyes of any potential enemy, but primarily in the public perception in every member country. The NATO credibility in the minds of its members is the strongest glue that sticks the Alliance together. This lies in the heart of the allied solidarity.

What could make us more capable?

Regarding the fact that some NATO nations are closer to regions with tangible conflict potential, the Alliance should focus, in first place, on supporting them to modernize their armed forces and to bring them up-to-date to the 21^st century security requirements. This means to achieve a defense transformation, which must be understood as a process which is broader and deeper than the defense reform. Transformation is to change the substance from one state of being into another. In our case, this means to switch from the Cold war era-oriented defense to the new one, which should fulfill its function in service of society in the age of globalization, where new, unknown so far, forms of vulnerability, and respectively - sources of power, come to the fore.

Concerning the foundations of achieving a credible defense, there should be an Allied shared vision on the need to stress upon the development of the necessary defense infrastructure that could serve not only the purpose of allied collective defense, but also and most importantly - of effectively projecting power outside the Euroatlantic area through NATO-led operations and missions. In the case of Bulgaria, the joint BG-US military facilities are a good example that could be taken as a positive one to follow and at the same time the role of EU common security and Russia should also be taken into account.

As collective defense implies credibility, alongside with its well-developed conventional forces, NATO will continue, in a foreseeable outlook, to rely on its nuclear deterrent as an ultimate guarantee to the allied security. Related to this aspect comes the issue of missile defense, which should be shared and must cover, on an equal footing, the territories of all the NATO countries, thus underlining the principle of indivisibility of security.

As of today, with regard to the new forms of vulnerability that we are exposed to, securing the flow of vital resources and the cyber networks is acquiring crucial weight in the whole array of measures we have at our disposal to guarantee national and allied security. That is the reason why NATO should work on the development of its capacity to counter any risks or threats of disruption of vital resources supplies. In this regard, at the present time, guaranteeing the supply of energy is concerned as foremost and the role of Russia and EU should also be tackled with the necessary attention. Of course the provision of other kinds of vital resources, including water, one day might suddenly surge to the forefront. The Alliance should be prepared for any contingencies in this field.

Having in mind the aforesaid, in a globalizing and increasingly high-tech world, information should also be considered as a vital resource.

An eventual disruption of the normal flow of information in whatever sphere of activity could have unimaginable consequences for the normal functioning of our societies. The today’s world is becoming more and more cyber-dependent and the irreversibility of this trend obliges us to accept that the defense of our homeland includes as a condition sine qua non the protection of our information infrastructure. That is why the issue of cyber security should be addressed timely and adequately.

Having in mind all this, securing the flow of vital resources, including energy and information, should become a collective responsibility that, at any point, could trigger the application of Article 5 measures. This logic opens the way for considering the collective defense in a broader sense than it has traditionally been so far. Currently, possible armed attacks against any national territory represent only one dimension of aggression. A conventional armed attack could be preceded by massive cyber attacks or simply by cutting off energy routes, thus facilitating a potential territorial invasion and, at the same time, disturbing the national or collective action in response thereto. Nevertheless, given the present dynamics, it could be even unnecessary for a potential hostile power to resort to an armed attack after having inflicted considerable damages to a country’s economy - both by means of cutting the energy supply and paralyzing the functioning of the state institutions and the socio-economic activities via a cyber warfare campaign.

In this sense, national territory these days should not be considered only as a portion of land, water and airspace locked in between the internationally recognized borders. Nor is it the only source of wealth and national identity in the epoch of globalization. National territory today has different dimension, one of which is the cyber space, where borders are transparent, opening a source of widening opportunities and wealth.

To follow the right path

In conclusion, having in mind all the abovementioned, the solution of our security concerns depends, first, on the careful analysis and subsequent forecast of the strategic environment and, second, on the permanent adaptation and increase in potential to conduct interventions at the earliest possible stage, even far outside the North-Atlantic area. This is the only way to avoid the final manifestation of hostile behaviour, i.e. the invasion of territory, which in fact might not happen in the forms and by any methods known so far.

