Year 2, issue 11, November 2004

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

Terrorist Threat and Integrated Security Sector - New Challenges for Crisis Management in CEE
Velizar Shalamanov

Concept of the Transformation of the Civilian and Infrastructure Protection System
Nikolay Pavlov

The European Union's Approach to International Terrorism
Peter Poptchev

The New Balkan Allies
Blagovest Tashev

New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

Events

To Our Readers

This is the 11th issue of the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch. It starts with a paper by Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, who continues with his research on the development of security sector reform, focusing on its new dimensions in the context of terrorist threat and the role in that regard of the crisis management system and the integrated security sector. He is also elaborating on the necessity of development of a new partnership for security.

Nikolay Pavlov presents a new vision for the civilian and infrastructure protection system in Bulgaria. He assumes that in the context of the new security environment and the war against terrorism, the importance of this system is progressively increasing. Inevitably, this demands the transformation of the present civilian and infrastructure protection system, through clear legislative regulation and substantial institutional building, into the "third pillar" of the security sector in Bulgaria, along with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense.

Petar Popchev analyzes the European Union's approach searching for a long-standing resolution of the problems related to terrorism as a phenomenon of international relations and the instruments adopted in that regard.

Our former editor, Blagovest Tashev, although currently in the U.S. continues his support for the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter. In this issue he discusses the role of the new Balkan allies - Bulgaria and Romania - in the context of the plans of the administration of George Bush to transform American military presence overseas. The two countries are in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic community and seem as a logical element of the American global military posture - a serious challenge to Bulgaria and Romania's evolving role in the Euro-Atlantic security system.

As always Hristo Chorbadzhiyski presents two new publications and offers a review of two security institutions: the European Defense Agency and the Western Policy Center.

We welcome your opinion about and contribution to the content of this newsletter. You can find all back issues at: http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/

From the publishers

Terrorist Threat and Integrated Security Sector - New Challenges for Crisis Management in CEE
Velizar Shalamanov

Development of the security sector reform process.
The defense reform in Central and East Europe (CEE) after the start of the transition to democracy was driven mostly by the processes of dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Helsinki and Vienna processes, development of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, joint involvement with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo operations, development of the New Strategic Concept of NATO referring to the European Security and Defense Identity /ESDI/, Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and Membership Action Plan as the new tools for change. As a result, most of the CEE countries are already NATO and EU members with a substantial progress in their security sector reform. It is for sure that the role of the Kosovo crisis was extremely important, because it initiated the inclusion of a number of new types of threats and operations in the security agenda, thus considerably influencing the reform schedule.

Tragic events of 9/11 and the follow up operations in Afghanistan and Iraq gave new impetus to the reforms and brought the focus rather on the more radical process of transformation - not only for the military, but also for the other elements of the security sector. Practically new type of threat was clear and present, that led to activation of article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The cross link between security and economy became evident and the "Business and Security" topic became quite common for both NATO, EU, and the national level agendas. The interdependence of internal and external security is now considered to be а new challenge to the security sector and the security policy of the countries and international organizations. The development of the security policies in the United States, NATO and the EU, as well as the real reactions to the new challenges, poses a key set of questions "Are there two different strategies on fighting terrorism on the both sides of the Atlantic, does a Secure Europe in a Better World share the same security perception with the US?". The answer is that a new wave of reforms/transformations is needed, step by step on national level, as well as in NATO and the EU as international organizations.

The existing terrorist threat to the European states is currently a serious challenge for their crisis management capacity, especially in the new democracies, most of all Poland and Bulgaria, as the most visible contributors to the coalition forces in Iraq. The implications concerning the economy of the above mentioned countries are also rather grave if we would only like to mention the required security measures, as well as the higher price of doing business in the Greater Middle East area. Most often our citizens are threatened when abroad and the capacity to protect their interests, as well as other national interests (economic) are essential for the security.

The link between organized crime, level of corruption and terrorism is an additional dimension of the problem. The slow progress in the reduction of the power of "black" economy and illegal trafficking as elements of the organized crime, as well as the still limited capacity of the administration to reduce the level of corruption and to prevent the more and more sophisticated attempts for money laundering are now рresenting another possibility which might successfully be used by terrorist organizations to pose even higher risk to the security of citizens and state.

New dimensions of the security sector reform process, related to the terrorist threat.
The full elimination of the organized crime, corruption and even terrorist activities is difficult and unrealistic to be expected in the foreseeable future. That is why, the administration capacity for crisis management, to deal with critical situations, and especially the effectiveness of the judicial system to deal with all types of terrorism related crimes is essential and an acceptable level of security should be managed in the period of high level of terrorist risk. The role of national police, border police, gendarmerie and specialized units in fighting organized crime is increasing day after day.

For CEE the balance between the projection of force with the allies within the framework of the war against terrorism and the protection of homeland is essential. It is clear that the terrorist network is targeting at the weaker elements of the coalition in order to influence internal politics with implications to the international relations in the coalition.

More and more, terrorists use the psychological warfare strategy and perform different types of information operations including Internet activities. It means that an "Information Strategy against Terrorism" is needed to guarantee the adequate reaction of the society during a crisis, provoked by terrorist acts. Such a document could prepare the population and provide for the deeper understanding of the terrorist strategy and tactics, as well as secure higher support to the operations of the security sector and the state as a whole.

It is useful to look at the processes of development of the Homeland Security Concept in the US and the transformation of the armed forces there as a source of good ideas and practices, focused on citizen and infrastructure with more attention on coordination, information sharing, networking and the great importance of technology and joint training. The countries of CEE could accept a proactive approach to security (in time and space), based on the Action Plan Against Terrorism, using the experience of transition in the security area up to now and recent trends, as well as the specifics of the security environment in which these countries operate.

The Role of the Crisis Management System and the Integrated Security Sector.
A good opportunity for development of a modern crisis management system is given by the ongoing process of development of the security sector reform concept in Europe and its implementation in CEE. This process is connected with the broader understanding of security in different organizations, in which the use of force has a central role. There are many other partner organizations working together in crisis management operations, so interoperability inside the countries and in Europe as a whole is a critical issue for the crisis management system. As a matter of fact terrorist threat has changed and will further change the security sector reform (SSR) concept, by the inclusion of a number of new elements in the security sector community, increasing the requirements for cooperation, information exchange and coordination.

