Vol. 4, No. 14, June 2006

Table of Contents:

The Challenges of Change - The New Military Leadership in the Ministry of Defense
Velizar Shalamanov

Comments on the Debate Regarding US military Bases
Blagovest Tashev

Turkey's EU Membership from a Security Point of View
Maria Dermendjieva

Civil-Military Relations and the War on Terror
Mary Borissova

Organizations

The Challenges of Change - The New Military Leadership in the Ministry of Defense
Velizar Shalamanov

There are a few essential elements necessary for a successful change in any public sphere: vision, strategy and a team that will carry them into effect. The necessary obligations and responsibilities must be delegated and the focus must be on short-term goals. The objective should be on developing a new security culture.

These are a few of the challenges facing the new military management that came into power on June 1, 2006. The personnel changes are promising; the new directorate chiefs are officers with real command experience. The new Chief of General Staff was previously the Chief of the Land Forces Headquarters and has also commanded an army corps. The appointment of younger officers with experience in Brussels and Mons in key positions in the General Staff and the Joint Forces Command should motivate the command staff as a whole. These changes will be worthwhile only if they lead to concrete results.

The first 100 days will shed light into the aims of this leadership for the next 3 to 5 years in the following central areas:
•  Professionalization and restructuring of the armed forces and reserves, and the creation of a National Guard;
•  Modernization and integration of weapons and systems in an effective command and control network, including systems for the management of expeditionary forces and "friend-foe" systems;
•  Preparation and certification of units for achieving interoperability, readiness and agility;
•  Creating an integrated civil-military model for the management of defense based on mature civil-military relations and a high level of transparency, accountability and effectiveness in the use of resources;
•  Effective participation in NATO and EU operations, as well as other formats facilitating the creation of an improved security environment and development for Bulgaria and its citizens;
•  Fulfilling the potential for a successful strategic partnership in the area of security and defense with the US;
•  Recognition of Bulgaria's comparative advantages within NATO and the EU in military affairs by creating regional centers of excellence that will aid the transformation efforts.

The expectations are high on a domestic level, among our allies, and neighbors, as well as within the international organizations, NATO and the EU. The responsibilities of the civilian leadership, still at the beginning of its tenure, are equally important, especially in the face of many social problems. Hence, after the initial investment in helicopters and transport airplanes, it will have less financial resources than necessary to continue the anticipated spending associated with modernization plans. Therefore, precise analysis and a detailed process design of alternatives for the development, selection and effective implementation of the most appropriate alternatives are crucial. It is imperative to evaluate the results and communicate the outcome with society, the allies and neighbors.

The start up of changes necessitates not only personnel replacements but also a comprehensive study of the transformation developed on a national level and concluded jointly with NATO's Supreme Allied Command for Transformation. The aim of the study ought to appropriately define the vision, strategy and an action plan for the next 3 to 5 years with specific and realistically provided-for resources.

The delay in reform efforts and the insistence on the implementation of existing plans crafted within an inadequate civil-military relations environment; flawed communications with the allies and NATO; and deficient resources, reform organization, evaluation and implementation framework will lead to grave consequences in less than a year. These negative tendencies will be accelerated as result of the anticipated NATO meeting in Riga in November and the decisions regarding the transformation, operations, and partnerships that will likely additionally burden the Ministry of Defense while facing decrease in allocated state resources.

There could be only one outcome: precise scientific analysis based on practical experience, detailed planning and direction of its execution. NATO's own transformation efforts are anchored in a similar context: various teams work on analysis, assessment and resource management of the reform in the Consultation, Command and Control Agency and in its Supreme Allied Command for Transformation.

It appears that the summer will be a difficult time for the defense sector to make substantial progress. The first visible results will come in the fall, while the real evaluation will be available next year. 2007 will be a critical year for Bulgaria as a NATO member in terms of its progress in the development and participation of forces in missions abroad.

