Year 2, issue 9, May 2004
Table of Contents:
To Our Readers
Political Dimensions of the Strategy for the Bulgarian Missions in Iraq
Blagovest Tashev
More About the Mandate of the Bulgarian Forces in Iraq
Lt. General (r.) Anyu Angelov
One Year After the Decision to Participate in Iraq: Time for Real Military and Professional
Changes
Velizar Shalamanov
Legitimacy and Communication Effectiveness: Situational Analysis
Dr. Antoniy Galabov
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
To Our Readers
This is the ninth issue of Security Focus and
Security Sector Watch. The new issue is devoted entirely to
the Bulgarian mission in Iraq. The deteriorating situation
in the Bulgarian zone of responsibility let not only to more
public attention to our battalion but also to political and
expert debates concerning a change to the mandate of the mission
and the role of the country in the coalition efforts. The
authors writing in this issue share the belief that the problems
before our mission are the result not only of the situation
in Kerbala but also a consequence of the lack of a national
strategy for participation in Iraq, which is also a part of
the overall national security policy. This strategy must include
political, military, societal and even some economic elements.
In the first article, Blagovest Tashev points
out that an effective national mission in Iraq requires the
formulation of a framework and mechanisms facilitating quick
and effective decision-making, assuring wide political and
public support, attaining international support and participation,
guaranteeing the coordination among institutions and bodies
relevant to security, and, of course, guaranteeing the civilian
and democratic control.
In the second article, Anyu Angelov touches
upon some of the issues in the debate about the reformulation
of the mandate of the Bulgarian battalion. According to the
author, the Bulgarian parliament has not met its constitutional
obligations as it had failed to formulate an adequate mandate.
In the third article, Velizar Shalamanov offers
a model for building the armed forces' capacity to participate
in missions abroad. Obviously, Bulgaria will continue to participate
in such missions for many years to come and therefore building
the appropriate capabilities becomes a priority in the reform
of the armed forces. Even more, it is very worrisome if the
mission of Iraq is indicative of the Bulgarian armed forces'
capacity to fulfill the entire range of missions.
Antonii Galabov discusses some of the public
dimensions of the Bulgarian participation in Iraq. He analyzes
what he sees as an inadequate communication policy of the
government not only about the allied mission in Iraq but also
about security in general. The lack of an adequate communication
and information policy not only decreases the mission's effectiveness
but also causes legitimacy problems in the area of national
security, including Bulgaria's integration in NATO.
Finally, Hristo Chorbadzhiiski reviews two
new publications and presents the web-sites of two organizations
in the field of security.
From the publishers
Political Dimensions of the Strategy for the Bulgarian
Missions in Iraq
Blagovest Tashev
The most serious problems of our mission in
Iraq are political in their nature. The ruling elite, including
the parliament, the government and the president repeat numerous
times, that our goal is the formulation of a new UN resolution
for Iraq and the active role of the organization in the in
the transition as well as NATO's active participation in attaining
security in the country. That sound assuring and of course
it should be part of the efforts of our diplomacy. However,
it also does not take into account the UN's resolutions, which,
in May and October last year, already addressed many of the
developments in Iraq, including the status of the occupying
forces, the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty and the holding
of elections. These resolution also urge other states to participate
in the stabilization and reconstruction of the country including
with armed forces.
Another unrealistic hope is that NATO is going
to take over the mission in Iraq. It becomes obvious that
the Istanbul Summit in June is not going to overcome the contradiction
among the member-states and thus is not going to take a decision
to engage in Iraq. The time left to the Summit is not enough
to overcome this problem.
What Bulgaria can do, however, is along with
the support to various resolutions by international organizations
to use its right as a member of NATO to engage in multilateral
and bilateral discussions about specific policies and measures
for the stabilization of Iraq. These include frank presentation
of our views about how to achieve the goals of the coalition.
If we think that the current policy is ineffective either
as a vision or in the details, it is only logical to make
everything possible to alter it in cooperation with our allies.
This, however, requires not only a proactive position, but
also capacity for analysis, assessment and formulation of
policies. We should not forget that even now NATO is partially
involved in the assistance of the coalition's mission, particularly
in the Polish zone of responsibility. Bulgaria should concentrate
its efforts in increasing precisely such involvement of the
Alliance and eventually in NATO's taking responsibility of
the entire Polish zone.
The most severe problems are to be found in
domestic politics. Apparently, no Bulgarian institution has
a strategy for our mission in Iraq. Not surprisingly, then,
all proposals for changes to the mandate of the mission appear
when the situation in Karabala worsened and the battalion
faced difficulties. Naturally, when there is no comprehensive
strategy, there exist chaos, ad-hoc policies in crisis and
sometimes the worst of all - institutional paralysis and the
avoidance of hard decisions.