The concept of the integrated security sector needs to be further developed on the basis of the vision of the new type of operations to protect National Security and to provide the security of citizen, infrastructure and territory. This concept requires the development of a modified legal and documentary base, improved integrated organizational structures, programs for system development and integration in a network based system, as well as a number of new approaches to human resources and financial resources management. The understanding of this new concept of the integrated security sector by the society in order to provide a high public support, to develop an effective public-private partnership with the increased role of the NGOs, media and industry is crucial both for success and provision of the continuity and operational effectiveness needed during the transformation process. Finally, the concept of the integrated security sector is closely connected with the integration on service, ministry, national and regional/international levels, which requires an intensive international cooperation.

In this new situation, the role of civil protection organizations as a kernel for a citizen and infrastructure centric security of free democratic societies is increased as an integration factor for defense, interior and other partner organizations, on the basis of the requirements of human security. The development of the Crisis management concept in the strategic environment of the war against world terrorism is central for the National security strategy, because different types of crises are rather more possible and diverse, quite often being of a transborder character, thus requiring very rapid local reaction as well as global coordination and cooperation. There are four main types of crises and institutions have different responsibilities in the management process, acting as the corresponding leading agency in coordination with the others. The new concept requires an integration of leadership, centralization and network approach in foreign and security policy. At the same time decentralization is needed for the first responders with standardization of procedures, equipment and most of all C4 systems, thus establishing an opportunity for both horizontal and vertical reinforcement in any situation.

Such a crisis management concept could become the driving force promoting the optimization of the national security sector and the security sector, hence a set of strategic reviews is needed to facilitate the decision making process, trying to find the best solutions by the implementation of the latest methods of modeling and simulation.

According to foreign experience, economy has a central role, because first of all, economic programs for sustainable development of a Marshall Plan type are needed for the areas considered to be the source of a terrorist threat, in combination with the SSR programs. A serious foreign military/police presence is needed to provide the initial security for the transition to a more democratic and free society. This presence is linked with the type of security operations, directly related to the economy (including post-conflict reconstruction programs), starting with the establishment of an initial communication and information infrastructure, education and training opportunities and local administrative capacity. In parallel, local security forces have to be created, trained and made responsible for security whereas foreign presence should only be perceived as a guarantee.

For the CEE countries to participate in this part of the crisis management efforts, an accelerated formation of expeditionary security forces is needed to provide the best use of resources, best training and equipment as well as the generation of the best mix of capabilities in an optimal time frame. At the same time, a new type of international arrangements is needed concerning not only joint, but also combined joint best mix of capabilities in an optimal time frame, to provide the security projection packages.

Both national and international political rules for decision making on the use of force and the use of postconflict reconstruction/democratic transition aid programs will further be developed, which will influence the legislation and the capacity needed by CEE to participate actively in these processes.

A comprehensive architecture of the security and economic development would thus be needed in order to optimize the processes under consideration, as well as the interrelations in the resource and time domains.

All the above mentioned developments would certainly influence the National Security Strategy and one of the laws considered to be most practical, as far as real activities are concerned - The Crisis Management Law. It is now regarded to be the framework for the integrated security sector, addressing the diverse spectrum of crises: military operations (the use of force abroad); public order and crime (the use of force at home); protection of national interests, citizens and property abroad (soft security abroad); civil protection and disaster relief (soft security at home).

Thus a community of partner organizations needed for the effective crisis management is set up on the basis of support activities as information gathering and assessment, protected communications for administration, protection of VIP persons, force projection services and protection/recover units.

The national crisis response system should address all types of threats, to manage/control operations of every description and to coordinate support information/protection activities.

Partnership for Security.
The new crisis management systems on national, regional and larger international levels serve as the basis for the development of a new partnership for security perceived in the broader sense of the concept and in close relation to economic development. Such a partnership is needed as no clear division between internal and external security, soft and hard security measures could be found out, as the security sector becomes more and more integrated both on national and international levels, as the threat sources turn out to be highly networked across national borders.

The role of interoperability, the use of new technologies (especially information technologies) with the substantial involvement of the research community, industry and society at large on the one side, and preserving the monopoly on the use of force and clandestine methods of information gathering as to specific elements of the security sector on the other, stresses on the new type of a partner-private partnership as well as on the more effective methods of democratic control of the security sector.

In conclusion, it should once again be stressed, that all the above mentioned aims and purposes require the development and the transparent management of the partnership for security programs on the national, regional and larger international level.

Concept of the Transformation of the Civilian and Infrastructure Protection System
Nikolay Pavlov

The establishment of an integrated security sector in Bulgaria imperatively necessitates transformation of all sub-systems in the sector, including the sub-system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure. What is more, within the context of the new security environment and fight against terrorism, the significance and relative weight of the system for civil and infrastructure protection have been going up.

Indicative is the experience of the United States, which set up a Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001. The Department is focused on averting terror acts in the US and reducing their vulnerability to terrorism and natural disasters. Some of the key activities delivered into the charge of the Department of Homeland Security are civil and critical infrastructure protection, as well as management of emergency situations. Other NATO member-states also have significant experience in the transformation of this important system within the security sector.

The adoption of the Crisis Management Law has been an important step towards the conceptual and normative regulation of social relations during crises of non-military nature. From the perspective of political realism, however, the forthcoming establishment of the National Crises Response System should be achieved in parallel and coordination with the transformation of the system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure. In practice, the crises response system and the system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure are the two sides of a coin. Good management of the process of transformation may help these two systems build an independent "third pillar" of the security sector.

Terminologically (and conceptually) Bulgaria could occupy the middle position between the practices of the US, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other. The term homeland security, adopted in the US, has no precise Bulgarian equivalent in contrast to civil protection, which has made its way within the frameworks of the EU. Many different terms could be used to denote the unified system for crises management and for protection of civilians and infrastructure: civil defense; security of the living environment; homeland security; public security; protection of the population and infrastructure; civil protection, etc. Perhaps the most suitable term for Bulgaria is "civil security" (also adopted in France). It is also based on the understanding that security should be focused on civilians. The term "civil security" implies the idea for active civil participation and civil control over this important element of the security sector.