NATO needs to take into account all this and therefore to adapt its conceptual and doctrinal foundations to the current security requirements, before definitely proceeding to the build-up and further development of the adequate capabilities with which to tackle the contemporary and future risks and threats.

If we know where we want to go, we will be able to find the right path.

^*Mihail Naydenov is a defense and security expert and member of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Society.

NATO`s New Strategic Concept: Lessons to Learn for the Decision Making Process

 Antoniya Shalamanova^*

On the political scene there are not only national, but international, supranational, and transnational actors who are also engaged in decision making processes. In the work of Margaret Hermann[1] it is suggested that there are three types of decision making units - a predominant leader, a single group, and a coalition. The author points out that in order to decide who is actually making the decision one has to examine not only the solution, but the whole process of the decision making. This matters because sometimes it is difficult to determine who is the decision unit in a particular decision-making process. Even though it is considerably clear how one distinguishes a predominant leader from the other two possible decision units, it is hard to distinguish whether a single group or a coalition is taking action. As Hermann suggests, when a resolution is taken by a single group the group is consistent of actors that depend on each other and cannot act as independent entities. On the other hand, when the solution is found by a coalition it is suggested that all the actors in the coalition can act as separate entities when it comes to different problems, but are gathered together to take decision on a particular problem. This decision cannot be made by one or two of the participants in that coalition but has to be acknowledged by all the members. The main question that has to be considered when examining who is actually the decision unit is who has the ability to commit resources for a certain position.

In the beginning of July it was announced[2] that NATO will create a new Strategic Concept to deal with the changing world. The Secretary General pointed out that the previous one dated from 1999 and since then many changes in the international arena took place. Therefore, the concept might be out of date and that is why there is a crucial need for a new one. The Summit that took place in Strasburg[3] earlier in the year decided that the Secretary General has to shape the New Strategic Concept for the organization which will help it to deal with the current international situation and also to provide some ideas for the future. Even though the task to formulate the new Strategic Concept was given to the Secretary General it is clear that he cannot do this alone. Because the issue is of international interest it is generally impossible a decision to be made by just a single actor. That is one of the reasons that the Secretary General appointed a group of twelve experts, headed by the former US Secretary of State Mrs. Madeline Albright, to map the formation and development of the Concept. This also suggests that the Secretary General alone does not have the ability to commit resources. However, the group also cannot solely take the decision about the content of the Concept and is formed to assist the North Atlantic Council, which will finalize the process.

The number of the actors involved in the process of preparing the Concept might suggest that it is a coalition that makes the final decision. As Hermann explains, when there are actors that can act autonomously and still have to make the decision together the decision unit is a coalition. On the other hand, it is always helpful to see how it has been done in the past[3]. Since 1949 NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts and all of them were approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).This suggests that the decision unit is more likely to be a single group because the NAC has both the ability to commit resources and the will to act. The group that is appointed to help the Council can be described as an assistant in preparation of the Concept. Still, that group is not entitled to find any particular solution by itself and has to coordinate its actions and resolutions with the NAC. As it is written in the NATO Handbook[4], the Council has the full power to make decisions and in the same time has the power to appoint “subsidiary bodies” that can facilitate its work on policies that require more expertise. Bearing that in mind one may suggest that in the case with the New Strategic Concept, the Council does not have the needed capacity to prepare the Concept and thus needs the help of the group of experts which is created exclusively to work on the issue. Still, it is clear that the entity which will make the final decision is the Council and the group of experts is formed just to facilitate the work and the decision making process for the NAC. This statement makes one argue that the decision will be made by a single group that has the ability to commit resources and is ready to act. It is clear that without the approval of the Council the Concept cannot be launched. And this follows to the point that the decision unit in the case with the new Strategic Concept is a single group.