Comments on the Debate Regarding US Military Bases
Blagovest Tashev

The problem with the debate on US military bases
A debate regarding the presence of US military forces on the territory of Bulgaria was sparked long before the signing of the military cooperation agreement between Bulgaria and the US. The debate is a good sign of the public's interest in an important national issue. The agreement is now a fact and it would seem that all that could have been said about its consequences was said. I assert otherwise.

Two tendencies have dominated the debate. One of them has been characteristic of every debate on foreign policy issue. There is an attempt to rationalize every decision in terms of the expected costs and benefits, especially in the short-term. For example, two arguments, mainly financial, were advanced during the deliberation on whether to send Bulgarian troops to Iraq. Supporters believed that participating in the mission would be helpful to Bulgaria in forcing Iraq to repay its debt. Opponents objected to the mission on the grounds of its overall cost and damage to the country's scarce financial resources. There is nothing wrong about focusing on the decision's short-term, measurable costs and benefits; however, it becomes problematic when this focus overlooks all other intangible costs and benefits.

Along with the first inclination to justify a decision on rational terms, there is yet another tendency. Debates concerning important political issues are often dominated by the expectation that the outcome will solve a problem in its entirety and guarantee the complete attainment of a certain goal. For example, there is a certain expectation among the political elite and the public that EU membership will guarantee Bulgaria's prosperity, NATO will assure all aspects of the country's national security, and participation of a military contingent abroad should facilitate Iraq's payment of its national debt to Bulgaria. This belief is misleading. Unfortunately, grand political goals, including foreign policy objectives, are attained through multiple choices among various options, making a variety of decisions, and the application of manifold interconnected policies. In other words, democracy, prosperity and security cannot be attained with one single action or date.

The case of Bulgaria's quest to join the EU is instructive. In 1999, the EU made a decision to invite Bulgaria for accession negotiations though the country was deemed insufficiently prepared when compared to the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This decision was only possible after Bulgaria's support of NATO's mission in Kosovo in the spring of the same year. Hence, the resolution of the Bulgarian government to support NATO in its conflict with Belgrade was a significant reason for beginning the negotiations. It did not lead to EU membership, but it did open the window for a possible accession in the future. Bulgaria had to undertake many actions and implement policies before and during the accession negotiations in order for the country to become a more qualified candidate.

Achieving security cannot be guaranteed with NATO membership alone; it requires multiple actions and policies. The path to security invariably includes NATO membership as one of the most important pillars in the process; the US military presence should be viewed mainly in this context. Unfortunately, the debate was hindered by the above-mentioned deficiencies; all discussions were focused on measuring the tangible material gains and the immediate security outcomes.

What was the content of the debate?
Let's first reiterate what was said in the debate regarding US military bases. It included the following themes:
•  The objectives of the US military presence on Bulgarian territory;
•  The nature of the future bases;
•  Economic gains and losses for Bulgarian citizens and the economy on national and local level;
•  The advantages for the Bulgarian armed forces in terms of beneficial joint training, use of advanced weaponry and modernized infrastructure;
•  The immediate consequences for the security of the country - including the possibility of a terrorist attack aimed at Bulgarian sites and interests, territorial integrity and preservation of national interests (the nature of these interests are defined by the understanding of the participants in the debates);
•  The perspective of the advancement of the Bulgarian-US relations;
•  The environmental impact of the bases;
•  The citizens' national-esteem having foreign troops on its territory (this was a popular rhetoric for some authors who reflected on the bases).

The debate included very polarized conclusions regarding the consequences of a possible US presence. Commentators' inclination depended on their initial bias; some thought that Bulgaria was becoming more secure, while others insisted on the opposite.

What was excluded from the debates?
It is logical to accept that the afore-mentioned elements are important for defining the costs and benefits associated with a US military presence in the country. Unfortunately, it must be pointed out that in this debate the most important element was missing - the strategic costs and benefits.