The Civil Security System for - The "Third Pillar" of the Security Sector in Bulgaria
The civil security system includes two major sub-systems of different structural level - the system for crises management and the system for protection of civilians and infrastructure. The system for civil security should be set up as an independent "pillar" of the security sector, which is equally important as the other two major "pillars" of security - internal security and public order (provided for mainly by the Ministry of the Interior) and external security and military operations (provided for mainly by the Ministry of Defense). Hence, the system for civil security should have a well-defined normative regulation (a special Law on the Protection of Civilians and Infrastructure, which complements the Crisis Management Law) and a solid institutional dimension. It is also possible that social relations connected to the provision of civil security should be regulated by a general Law on National Security.

The civil security system is built to the highest extent on the active civil participation and civil control as compared to the other elements of the security sector. This presupposes a higher extent of transparency, feedback and, in the long run, democratic nature of this key element of the security sector. The establishment of an efficient system for civil security makes it possible to maintain well-balanced civil-military relations.

The civil security system is built on the principle of decentralization. Special importance should be rendered to the local units for civil security (managed by the local authorities), which response first to emerging danger for civilians and infrastructure. This specificity of the civil security system corresponds directly to the process of e-government establishment, including on the local level. In case there is good management of the process of transformation, the "security" service may well be provided as a "one-stop-shop" service together with other administrative services (on the Internet or a single phone for emergency and non-emergency calls). In this respect, much could be borrowed from the experience of the Emergency Call Centers created on all levels of the administrative territorial units within the US.

The principle of decentralization does not call off the need of overall coordination and control implemented by the "central units" within the system for civil security - the National Crises Management Center for, "Civil Protection" State Agency and the Permanent Committee for Protection of the Population Against Natural Disasters, Accidents and Emergencies (PCPPNDAE). An important role in the formulation and management of the Plan for Transformation of the Civil Security System could be played by the National Research and Coordination Center with PCPPNDAE.

The civil security policy combines the security policy with the so-called humanitarian policy (the implementation of humanitarian rescue operations). In this sense, the operations carried out to guarantee civil security should include not only the operations explicitly referred to in the Crisis Management Law (article 59), but also some specific operations, such as:
- Emergency and rescue operations and protection of the population against nuclear, chemical and biological contamination;
- Emergency and rescue operations and protection of the population against natural disasters and industrial accidents;
- Operations for protection and rehabilitation of the infrastructure.

The protection of critical infrastructure requires also the establishment of a special Critical Infrastructure Register of strategic sites, such as: nuclear, thermal and hydro electric power stations, plants for the manufacture of strategic production, dams, vulnerable bottlenecks along roads and railway tracks, viaducts, tunnels, etc. The activities involved in the protection of critical infrastructure enable the efficient public and private partnership and the participation of business in the provision of civil security.

Even more complicated is the issue concerning the clear-cut distinction between civil security operations and internal security and public order operations. This holds particularly true to risks related to terrorism, civil clashes, disorder and operations limiting the scope of illegal migration. In practice, the functions of the civil security system and internal security and public order system (institutionalized mainly within the frameworks of the Interior Ministry) might possibly overlap in this most delicate area. In this connection, special importance should be rendered to the processes of transformation and demilitarization of the Interior Ministry, as well as to the first practices regarding the application of the Crisis Management Law. These processes and practices will predetermine, to the highest extent, the right of civil security structures to impose force and act as a real "third pillar" of the security sector.

The share of business and NGOs in the provision of civil security imposes well-defined legally sanctioned regulations for their licensing. It is logical then that the central coordinating authority within the civil security system (currently the "Civil Protection" State Agency and/or National Center for Crises Management) should issue licenses and certificates to NGOs and business entities, which are willing or are obliged under the law to partake in operations for the provision of civil security.

Institutionalization of the Civil Security System
From the perspective of political realism, most complicated is the issue concerning the institutionalization of the civil security system. At the same time, it plays a key role in the successful transformation and establishment of this system.
At present the system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure includes several units:
- "Civil Protection" State Agency, which under the Crisis Management Law should be organizing the work of the Committee on Rehabilitation and Support During Crises;
- Permanent Committee for Protection of the Population Against Natural Disasters, Accidents and Emergencies, which is headed by the minister without portfolio;
- National Research and Coordination Center with PCPPNDAE, which could play the role of a "transition team" in the transformation of the sub-system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure.
- The crises response system includes the following units:
- National Center for Crises management with the Security Council with the Cabinet;
- Councils for security and crises management with the regional governors and mayors of municipalities;
- Crises reaction forces including mainly the emergency and rescue services of the Ministries of Defense and of the Interior, medical emergency teams and voluntary formations, which have not been set up yet.

The transformation and institutionalization of the civil security system necessitate a unified coordination and management of the entire civil security system. The Security Council with the Cabinet should play a special role in this respect. In its current situation, however, the Security Council does not have the necessary potential to efficiently carry out this function. This is why, other solutions for the institutionalization of the civil security system are also possible.

One possible option is the establishment of a separate Ministry of Civil Security (on the analogy of the Department of Homeland Security in the US), which should include the units of the system for the protection of civilians and infrastructure and the crises response system.

Another possible option is to connect the institutionalization of the civil security system with the State Administration and set up a Ministry of State Administration and Civil Security. Under this option, there might be a minister without portfolio with the Ministry, who coordinates the civil security and is a member of the Security Council; who monitors the executive agencies with this Ministry and is in charge of his/her own administration.

The institutionalization of the civil security system also necessitates a re-consideration of the place of the Fire and Emergency Safety National Service, which currently operates within the frameworks of the Ministry of the Interior. As an important unit for the protection of civilians and infrastructure, it should be logically incorporated within a possible Ministry of Civil Security. The place of the National Service is closely related to the more general issue of the demilitarization of the Interior Ministry. At the same time, the issue of the municipal subordination of the Fire and Emergency Safety teams and police forces is left open-ended and should be therefore regulated under the Law on the Interior Ministry and the Law on Local Authority and Municipal Self-government.