Even though the preparation of NATO`s new Strategic Concept seems to be a complex issue, examples from the past indicate that the decision is taken by a single group. This might seem strange in a way for such a big issue to be taken by only a considerably small group of people, but sometimes it is better to have a smaller number of decision makers to find the best solution. All the examined aspects of the decision-making process for the preparation of the NATO New Strategic Concept suggest that although there are many actors involved the final position is taken by the Council. The group of experts is appointed to assist the NAC but neither has the ability to commit resources, nor is ready to act.

All of the arguments stated above apply to the conclusion that it is single group that makes the decision for the new Strategic Concept. This group is the North Atlantic Council which is the only actor involved, has the ability to commit resources and is ready to act. These two features perfectly correspond to Hermann’s explanation of a single group as a decision unit. Another argument that supports the conclusion of a single group taking the decision is that organizations like NATO have strong traditions and clear rules, and work in strict manner. So, if in the past it was the NAC making the decisions, it is also the way that it will be done in the future.

Such a mechanism of consensus based decision making by NAC, representing all member Nations with the same rights is following the positive characteristics of both single group and coalition. At the same time the involvement of a group of experts and their mandate for large scale consultations with other experts and civil society in all member Nations and Partners is improving further the base for decision making, providing opportunity for more informed decision and more informed audience that this decision will affect.

Formally we have single group decision, integrating some good characteristics of the coalition decision making and strong advisory / participatory element from expert community / civil society.

Could we in Bulgaria use lessons from this process in drafting and approval of the Security Strategy of the country as NATO and EU member, but still sovereign state in the difficult part of Europe? If NATO needs New Strategic Concept, because the one of 1999 is outdated by events, so Bulgaria needs even more new Security strategy, because the concept of 1998 and the Military doctrine of 1999 are not envisioned as documents of the member state of the two most successful alliances - NATO and EU. No reasonable changes in the security sector could  be implemented without a Strategy, developed through a process which following the best practices in the Euroatlantic community - and the process of development of the New NATO Strategic Concept is an excellent example how it could be done properly.

^*Antoniya Shalamanova is a Project Coordinator of George C. Marshall Associations - Bulgaria and a student from  the American University in Bulgaria.

Views from Georgia about NATO Eastward Enlargement  

Nino Kukhianidze^*

After the cold war Realists had a major debate on the issue of NATO eastward expansion. They had two different, opposing ideas about the alliance’s enlargement.

Those who were proponents of NATO expansion towards the east, say that the main benefit of the enlargement would be a greater regional security. Their argument is based on the idea that Russia would deter from intimidating its neighbors or engaging in territorial revisionism to recover lost territories. Therefore in case of NATO enlargement towards the east, Russia would have to consider the fact, and take it into account that any threat or use of force towards its neighbors would be responded by the Alliance according to Articles 5 and 6 of Washington Treaty. With NATO in the region, Russia would not dare to threaten, intervene or intimidate smaller and weaker states in the neighborhood. It would pursue security and stability in the region.[1]

Realists who argue in favour of NATO expansion claim that its enlargement would benefit Russia too. States in Eastern Europe, if they enter NATO, will feel safe and won’t fear for their security, they won’t be tempted by chauvinism or nationalism, which might cause regional instability; they won’t start searching for other alliances, or form a new alliance to guarantee their own security. That would form a complication, since in that case it will not be possible to build a regional security community. But if such states became NATO members, these complications would disappear. With NATO right there, it would be much easier for Russia and NATO to cooperate and make security arrangements. Russian security unilateralism would decrease and consultation would increase.