Bulgaria faced strategic uncertainty after the fall of communism. The end of rivalry between the two blocs in the end of the 1980s could not alleviate perceptions of insecurity; the unpredictability of the international environment loomed large and Bulgaria no longer belonged to a community with is own values, structure and resources. In this context the country's elite and public made a strategic choice to join a liberal democratic community, i.e., the West. Some argue that this consensus emerged in the early 1990s, while others contend it became a priority in 1997. Joining the community required a number of steps and new policies, including membership negotiations with the EU, NATO membership and reforms in all public sectors. In other words, the process of joining the West entails the gradual pull back from the zone of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability and the gradual joining of a community in which uncertainty and unpredictability are either minimal or dealt with effectively. Bulgarian made a strategic choice, which leads to consequences related to the country's place in the international system and its behavior.

Bulgaria's gradual incorporation with the West, notwithstanding, the country cannot escape the consequences of geography. Bulgaria is located in an area of instability and in proximity to zones, which are sources of security threats to the country and the West as a whole. Thus joining the West not only eliminates Bulgaria's presence in the area of uncertainty and unpredictability but also turns the country into a recipient of the West's instruments for response to outside threats and risks, just as they are certainly present in the other members of the community. The US military presence should be viewed as an intrinsic part of this process. It is impossible for Bulgaria to strive to be part of the West while rejecting its security system. Countries that shy away from full participation in the numerous institutions, policies and actions of the West are simply not full-fledged members. They are partners of the community, but not an integral part of it. If Bulgaria chooses to reject the American military presence, the county will take a big step back in the process of escaping from the zone of uncertainty and unpredictability. This, of course, will not lead to Bulgaria's exit from NATO or the end of its quest to join the EU; it will, however, as mentioned earlier, preclude the country from making yet another beneficial and necessary steps on the way to achieving its main national goals.

Turkey's EU Membership from a Security Point of View
Maria Dermendjieva

The political debate concerning Turkey's EU membership has recently accelerated. While differing political positions have been voiced, Bulgaria has at the highest political level actively lobbied EU representatives for the expedited accession of Turkey into the Union. On the other hand, the party "Democrats for Strong Bulgaria" has called for a more cautious approach; the inclusion of an unprepared aspirant country, such as Turkey, will hamper European interests as well as Bulgaria's. So far, politicians have shied away from putting forth a unified position regarding this matter.

In this controversial debate, the opponents of Turkey's membership usually stress economic and cultural arguments. Proponents, on the other had, usually point out to Turkey's contribution to European security; the country's geostrategic position is undisputable. It is, however, debatable whether this contribution can be assured by granting full-fledged membership or simply a privileged partnership (despite the existing uncertainties surrounding this definition).

The strongest arguments for Turkey's full membership in the EU are mainly related to security - contribution to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), facilitating the transformation of the EU into a global political actor in the area of security, and assisting the EU in its mission to reach out to countries in the Middle East, and serve as an example for their development. A closer look at the EU and Turkey as political actors indicates that these arguments are insufficient.

EU's security policy and Turkey's contribution
EU is a supranational organization with measurable financial and economic goals while its security objectives are hard to measure. To a large extent, the latter are based on moral and political categories. Turkey's role in guaranteeing European security can be achieved only if the country truly shares the transatlantic values of freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. Despite some constitutional and legislative changes, Turkey has not achieved much in the desired direction; reform and law implementation is applied only selectively.

As an economic power, the EU has mainly exercised its soft power in the international arena, and its security policy has only been applied by its individual member states. The European Security Strategy was adopted in December 2003, but it failed to define precisely the key issues; objectives and resources were not effectively committed for better addressing the new missions. In the event the EU wants to increase its role as a global actor and give more substance to its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP, it needs to make the necessary conceptual changes. If the EU does not define its objectives in this aspect, Turkey will not be able to help fulfil European interests. When a collective actor wishes to continue its integration in a certain sector, there needs to be a common perspective and problem-solving mechanisms.

From the very beginning, European integration has been vacillating between two processes - deepening and enlargement. One of the reasons for the success of European integration has been the omission to specify the final objective of integration since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Analysts assert that the most likely scenario for the EU is to remain at the current level of integration in between the Treaty of Nice and the Constitution. This could lead to the renationalization of certain policy areas and the increased cooperation inside and outside the Union. From a security perspective, the arguments in favor of Turkey's membership are long-term. They are reduced to EU's inevitable security power increase and the pursuit of common strategic interests for stabilizing the Middle East, while establishing Turkey as a model in the modernization process of the Muslim countries.