The institutionalization of the civil security system imperatively necessitates a more active participation of the population in the provision of security through voluntary para-military formations. These civil security formations could be set up following the model of the US National Guard and the UK Territorial Army.

One possible solution is the establishment of Civil Security services with the regional governor, which should be at the call of the mayors through a simplified procedure. These paramilitary voluntary formations may be comprised mainly of reservists and be put under the command of officers of the off-duty trained reserve. The major functions of the Civil Security services should be, as follows:

- security guard or enhanced security guard of "sensitive" sites (administrative sites and critical infrastructure);
- fight against terrorist groups;
- public order maintenance;
- prevention of disasters, accidents and catastrophes, as well as liquidation of consequences related to them.

The civil security services should be an integral element of the civil security system and their activities should be coordinated with the Ministry of Civil Security (the Ministry of State Administration and Civil Security). The activities of the Civil Security services should be regulated in a special law.

An important element of the civil security system should be a working unit for psychological protection of the population. Civil security provision depends just as much on the psychological protection as on medical emergency aid. This unit for psychological protection might play a particularly positive role in view of the threats of terror acts.

The system for civil security of the Republic of Bulgaria should be built in cooperation with NATO Civil Protection Committee, EU Humanitarian Aid Office; Black-sea Initiative for Partnership in the area of civil protection; the International Red Cross Committee and the World Health Organization. The efficient operation of the civil protection system will give Bulgaria the chance to initiate regional initiatives and become a leader in this area across South-East Europe and the Black Sea region.

The European Union's Approach to International Terrorism
Peter Poptchev*

With the Madrid explosions on March 11, 2004 international terrorism succeeded in influencing directly the electoral process in a member state of the European Union and hence its foreign policy. Osama bin Laden's ensuing televised message of 14 April has indicated that al-Qaeda is striving to assert itself as a factor in the anticipated historic changes in the region, such as democratizing Iraq, devising a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a changed strategic environment, and undertaking in-depth reforms in countries of the Greater Middle East. Like the United States, the EU countries intend to play a major role in providing assistance to reform-oriented governments and civil society in a region stretching from Mauritania and Morocco to Iran and Afghanistan.

The "peaceful" message by bin Laden was doomed to failure in advance, regardless of its diplomatic tone. That is because the terrorist acts in Madrid had caused not only a shocking psychological effect but were perceived by the European public opinion as an attack on the values on which the European Union is founded. So far as the European Union was concerned, international terrorism had acquired the characteristics of a strategic threat. Romano Prodi and high-level representatives of Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy rejected categorically the possibility for dialogue and negotiations with Osama bin Laden.

From a strategic point of view, in this case international terrorism attained results contrary to the ones that had been sought. In response to the threat, the European Union resolved to elaborate urgently the missing components of a common policy and joint structures to fight terrorism. The Union is presently engaged in putting in place lasting solutions to long-standing problems and inadequacies of the security system. The EU's approach is marked by professionalism and regard for the underlying issues related to terrorism as a phenomenon of contemporary international relations.

In their programmatic Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted on 24 March 2004, the twenty-five member states stress that the European Union will show "neither weakness nor compromise of any kind" in combating "all forms of terrorism", and in so doing will respect the provisions of democratic norms and international law.

The EU countries took a political commitment to act jointly against acts of terrorism "in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause contained in the draft Constitution for Europe". Another novelty is their intention to develop the contribution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the fight against terrorism. Previously it was always held that it was in the traditions of European security culture to keep the efforts against terrorism mainly within the sphere of justice and home affairs. Today the EU accepts - likewise the USA and NATO - that a military component should be also envisaged, in particular in view of the danger of terrorists acquiring access to weapons of mass destruction.

From a doctrinal point of view the anti-terrorist policy of the EU leans on the Union's Security Strategy approved in December 2003 which envisages a dual-track and balanced approach to terrorism. The latter consists of fighting the direct threats from terrorists and addressing the root causes of terrorism (later the European Commission changed "root causes" with a more precise formulation: "all the factors which contribute to terrorism").

Countering the Threats
In principle, so far as responsibilities are concerned, the role of national law-enforcement agencies is seen as primary and that of the common EU structures-secondary. The terrorist attacks of 11 March threw new light on a conclusion made long ago, namely, that terrorists could make use of the liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the EU. In particular they would have two facilities: the freedom of movement in the Schengen area and a variety of police and judicial systems in the EU. Overcoming these vulnerabilities depends on the speedy completion of the project to construct "an area of freedom, security and justice" in the European Union. This multi-faceted project, whose political and judicial foundation has been agreed in the period 1997 - 99, requires in the first place the readiness of each EU member state to part with some of its sovereignty in a number of sensitive areas. Building an effective system to fight terrorism is also bound to encounter the delaying effect of inherent features of the European integration such as the rule of contractual interstate relations and a preference for gradualism.

An important contribution of the March 24 Declaration is the agreed joint commitment to implement all measures related to the legislative framework of fighting terrorism by 30 June 2004, thus overcoming previous hesitations by certain member states. The Declaration urges an expeditious handling of already taken decisions (so called "Framework decisions") on, for example, the European arrest warrant, joint investigation teams, money laundering, and the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of instruments and the proceeds of crime.

In the Declaration the tasks in the sphere of operational cooperation are formulated in a way which confirms the conclusion that the operational and institutional capacity of the EU to undertake joint and coordinated actions against terrorism is yet to be completed. For example, turning the two basic EU agencies, Eurojust and Europol, into functioning multilateral mechanisms is still an ongoing process. In particular, so far as Europol is concerned, the opinion of renowned experts says that it is still not within its capacity "to generate a consistent anti-terrorist policy".