So, if NATO does not expand the security in Eastern Europe and international order, the stability in the region would be worse in terms of uncertainty and unpredictability, it would be perilous and more provocative.[2]

Those, who are against NATO enlargement, claim that the alliance’s expansion into the former Soviet sphere of Eastern Europe might unite all those nationalist and xenophobic political forces in Russia, who are against closer collaboration with the West, especially with the United States. So, there is a possibility that the Cold War might start all over again between East and West.[3]

The ones against NATO eastward enlargement also think that, if the alliance expanded eastwards, it would reduce it’s credibility of Article 5 - an armed attack against one or more member states should be considered as an attack against them all and will be responded adequately. NATO would diminish its capacity to defend its member states’ independence and security in Eastern Europe, since the Alliance might risk an all-out war with Russia. For those who argue against NATO enlargement, one of the important factors in this argument is that some states from the former Soviet sphere, who want to obtain NATO membership, have strong historic animosities and resentments towards Russia, some have undeveloped and unstable government systems. So, considering these factors they can not become solid and reliable members of the Alliance. Both Realists, the ones who are in favour of NATO enlargement and ones who are against it assess opportunity and risk differently but both of them are concerned on the fundamental values of security and stability.[4]

NATO’s political leadership has stated that enlargement is in the best interest of the Alliance and its doors remain open. NATO’s approach in the 21^st century, as described in the 1999 Strategic Concept, was and still remains based on a broad definition of security which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense dimension, which included continued commitment in conflict prevention, crisis management and enlargement - NATO’s continued openness to new members.[5]  NATO’s intention is to create a whole, free and peaceful Europe.

Since the end of the cold war there have emerged serious new threats to the security of the states and allies. In August 2008 Russia abused its position as a peacekeeper to invade Georgia and broke off Abkhazia and the Region of Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) from Georgian territory by military force. This comes to top of Russia shutting off gas supplies to Ukraine, affecting NATO-ally Bulgaria, and suspicions of Russian involvement in cyber attacks against Estonia.[6]

Both Georgia and Ukraine are former Soviet republics, and Russia is trying to keep them having that status “former Soviet” forever. NATO’s very existence serves as an unwelcome reminder of the Cold War for Russians, they were always suspicious about NATO’s intentions and their way of thinking, concerning this hasn’t changed. Though NATO hopes that even with dialogue being very difficult with Russians, in a situation like this, still cooperation is not impossible and relies on that. Russia and NATO have some common interests which include support for stability in Central Asia, countering terrorism and piracy, and curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.[7]

But there are some important issues where NATO and Russia do not agree with each other - NATO’s eastward enlargement; especially Georgia and Ukraine joining the Alliance is what Russia is against. Present NATO has a strong position on this subject - that weather or not Moscow approves, the Alliances doors will remain open for the qualified candidates. Decision about granting NATO membership to a state is made by the Alliance members only and no one else. But the Georgian public is convinced that because France, Italy, and especially Germany get essential part of natural gas from Russia, they felt obliged to take Russia’s political will into consideration when made decision to reject NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine. Even Russian experts ironically speak about the ‘schroderization’ of Western Europe, meaning that Herhard Schroder, the former Counselor of Germany is the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Russian gas company “Gasprom”, in other words he is Putin’s employee.

From the military perspective of enlargement, NATO must maintain the already established rigorous standards to ensure that new members are providers and not only consumers of NATO security. With regard to Georgia and Ukraine, military engagement, cooperation, assessments are ongoing, any progress toward NATO membership remains firmly in the political arena.[8]

Georgia began sending troops to assist NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999 and had pledged to send troops to assist the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In 2007, Georgia became the third largest contributor (behind the United States and Britain) to coalition operations in Iraq, with a deployment of 2,000 troops. The Georgian military had undertaken major efforts to re-equip with western-made or upgraded weapons, armor, aviation, and electronic equipment. Georgia’s Strategic Defense Review suggested that the country eventually might be able to contribute to NATO by developing a niche capability in mountain combat training.[9]

In August 2008, the small victorious war against Georgia led to euphoria among Russian politicians, and military experts published a series of articles on the importance of de-sovereignization of Georgia and it’s fragmentation into vassal quasi-states. In this articles, there also can be clearly seen the authors’ anti-Western attitudes and the reliance on power. For example, Mikhail Alexandrov, Head of the Department of Trans-Caucasus at the Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), wrote that “…Georgia - this is our Kursk battle and battle for Ukraine is in future. Our victory in confrontation with the West will depend on how we play our cards in Ukraine.” In his opinion, capturing Tbilisi would help to “…establish new democratic regime in Georgia”. It seems, Alexandrov means ‘special’ form of democracy which is created by the Russian occupation troops and not by the people of Georgia.[10]