As an associated member, Turkey was able to influence the decisions of the Western European Union (WEU), however, it is not the case with the ESDP. A privileged partnership could help Turkey make a contribution to the ESDP, which means that participating third parties acquire more rights. Turkey's accession into the EU should be justified on the ground of more pertinent reasons - political, economic, social, civilizational, all of which should accommodate both sides. Proponents' arguments for Turkey's contribution to security are not sufficient; Turkey's own problems with security are discouraging. There is a danger of straining the burgeoning CFSP and ESDP and weakening the Union. The discrepancies in security policy perspectives among member states became more visible with the war in Iraq. Turkey's unresolved conflicts will likely deepen these discrepancies. In the long term, the EU will probably manage to develop its mechanisms and instruments, and transform itself into a more effective and powerful actor in security affairs. At this point in time, an enlargement beyond the Bosphorus will not be beneficial in this regard.

It is also questionable whether Turkey's full membership will solve the country's domestic problems or whether a political crisis will inevitably spill over to the EU as well. In this case, the EU will not be in a position to react politically or to use its instruments, such as the CFSP. This is especially important in the context of the uncertain fate of the Constitution deemed to be the corner stone of future enlargements. Currently, the EU would be overburdened with Turkey's full membership; a privileged partnership will be more advantageous for the EU and Turkey. The term 'privileged partner' is not clearly defined and, therefore, it is imperative to clarify the rights and obligations associated with it; Turkey's diplomatic or military contribution to CFSP/ESDP is doubtful considering the country's exclusion from the decision-making process. In the context of these conditions, the pre-accession negotiations will be difficult and Bulgaria should formulate and stand by its own interests and requirements as a recent EU member.

Civil-Military Relations and the War on Terror
Mary Borissova

The statement that "war is too important to be left to the generals" is revisited yet once again. Currently, civil-military relations are a hot issue in the US due to the recent calls by six retired generals and some senior politicians for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation. They claim that the Secretary of Defense is micromanaging the armed forces, has ignored military advice on the global war on terror in Iraq, and has subjected the military to poorly-planned war-fighting and reconstruction efforts. One of the major qualms about the war in Iraq is that too few troops were committed to the war, which contributed to the failure to restore order after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. The disbanding of the Iraqi police and armed forces and the delay in establishing an Iraqi provisional government are now acknowledged mistakes - but they are more political than military.

The Secretary of Defense is reprimanded for not conducting the war in Iraq based on the army's plans for invasion. Rumsfeld chose to rely on light forces and high tech weaponry, which was ultimately insufficient in imposing control, ending the violence, and containing the insurgency and the prowling. According to the Economist, Rumsfeld has become "a distraction at home and a barrier to success in Iraq." Post war reconstruction in Iraq was unwisely left in military hands and not delegated to the State Department, which has handled such matters since the Second World War and has extensive experience in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

The civilian leadership is held accountable not by the military, but rather by Congress, the electorate and often by the mass media. The armed forces are subordinate to elected and appointed government leaders. Although the military gives advice, it is the civilian leaders who make all strategic and policy decisions. The principle of civilian supremacy over the armed forces is also in Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prescribes a court-martial for any commissioned officer who ''uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense'' or other federal or state officials. Serving officers are able to speak candidly in private when asked for advice on military matters. Some argue that the code does not apply to retirees, while others contend that both active duty and retired officers are subject to it.

One of the most challenging puzzles for both policy making and theory is to understand the war on terror's impact on civil military relations. The character of the security environment has been documented to have an effect on the nature of civil-military relations. Michael Desch in his book Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment shows that when external security threats are high and internal security threats are low, civil-military relations are at their best. The worst scenario is when external security threats are low and internal security threats are high. The other two possibilities, when both threats are high or both are low, carry much uncertainty for the prospect of smooth civil-military relations. The end of the Cold War and the events on 9/11 conveyed that security threats are becoming less discernible and distinguishable, thus putting a strain on successful and focused security policy priorities.