The central problem in the system of operational cooperation is however the issue of exchanging specialized and intelligence information. The advent of the so called new threats to security (radical terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, goods and technologies with dual-use, transnational organized crime, etc.), and more specifically the qualitative changes in these threats, require enhanced intelligence cooperation. Specialists in the field stress that the structure of the analysis should also change in a way that takes into account the nature of terrorism, in particular its specific feature to blur the difference between external and internal threats. Not surprisingly, the two main tasks before the EU counter-terrorism coordinator Gijs de Vries are: elaborating a scheme to exchange intelligence information acceptable to all 25, and enhancing the effectiveness of cooperation with the USA in the fight against terrorism.

Another important development, which goes outside the framework of the March 24 Declaration, is the establishment of a "pioneer group to fight terrorism" with the participation of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In the beginning of July this year, at their fifth meeting near Sheffield, North England, the interior ministers of the so called "G-5" revealed a certain delay in the implementation of the March Declaration and agreed, among others, to improve the exchange of information and border control.

Addressing the factors which contribute to terrorism
In the March Declaration only the basic principles and guidelines have been specified; the elaboration of a planned "long-term strategy" is yet to happen. Measures have been envisaged to "investigate the links between extreme religious beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other factors, and support for terrorism". Cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic world is to be promoted.

In the words of Martin Ortega, an EU expert on Middle Eastern affairs, the public discontent in some Arab countries - both against their governments and Western policies - "has led to the establishment of a transnational terrorist network which is today's enemy".

In an "Interim Report on an EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" the European Commission has recommended relations of a new type with the Arab and Muslim countries. The report envisages applying a differentiated, rather than unitary, approach to each individual country in the region according to its requirements. The EU intends to engage itself with key questions like solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reconstructing Iraq, reaching progress in the area of democracy and human rights as well as developing "a broad concept of security which addresses problems like unemployment and economic underdevelopment". The underlying principle of the EU approach is aimed at having the Arab and Muslim countries share the ownership to the strategic partnership initiative. This is of fundamental importance since key countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, disturbed by other similar ideas, have stated that "Arab countries can handle their problems by themselves".

At best the EU can be only one of the participants in multilateral efforts to reform and stabilize the Grater Middle East. The Interim Report prescribes that the EU "works closely with the USA, UN and other external factors". In June, at the G-8 Summit on Sea Island, USA, the EU Irish Presidency has supported the US plan to reform the Grater Middle East, adding that the EU will come up with its own initiative in the near future. An analysis published by the EU Institute on Security Studies underlines that any convincing global political formula for the Middle East requires "an appropriate combination of European expertise and American energy". Regardless of certain specific positions of the EU the tendency is for the views and practical approaches of the EU and the USA to move closer to the strategic requirements of overcoming international terrorism.

A closer alignment of the Bulgarian counter-terrorism policy with the policies and the security structures of the EU and the USA in this field is bound to increase the level of security of Bulgarian society.

* Peter Poptchev is a diplomat with a Ph.D. in political science, an expert on international security, with experience in the UN, NATO and the EU. He has chaired multilateral negotiations on the ban of weapons of mass destruction and other challenges to security. Author of three books. He is a member of the Center for Security Studies Foundation. This piece is a short version of a previously published article. The views expressed are those of the author and do not engage any institution.

The New Balkan Allies*
Blagovest Tashev

In a speech before the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cincinnati on 16 August President Bush formally revealed his administration's plan over the next decade to bring back home up to 70,000 military personnel and about 100,000 family members and civilian employees from their current bases in Europe and Asia, mainly in Germany and South Korea. Some of the troops and installations will be moved to "new locations so that they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats". Hundreds of installations will be closed down and new ones will be build in places which until 15 years ago deemed America to be the enemy.

Although no new host countries were named in the speech, some of the states in Eastern Europe seem on the way to become a part of largest restructuring of America's global military posture since the Korean War. Emerging as the new periphery of the Euro-Atlantic community and adjacent to volatile and threat-rich regions, countries like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria are only logical future destinations of America's forward military deployment. Consultations and negotiations with allies are well under way and in the coming months more specifics are to come.

As big a change to America's military presence this plan may be, it represents an even more dramatic challenge to Bulgaria and Romania's evolving role in the Euro-Atlantic security system. Recently admitted to NATO and well on their way to becoming members of the European Union, both countries still perceive severe threats in an uncertain security environment. From Bucharest and Sofia, the painful process of rehabilitating and integrating the Western Balkans in a stable Europe seem anything but irreversible. The short but devastating outburst of violence in Kosovo early this year, an ongoing political crisis in Macedonia with a similar potential, and Serbia's halting transition serve as a reminder that as far as security is concerned, geography in the Euro-Atlantic area still matters. Indeed, the time when one could see Romania and Bulgaria as potentially the next falling chips in the tragic Balkan domino are long gone. Yet both countries face real regional challenges born out of decade of Balkan conflicts including arrested economic development, unsettled borders and statehoods, organized crime transcending regional borders, trafficking of humans, arms and goods, lack of stable institutional order. Looking from Sofia to the West in terms of security, one sees adjacent Macedonia and Kosovo rather than a distant Brussels.

Looking to the East from Bulgaria and Romania, even before one points out to the Middle East as the most pressing hot spot in the "arch of instability", the Black Sea region looms large as a long neglected security area. The traffic of drugs to the West, the steady stream of militancy from the Middle East, and the energy lines from the oil and gas reach regions of the East to an energy hungry Europe gradually define the Black Sea as an area urgently requiring political attention and investment in its security at least as a preemption to its perceived and real state of a soft target. The role of Bulgaria and Romania in this regard can be crucial. International treaties exclude the permanent deployment of ships of outside powers in the Black Sea. At the same time both countries are in a dare need of naval forces capable of meeting the challenges of the new security environment. Thus the potential for an effective partnership between the two countries, the United States and Turkey is promising but requires imagination and brave thinking. The current joint naval exercises involving all sates in the Black Sea area are a step in the right direction but far from enough in terms of preparing the new NATO members for their new role in the region. Meanwhile, political events make the requirement for new approaches to security in the area essential. The promising start of the political change in Georgia was followed by renewed push by Tbilisi to restore the territorial integrity of the state and threatened not only the transition to democracy but also the stability of the region even beyond the borders of the Caucasus. To the West, the presidential elections in October in Ukraine are crucial in helping the country sort out its vision as either an European state or a country cought in between two worlds. The long-term consequences for Ukraine as well as for the Euro-Atlantic area are difficult to overstate.