As a start, it is necessary to achieve coordination
among the institutions. It is unacceptable when our soldiers
risk their lives in mission abroad, Bulgarian institutions
to contradict each other. This behavior not only confuses
the society and the allies but also demoralizes the members
of our forces in Iraq. It is unacceptable while our force
participate in combat the president to demand a change to
the mandate and the political parties and the government to
see it as unnecessary. In order to achieve this coordination,
however, it is essential that executive power takes the initiative
and begins to integrate the national security system. Instead
of establishing crisis centers months after the start of the
mission it needs to give the Security Council to the prime
minister real functions. Instead of discussing the transfer
of the authority over various intelligence services from one
institutions to another, to reform the entire intelligence
community. Instead of hiding the conflicts between the minister
of defense and the Chief of General Staff, it needs to build
an integrated Ministry of Defense. It is high time to end
the empty rhetoric about the fundamentally different security
environment and start building an adequate national security
system.
In the integrated security system, every institutions
has its specific place and role. For now, however, the parliament
has the limited role of defining the mandate of the mission
and the activities during a crisis situation in Karbala. Even
when the National Assembly decided to become involved at the
beginning of this year, following the death of Bulgarian soldiers,
its role remained limited. Even if we assume that the civilian
and military leadership did not provide to the parliament
sufficient information about problems facing the mission,
the National Assembly has plenty mechanisms at its disposal
to exercise control over the implementation of the mandate.
Even the opposition parties have no excuse, which could use
political and parliamentary tools in attracting public attention
to the problems of the mission and exerting pressure over
the government to solve them. In any event, providing a wide
mandate to the government by the parliament comes along with
the requirement that the legislative power exercise a stringent
control and oversight of execution of the mission.
Recently the role of the president in the mission
seems the most active. This activity, however, will bring
about mostly positives for the image of the head of state
and no positives for our forces in Iraq, unless his activities
are coordinated with the executive power and are fitting within
the overall strategy for the mission. The president's observations
about the bad shape of the mission's equipment is a logical
criticism toward the investment in the armed forces made by
the government and the parliament, but is also surprising
given that the head of state and commander-in-chief must had
been aware of the state of affairs at the start of the mission.
In fact, the second rotation of the battalion in Karbala is
better equipped than the first one. It is important to understand
that the executive power alone has the legal obligation and
the power to alter and manage the national security system.
Whatever the president do in relation to the mission, his
institution has limited powers in this regards. It is time
for the executive branch to act.
More About the Mandate of the Bulgarian Forces in
Iraq
Lt. General (r.) Anyu Angelov
The events in Iraq in the early April let to
a lively debate about the need of reformulation of the mandate
of the participating Bulgarian forces. Almost all political
parties advanced public arguments following the statement
of the President and commander-in-chief about the need for
such change. After his return from a surprise visit to Iraq,
however, the president withdrew this idea. In fact, both the
arguing sides and the society remained badly informed about
the nature of the issue. Indeed, what is a mandate of a Bulgarian
military forces abroad? This is precisely what the chief of
General Staff needs to explain, instead of criticizing the
minister of defense and the entire government and thus getting
involved in politics.
According to Article 85 of the Law on Defense
and the Armed Forces, the National Assembly has the obligation
to define the conditions for sending Bulgarian armed forces
abroad. This is the meaning of the word "mandate."
Let's see whether the National Assembly did its job in defining
the mandate of our troops in Iraq. Formulating the mandate
includes: which unit; what personnel; what arms and equipment;
when and in what country does the unit go; what are its mission
and specific tasks; how to prepare the unit and how long it
is going to take; an already existing unit or yet to be combined
unit; duration of rotation; the amount of payment to the personnel
during the tour of duty in the unit; location of the unit
on the ground and zone of responsibility; rules of engagement;
scope of control exercised by the multinational command -
operational command or operational control.
The decision of the National Assembly, published
in the State Gazette, no. 51 of 3 June 2003 and consisting
of ten sentences, merely defines the size of the military
component and the state where it is to be sent. The mission
of the force is simply defined as participation in the "fourth"
phase of the operation in Iraq. There is no word on whose
this operation is, who planned it, in fact, what the first
three phases are and who formulated the nature of the fourth
phase. The National Assembly has not even made a reference
to the Security Council Resolution #1483 of 22 May 2003, which
defines the forces of the U.S. and Great Britain alone as
occupation powers. The resolution also urges member-states
to contribute to the stability and security in Iraq, but does
not recognize them as occupying powers. In other words, their
mission is peacekeeping. Therefore, these states have no right
to participate in seek and destroy operations, in putting
down resistance movements and in defense operations against
organized military force (the reader should make a distinction
between providing security and defense).
The rest of a mandate did not find its place
in the decision of the National Assembly. We must assume that
either a decision of the Council of Ministers or the Memorandum
of Understanding of the coalition countries defined the rest
of the mandate. Therefore, the Parliament has not defined
a mandate and thus cannot "reformulate" it.