Another Russian military expert, Alexei Vashenko thinks that “…Georgia became NATO’s main platform, … it is the biggest danger for Russia’s future, … and this is why Russia should divide the rest of Georgia into parts as soon as possible”.[11]

Shahin Abbasov, Political Scientist from Azerbaijan, wrote that Russia did not achieve it’s goals in the first war. Its goal was not the Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. The goal was to block Western excess in Georgia and the whole region”.[12]

After the war Russian top military officials continued to threaten Georgia. In November, 2008 the Russian Defense Minister declared during his visit in Turkey that Georgia’s attempt to join NATO may lead to a more serious conflict between Georgia and Russia.[13] Georgians perceive it as the main reason of Russian invasion in Georgia in August, 2008.

Taking into account that Dmitri Medvedev, the president of Russia, repeatedly expressed his ideas about the so called special ‘sphere of influence’ and Russia’s ‘privileged interests’ on Post-Soviet space, it is possible to state that potentially Russian strategy is dangerous not only for Georgia but also for Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics. This is also a question of misunderstanding between the West and Russia. Russian politician’s declaration about ‘multi-polar’ world, in fact means that Russia will be a “Eurasian polar” with other Post-Soviet countries subordinated to it.[14]

The new US leadership offered the conception of ‘multi-partner’[15] instead of ‘multi-polar’ world which is based on sovereign democracies’ rights to choose their own partners and allies instead of being the victims of ‘spheres of influence’ of big neighbors. Georgia strives towards Euro-Atlantic structures and sees itself in future as a member of NATO and the European Union, while Russia stands on the opposite position - it is hostile to NATO and is against Georgia’s integration with the EU. Georgia chose the way of liberal democracy as its political value, while Russian leadership rejected this value and based its strategy on the chauvinistic idea of Russia being the main center on post-Soviet space. And this is the main conflict between Georgia and Russia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only the means of Georgia’s oppression for Russia.

Despite Russian military threat, Georgia did not reject the way of joining NATO, though to achieve this goal it should meet modern Western European democratic standards.

NATO is a unique military-political organization which helps Georgia not only to build its army according to NATO standards but also built democracy in the country. A lack of democracy in Georgia caused demonstrations in November 2007. But the Georgian government lessons learned from these events, demonstrated flexibility and readiness to meet democratic standards, and since Spring, 2009 situation essentially improved in the country. Now Georgia is on the right track and joining NATO is only a question of time.

^*Nino Kukhianidze is within the Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reintegration.

Views from Central Asia to NATO’s Strategies in Afghanistan and the New Alliance Strategic Concept Development

 Oybek Makhmudov^*

The development of NATO's New Strategic Concept is strongly related to the new global world threat - the terrorism, which directly puts into the Alliance focus the Central and South Asia region. However the Alliance economical expenses spent on military activities does not affect sufficiently the internal situation in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these are negatively influencing the local populations of regions and foster the drug trafficking and hostile militants groups’ penetrations and attacks. In addition, in Afghanistan and Pakistan a concentration growth of radical groups’ training bases (where militants obtains practical expertise in suicide bombing, terrorist’s attacks, and hijacking) from all over the world is a painful fact.

The present enlargement of Allied military troops in Afghanistan is practically resulting to an increase of the asymmetrical terrorist activities from the militants and the destroying of land vessels and suicide attacks among local population’s places. A disproportional positioning of NATO military troops in the South Afghanistan is observed. In contrast, the militant’s proportionally are increasing their fighters’ number with thousands of terrorists. At the next coming years the Taliban could penetrate to Central Asia, through Tajikistan territories.

So, for Central Asia the stabilization of the military situation in Afghanistan is a task of vital importance, which is related to a detailed NATO’s strategic analysis of the weaknesses and failures in the Afghanistan case.