The Middle East and its conflicts is the security challenge driving much of the change to America's military presence including its future shifts. To be sure, the behavior of Bulgaria and Romania in the ongoing Iraqi conflict has been remarkable. Against the prevailing public mood at home and in Europe, Sofia and Bucharest provided steadfast political and military support to the coalition efforts in Iraq paying in the process a high price in human life, treasure and political capital. Undoubtedly, both countries passed the first serious test as formal allies, a distinction that even some other members of "new Europe" failed to achieve. What makes this feat even more remarkable is that the left in both countries-the two presidents and the ruling party in Romania are descendents of the communist parties-supported, although reluctantly, the participation in the conflict and did not call for immediate withdrawal when national troops gave casualties in Iraq. The place and role of the Middle East, particularly Iraq, in East European security thinking, however, should not be overestimated. The participation of "new Europe" in Iraq coincided with increased public fears of international terrorism as many blamed it on America's invasion. Paradoxically, the publics perceived more insecurity even as their countries joined the most powerful military alliance and there were intense discussions of transferring American military bases to the new members.

Therefore, for the new partnerships to be successful, America and the governments in Sofia and Bucharest must build a comprehensive security relation that goes beyond the military dimension. The relationship must have positive impact on the areas of security of greatest importance not only to America but also to Bulgaria and Romania, including national and international organized crime, international terrorism, drug trafficking, regional ethnic conflicts, the integration of Serbia and Montenegro in the international community, and the status of Kosovo and Bosnia. In order to address these challenges the U.S. must be prepared to contribute to the security sector reform in Bulgaria and Romania as well as the region including: joint training and use of the military bases leading to joint participation in missions; modernization of infrastructure in military bases and other institutions of the security sector; involving local business in the maintenance of military bases; involving Bulgaria and Romania in the reform of the national security sectors of the PfP countries in the Balkans and the Black Sea region as both countries have accumulated valuable experience in this area; providing assistance in both countries' efforts in the integration of the institutions of the security sector; further push for institutional reform in both countries especially in the rule of law and police reform; assisting the countries in civilian and critical infrastructure protection; transfer of excess weapons systems; participation of American defense companies including with offset programs.

Finally, one of the most neglected dimensions of politics in Eastern Europe is public support and legitimacy. The governments in Eastern Europe were able to ignore public opposition to the war in Iraq and provide support to the United States. In the future, however, the gradual "westernization" of East European politics will make much harder for anyone willing to take a foreign policy decision over the public's objections without risking the loss of political capital. In addition, we are yet to experience the left's anti-American instinct in some parts of Eastern Europe especially, when Europe seems divided over the exercise of American power in the world. Thus, any American military presence in the region require careful cultivation of an informed and understanding public.

*  A shorter version of this text was first published by the United Press International on 26th August.

New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

In this issue of the newsletter we publish the full text of a joint declaration prepared by thirteen former and current European senior military officials that calls for greater defense integration and cooperation in order to strengthen Europe's military capabilities. The declaration, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, outlines ways in which European governments and institutions can address existing shortfalls and enhance European defense capabilities. It has been endorsed by: General Cevik Bir, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Turkey, Admiral the Lord Boyce, former Chief of the Defense Staff of the UK, general jean boyle, former Chief of the Defense Staff of Canada, General Constantin Degeratu, former Chief of the General Defense Staff of Romania, General Gabriel Do Espirito Santo, former Chief of Defense of Portugal, Air Marshal the Lord Garden, former Assistant Chief of the Defense Staff of the UK, General Christian Hvidt, former Chief of Defense of Denmark, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Chief of Defense of Finland, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, former Chief of Staff of France, General Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Staff of Germany, General Joe Ralston, former Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hans-Ulrich Scherrer, former Chief of the General Staff of Switzerland, and General Jiri Sedivy, former Chief of the General Staff of the Czech Republic.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC
Joint Declaration on European Defense Integration, August 25 2004
http://www.csis.org/press/pr04_47.pdf

Europe is currently enjoying a period of peace and stability unprecedented in its history. Over the last fifty years, a number of authoritarian regimes in and around Europe have given way to stable and democratic partners, creating an environment where war between states now seems unimaginable. Never has the European continent been so whole, secure, and free.

Europe Faces New Security Challenges
Yet Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, still face serious security threats. Longstanding security challenges such as failed states, transnational crime, and internal and regional conflicts continue to threaten European interests. At the same time, Europe and its North American allies are grappling with the rise of a new brand of international terrorism born of extremism and new dangers associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

These five security threats - terrorism, WMD proliferation, organized crime, failed states, and regional conflicts - now serve as the focus of European, as well as North American security strategies at both the national and regional levels.

Further European Defense Integration is Good for Both Sides of the Atlantic
This new set of security challenges coupled with the European Union's political development makes further integration in the defense domain a logical next step. As stressed in the EU's European Security Strategy, Europe now has a global security role to play and requires military forces that can protect and advance European interests both at home and abroad. European leaders must come to a greater political consensus on appropriate roles and missions for European militaries in this new security environment and on the capabilities necessary to perform these missions. Building stronger European defense capabilities is also critical for strengthening the transatlantic relationship in a world in which both sides of the Atlantic must work closely together to combat common security challenges. Neither Europe nor the United States can meet these challenges alone. Each needs the cooperation of the other to protect and advance its interests. It is in America's interests for Europe as a coherent whole to be able to undertake a wider set of military missions as a full partner. Whether the transatlantic partners work together or opt to act on their own, enhancing European defense capabilities is not only in Europe's interest, but also in the interest of the United States and Canada.

Having more capable European military establishments will also give European leaders more options for preventing and responding to crises than just diplomacy. The ability of European states and the United States to jointly field expeditionary forces and sustain long-term operations will have a direct bearing on our collective capacity to deal with 21st century challenges ranging from international terrorism to failed states.