The War on Terror essentially requires focusing on both the internal and external dimensions of threats, which are often intertwined. This new security environment necessitates civil and military leaders to determine their main concerns and areas of cooperation. One worrisome observation is that non-veteran civilians differ from veteran civilians and military elites in significant ways in their views on the use of force. Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi show the divergent views of civilian and military leaders on the utility, appropriateness and use of force. The authors' research is concentrated on the US case and bares some important observations on the current state of civil-military relations. One of the conclusions is that non-veteran civilians are more ready to resort to the use of force than are veterans and military elite. Secondly, non-veteran civilians are more likely to favor committing fewer troops when using force, while veterans and military officers favor more decisive use of force once a decision to resort to force has been taken. And lastly, non-veteran civilians are more likely than military elites and veterans to deploy military forces under ambiguous mandates and restrictive conditions.

These research findings clearly alert to some significant differences in opinion among civilian and military leaders. The war on terror is bound to prompt further debates in areas of overlapping responsibilities among civilians and officers. The strategic doctrine, use of force, and rules of engagement are all issues that could bring to the fore divergent opinions and challenge the cooperative nature of civil-military relations. However, it is imperative to bear in mind that democratic civilian control, as conceptualized for example by Michael Desch and Peter Feaver, asserts that civilians "should get what they ask for" and that "the civilian view trumps the military one". The military should accept that their role is to fulfill the demands of the civilian government and the "best indicator of the state of civil-military relations is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge".

There is a real jeopardy in opposing the notion that the management of war is a political issue, which is in the purview of the civilian "supreme command." No matter whether one believes in the appropriateness of active duty or retired military officers' public criticism of US civilian leadership, one has to be aware of its potential detrimental effect on a system which prides and thrives on the principle of democratic civilian control.

Mary Borissova is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, US.

Organizations

SMi Group
http://www.smi-online.co.uk/

The aim of SMi is linking business with information through the delivery of high quality business-to-business information services. Each year thousands of senior executives from blue chip companies benefited from SMi's highly targeted conferences, executive briefings, newsletters and management reports. SMi is aiming to respond quickly to the requirements and needs of its customers, ensuring that all SMi products are highly relevant, innovative and timely.

As a market research based organization, SMi ensures that its programmers and publications are brought to the attention of the key decision makers in each industry sector in which it operates. SMi cultivates and maintains strong industry contacts to ensure that it is informed of all pending changes in government and regulatory policy. SMi regards its relationships with speakers, delegates and subscribers as an investment for the future.

SMi is mainly covering the following industry sectors: Defense & Aviation, Finance, Telecoms, Pharmaceuticals, Energy, etc.

The SMi Defense sector produces conferences and publications covering topics as diverse as: Defense Digitalization, Future platform development and systems integration, IT and Communications, Procurement and Policy, Missile and Weapons Systems, Logistics and Support, Training and Simulation. SMi Defense conferences are attended by a range of high level government and military attendees, including Procurement Directors, Program Managers, Chief Engineers and International Business Development Directors ( http://www.smi-online.co.uk/products/default.asp?pb_sect=1).

Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
http://www.ciaonet.org/

Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) is one of the most comprehensive source for theory and research in international affairs. It publishes a wide range of issues from 1991 onward that includes working papers from university research institutes, occasional papers series from NGOs, foundation-funded research projects, proceedings from conferences, books, journals and policy briefs.

CIAO is also widely-recognized source for teaching materials including original case studies written by leading international affairs experts, course packs of background readings for history and political science classes, and special features like the analysis of a bin Laden recruitment tape with video. Also on the website are available working papers, conference proceedings, journal abstracts in the field of international affairs, policy briefs and economic indicators , case studies, written by leading scholars, examine the effects of important events in history, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, explore conflicts as recent as the U.N. intervention in East Timor and address recurring topics in world politics classes like weapons of mass destruction. The case studies are accompanied by extensive bibliographies, multi-media, key treaties and speeches.