Problems of NATO military activities in Afghanistan

The Alliance is using a global strategy in countering terrorists’ threats in Afghanistan that is, according to our military experience, completely unconcern to the specifics of country geography, ethnic, cultural and religious factors. In addition NATO lacks of sufficient knowledge about local war tactics.

From one side, NATO troops are well equipped but this does not provide a guarantee of their success in the countering operations with the Afghanistan militants. Currently, the stockpiles of NATO arms and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are increasing but according to the experts’ assessments the national ammunition stockpiles in Afghanistan are estimated on 100,000 metric tons, mostly unguarded and abandoned by the militants.[1]

The weak control of air space security is resulting into an increased number of hijackers because of the good technological equipment of the terrorists - Talibans still have more than thousands of Stingers and Salafists groups obtain the manpads SA-7, which are directly targeted to helicopters, civilian and military air cargos.

In addition, the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan has also difficulties with the drugs countering related to the control of the Pakistan and Afghanistan borders from international forces. In fact, half of the Afghanistan GDP comes directly from the drug trade, primarily in opium production. The different drug cartels that are involved in the production and transportation contribute to the country’s violent crime. The drug trade has provided Afghan warlords, militant’s commanders and corrupt government officials, enable terrorist for active operations in Southern and North-Eastern Afghanistan and recruitment of young generation from Central Asian countries to jihad groups through “heroin dependency” tactics.

What could be done in support of NATO mission in Afghanistan in the context of the Alliance new strategic concept development?

The involvement of the Central Asian experts in discussing and consultations with NATO on common resolving of the Afghanistan issues could be a successful approach. The gradually developing relation and dialogue of NATO with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in countering drug, small arms traffics and terrorist’s activities could also be a good joint activity against the global terrorism. Central Asian experts could support the Alliance experts on neutralizing anti-personnel mines and building cooperation on the joint police training. The effective countering with opium production in Afghanistan, would mitigate the financing of terrorists’ activities in Central Asia and neighbouring countries. It is also necessary to involve in the drugs control process the international police forces and in this way to break the transfer to the European market.

The Alliance should carefully continue the dialogue attempts with Talibans forces, supported by Pakistan’s think tanks because this dialogue could enhance the militant’s positions in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and threaten the Central Asia region, as a whole, by means of an escalated tensions on transregional levels between minorities.

Additionally, the terrorist searching in homes of Afghans by the Alliance soldiers is in contradiction to the local traditions and unfortunately this tactics became quite unpopular among the whole local population of Afghanistan. This tactics evidently requires a strategic review for achieving a more successful NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

The enhanced activities of YATA among young populations of Central Asia countries and Afghanistan for breaking the stereotypes about NATO organizations as “occupation force” is an important activity. So, NATO could work under a positive image inside Afghanistan and among the communities of the neighbouring countries. An active involvement of the Central Asian countries representatives in the discussions about the regional security and the benefit of their local experience in solving domestic problems in various aspects such as: humanitarian, cultural and social view could practically support the NATO’s New Strategic Concept development.

An Alliance unit for countering financing of the terrorists groups through the Hawal system, that have billion dollars annual turnover[2] and is financing Talibans and radical groups (Hizbu ut Tahrir,Tablih and Salafusts) activities in the region on armed conflicts[3] is also an option of significant importance.

Besides it would also be effective if NATO creates an Analytical Center for Information Warfare that will counter to jihad ideologies of the Talibans’ militants activities in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) and South Asia (Bangladesh).

For more effective developing of NATO’s New Strategic Concept, the Alliance should include the realities of the Afghanistan region in the future ISAF strategy.

Therefore now it is the time for EU and NATO cooperation dialogue with SCO for effectively resolving of the common Afghanistan and Central Asia problems with terrorism which is the major threat to the whole global security.

Only with integrated efforts an optimal preventive approach for mitigation of common threats implemented by the terrorism is possible.

^*Oybek Makhmudov is the Director of the Center of Youth Political Scientists, Uzbekistan.