Substantial Capability Shortfalls Need to Be Addressed
The need for more expeditionary forces has already placed new demands on European militaries in recent years, including increased deployments and calls for operational readiness. Forces that were designed for the defense of Europe rather than the conduct of expeditionary operations abroad have struggled to respond adequately to the changing security environment. Today, members of the European Union have 1.9 million military personnel, but only a small fraction of these are readily deployable.

In addition, many of Europe's deployable troops are better prepared for peacekeeping and nation building than highintensity combat. But today's defense requirements go well beyond peacekeeping and nation building, two areas of traditional European comparative advantage. Recent missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, the Congo, and Afghanistan underscore the need for European militaries to organize, train, and equip their forces for combat operations as well.

With some notable exceptions, most European militaries suffer from severe capability shortfalls. In Kosovo, European air forces lacked the precision-guided munitions to contribute more than 15 percent of the total air sorties. Several European militaries also lack critical C4ISR, lift, and strike capabilities, greatly hindering their operational effectiveness. Furthermore, few European militaries have the capabilities to sustain their forces in out-of-area missions for any significant length of time. Europe as a whole lacks many of the military capabilities called for in European strategy documents.

Collectively, militaries across Europe also suffer from unnecessary levels of duplication in areas ranging from infrastructure (such as headquarters, training, and bases) to deployable military assets (such as fighter aircraft and large tank formations). More troubling, Europeans spend not only on equipment that duplicates capabilities, but also on capabilities that are often inefficient or outmoded. Such duplication wastes precious defense resources that could be better directed to a more coordinated approach to research, development, and procurement that would ultimately improve European military effectiveness in operations.

Current Capability Initiatives Need to Be Strengthened
European governments recognize that if such trends continue, Europe's ability to conduct effective, integrated military operations in today's international security environment will further erode over the next decade. As a result, the European Union and NATO have launched a number of initiatives in recent years aimed at both improving existing capabilities and generating new ones.

In 1999, NATO unveiled the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to "ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve their capabilities to face the new security challenges". Three years later, when most of the 58 suggested capability improvements had not been realized, the alliance launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), a streamlined version of DCI. Despite good intentions, the PCC has been slow to produce the necessary changes in capabilities. NATO has, however, succeeded in establishing a NATO Response Force that will significantly enhance the alliance's ability to rapidly deploy forces in the event of a crisis.

The European Union has also launched initiatives aimed at strengthening the defense capabilities of its member states. In 1999, EU members committed themselves to creating a Rapid Reaction Force, capable of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days, sustainable for up to one year. In 2001, the European Union also launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), which focuses on fourteen areas of improvement. The hope is that the ECAP, combined with the European Union's Headline Goal 2010, will move the European Rapid Reaction Force closer to reality. In 2004, the UK, France, and Germany proposed the creation of up to nine EU Battle Groups - combined formations of 1,500 personnel, supported by the necessary air and naval assets and available for operations within 15 days and sustainable for 30 days.

While the European Union and NATO have made firm commitments to strengthening their capabilities on paper, in practice, efforts to close the gap between European defense goals and capabilities have yet to produce many meaningful changes in available military capability. That said, there have been some notable successes. For example, the NATO PCC on strategic sealift has crafted an innovative approach to contract excess commercial shipping for military use.

Similarly, since Kosovo, European air forces have substantially increased their precision strike capabilities through the acquisition of new precision guided munitions.

Europe Needs to Spend Smarter on Defense
Of all the factors contributing to Europe's failure to acquire new capabilities, none is cited as often as declining defense budgets. Compared to the United States, most European governments spend considerably less on defense as a percentage of their GDP - an average of 1.9 percent. Raising these levels will be difficult. To cite just one important reason, the growing costs of supporting aging populations will likely constrain European defense spending in the future.

However, European defense expenditures should aim at a minimum to keep pace with inflation. Most importantly, European countries need to spend smarter on defense. More emphasis must be placed on research and development, European industrial consolidation, and better transatlantic cooperation to facilitate the transformation of European forces. In this regard, "Buy American" and "Buy European" requirements are extremely counterproductive.

Europe Needs Greater Defense Integration to Realize Its Goals
Given the political and budgetary constraints that European capitals face in increasing their defense budgets, the obvious way to address existing shortfalls and substantially enhance European defense capabilities is through a greater degree of defense integration - that is, coordinating the efforts of individual European countries, the European Union, and NATO to create an enhanced and more interdependent set of collective defense capabilities to meet Europe's future defense needs. This must be done while recognizing that integration should not limit the ability of individual nations to carry out - or opt out of - specific military missions. To this end, we have launched a year-long study to explore how greater European defense integration might be achieved. Various models of defense integration are possible. European countries could pool national resources to field combined units or capabilities with less overhead and lower cost, giving them access to more military capability than they could otherwise acquire. This approach is particularly attractive for generating more enabling forces and force multipliers. Individual countries could also opt to develop specific capabilities (such as long-range transport planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) defense units) that would then be made available for collective security missions through the European Union or NATO. Finally, harmonizing procurement - by ordering from the same sources and pursuing economies of scale when purchasing expensive equipment like aircraft - is another way to move toward greater defense integration.

To conclude, European countries must move quickly to acquire the military capabilities that will enable them to share the responsibility for global security. We believe that further defense integration in Europe is critical to meeting Europe's defense needs, now and in the future. Therefore, we recommend that the leaders of Europe:

• Make a clear commitment to greater defense integration and interdependence with the aim of increasing European effectiveness in military operations and maximizing the returns on defense expenditures.
• Agree on more explicit roles and responsibilities within both NATO and EU structures for addressing priority capability shortfalls, based on a common vision and the comparative advantages of various countries.
• Develop common plans for developing needed capabilities. Such plans should formalize roles, responsibilities, resource commitments, and timelines for specified actions and results.
• Fundamentally redesign NATO's force planning and requirements definition processes to focus far more on outputs rather than inputs, and give NATO's Allied Command Transformation a lead role in the process.
• Accelerate implementation of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups as key vehicles for defense integration and transformation.
• Consider establishing NATO- or EU-owned and operated multinational component forces that could serve as force multipliers or enabling forces, thus eliminating the need to include such capabilities in the force planning of individual nations.
• Strengthen the role of the EU and NATO Military Committees in order to better coordinate and deconflict EU and NATO capability initiatives.
• Encourage the new EU Defense Agency to monitor and assess progress toward these goals in close cooperation with the EU Military Committee, including undertaking periodic hard-hitting assessments of all actions to date, outlining priorities, and recommending next steps.
• Enhance coordination of European defense research and development efforts, pursue greater European industrial consolidation, and work with the U.S. administration and Congress to remove obstacles to stronger transatlantic cooperation in procurement.

Taking action on these recommendations will require a renewed transatlantic relationship in which each side respects the other as a partner. It will also require the sustained personal leadership of heads of state and government, military leaders, and the leaders of NATO and the European Union. Although this will be no small challenge, failure is not an option. Failure to meaningfully improve Europe's collective defense capabilities in the coming years would have profoundly negative impacts on the ability of European countries to protect and advance their own interests, the viability of NATO as an alliance, and the ability of European countries to partner in any meaningful way with the United States to meet shared security challenges. Seen in this light, defense integration is not just an appealing notion; it is a necessity.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Paris
European Defence: A Proposal for a White Paper, 2004
http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/wp2004.pdf

The European Union is an unique example for overcoming contradictions and conflicts between states. The fifty years integration in Europe lead to unprecedented stability and security on the continent. On the other hand this is not a characteristic of the contemporary international environment. In the globalization era none of the international actors is not invulnerable to security risks and threats. This what happens in close proximity or thousand kilometers far away of the EU borders, inevitably have or will have direct or indirect impact to European Union's interests. The EU respond to the new security challenges through the last 10 years was to make efforts on enhancing its defense capabilities. But there are two critical questions: whether the undertaken steps so far are adequate to the new threats and whether the chosen further development destination of the European defense policy is really the proper one?

These issues are in details analyzed in the ISS paper European Defense: A Proposal for a White Paper (the full text is available at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/wp2004.pdf). The paper is a detailed review of a wide spectrum European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aspects, and it suggests feasible defense and security developments in Europe.

One may consider this paper as a thorough handbook on the ESDP essence and development, which furthermore offers theoretical projections of ESDP in the future. On the basis of a contemporary international environment analysis- "new and traditional threats to the international security, new Europe and new America" - the reasons for establishing ESDP and its subsequent development are reviewed. But the explicit and may be the most important and interesting part of the Proposal is the one offering eventual strategic scenarios in which EU could be involved. These eventual strategic scenarios pull out the shortfalls and the weaknesses of the ESDP. In conclusion, the experts elaborated this paper propose list of recommendations on how these shortfalls and weaknesses of the European defense capabilities effectiveness could be overcome.

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

European Defence Agency

In contrast to other EU policies, the European Union has made only small progress toward greater coordination of defense policies. This is because governments have traditionally been unwilling to cede sovereignity over their defence policies to supranational organizations like the EU. But the wars in former Yugoslavia in late 1990s pulled out the ineffectiveness of the EU member states' individual actions. Failures as the one experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina forced the EU states to accelerate the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy. That experience encouraged the EU governments to seek joint security and defense actions, as tool for better results in managing possible civil, ethnic, or military crisis.

Meanwhile EU took the control over the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina after NATO. Following this commitment EU governments more often come to the issues of the types of soldiers and equipment they need for building adequate defense capabilities. To this end the European Council last year took a decision to establish intergovernmental agency dealing with common EU defense capabilities. This year on July 12th by a Council Joint Action was established European Defence Agency (EDA). The main aim of EDA is to support the member states in their efforts to improve European defense capabilities in the ESDP framework. Particularly EDA has to implement the following goals and tasks:

• to develop defense capabilities in the field of crisis management;
• to promote and enhance European armaments cooperation;
• to support the development of the European defence industrial and technological base and the creation of internationally competitive European Defence Equipment Market.
• to enhance the effectiveness of the European Defence Research and Technology.

In institutional terms EDA acts exclusively under the European Council's authority. Council decisions relating the Agency's structure and function are taken by the Council meetings in Defense ministers composition. The Head of the Agency is the High Representative for CSFP, and the actual management is entrusted to a Steering Board constituted by the Defense ministers of the willing to participate in EDA member states, and a representative of the European Commission.

In contrast to the other EU bodies EDA is not a part of the regular EU institutional framework, even though it is headed by the High Representative for CSFP. Furthermore, it is not comparable to traditional national defense agencies, for its activities are at no means concentrated on procurement - EDA is not provided with a budget. In the short term the most important role of the European Defence Agency will be to coordinate and to harmonize the member states' defense capabilities in order to enhance the ESDP further development.

Western Policy Center, Washington DC
http://www.westernpolicy.org/

The Western Policy Center is the premier American institute conducting analysis and review of U.S. foreign and security policies in the eastern Mediterranean and southern Balkans. It is dedicated to promoting freedom, security, and democracy in a region that is astride the emergent areas of international disorder and pivotal to the interests of the United States, within the expanded vision of a Europe whole and free.

The Center fulfills its mission by:
- Providing expertise upon which U.S. and European policymakers, diplomats, military officers, and foreign-policy professionals can draw to expand successful alliances and strengthen existing ties among southeastern European countries;
- Organizing and managing public affairs programming and educational research activities, within several foreign-policy area projects that examine the eastern Mediterranean, the southern Balkans, trans-Atlantic relations, and cross-regional affairs;
- Publishing and disseminating original essays, commentaries, and analysis, along with regular country reports, directly and through print and broadcast media, to an international readership of professionally interested parties; and
- Strengthening individual, organizational, and institutions networks engaged in regional affairs.

The Western Policy Center is dedicated to promoting an informed debate on U.S. foreign policy in Southeastern Europe. It works closely with nongovernmental organizations to provide public forums and private venues on U.S. interests and Western institutions within the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

The Center's internship program offers an exciting opportunity for students to become involved in its programs through immersion in all aspects of policy planning and education on related regional issues. Please view the internship section on the Center's web site: http://www.westernpolicy.org/

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