Since even the legislative power does not recognize
the rule of law, the acts of the other institutions come as
no surprise. The members of the Bulgarian delegation negotiating
the Memorandum of Understanding have approached their task
irresponsibly. Two bases in downtown Karbala have been assigned
to the Bulgarian battalion and no base have been built outside
the city limits to be used in case of emergency withdrawal.
The Bulgarian battalion is the only combat unit of the coalition
forces assigned to one of the two most sacred for all Shiias
cities, in which maintaining order is an extremely difficult
task. The discrepancy between the battalion's capabilities
and the tasks in its zone of responsibility is most obvious.
The Bulgarian state withdrew its diplomats from Iraq and left
the battalion without a civilian component to liaise with
the interim coalition administration, whose rights and responsibilities,
as part of the Foreign Liaison Missions, are defined by Order
#17 of the same administration. This constrains the flow of
information from the coalition administration directly to
the battalion through diplomatic channels and the effective
representation of the Bulgarian forces in the coalition.
These problems must be taken into account by
the General Staff in the preparation and command of the Bulgarian
battalion in Iraq. Instead, the Bulgarian military leadership
tasks, or allows the Polish command to task, the national
battalion with responsibilities incompatible with its peacekeeping
mission and with the established by the Memorandum requirement
for force protection as the priority over any other mission
and task. Thus the leadership needlessly endangers the life
of our troops. And although during the defense of the city
municipality and the police station there were no casualties,
we should not really on the hope that "God is Bulgarian"
or that "No one judge the winners."
It is imperative that, in response to the rapidly
changing situation in Iraq, the National Assembly formulate
the entire mandate of the Bulgarian troops. The Bulgarian
state needs to send as soon as possible a diplomatic team
to liaise with the interim administration. And if there are
difficulties finding the appropriate diplomats, there are
always officers from the reserve who would take on this dangerous
but very important task.
There should be no doubt, the participants in
the Bulgarian battalion serve with distinction and honor and
deserve the awards given them on 6 May. But it is doubtful
their political and military leaders deserve any awards. We
are yet to find out.
One Year After the Decision to Participate in Iraq: Time
for Real Military and Professional Changes
Velizar Shalamanov
Developments in the UN, NATO and the Bulgarian
institutions are important but they do not alter the essential
requirement that the Bulgarian armed forces should be capable
of participating with at least one tactical battalion in operations
away from the national territory along with NATO allies. This
is a requirement valid for the next 20 years and an essential
part of the transformation of the national armed forces.
In order to achieve this goal, we need to have
three completely professional battalions along with additional
components to increase their strength including all military
services and forces of the police, gendarmerie, civil-military
affairs and civil protection. The forces are professional
in the sense that they can be sent to places to defend the
national interests with a decision of the parliament with
additional formalities. The three battalions and the additional
components must have modern arms and equipment and be managed
by an interoperable with NATO and the EU command system and
capable of participating in a network-centric operations.
In addition, the battalions should train jointly and systematically
with allies along NATO standards, using English as the working
language.
The management of the forces requires an operational
command headed by: a commander; political and legal advisor;
PR and civil-military relations specialist; joint staff and
command center operating 24/7 and capable of maintaining communication
with the forces wherever they are deployed and communication
with the operational commands associated with the national
mission and the security of the battalion.
In order to achieve this, it is not necessary
to pass new laws and additional budgets, but rather it requires
an action plan, a few programs and, above all, a leadership
and professionalism. Bulgaria could have, if not entirely
professional Karlovo brigade, at least a battalion each from
the Stara Zagora, Kazanlak and Karlovo brigades along with
components from the special operations brigade, the engineering
brigade, the chemical battalion, medical and logistical units,
police and gendarmerie modules, intelligence module, air and
sea support. This is the core of the expeditionary forces,
or as they are called in the Defense Doctrine - Rapid Reaction
Forces.
The military and professional leadership is
exclusively responsible for the lack of progress in this area.
The solution of this problem is a model for the development
of the armed forces in the next five-ten years. This solution
was clearly defined in Memorandum #2 to the president, the
government and the parliament presented by the Security Sector
Reform Coalition on 14 April 2003.
How to achieve it
First, selecting all volunteer forces and formulating special
plans for their career development through participation in
operations, rotations at various national and international
posts until taking command positions in the army for the next
5-10 years of military service.
It is important to reconsider the now infamous
and secretive modernization plan and to formulate a priority
modernization program for the expeditionary forces through
the utilization of weapons and equipment delivered by our
allies. It is essential to achieve full use by the three battalion
groups of the command and control systems whose introduction
cost over 300 million levs in the last five years. This is
impossible to achieve without an effective capabilities building
agency, modernization and research supported by an annual
budget of 200 million levs.
The task at hand is rather simple - the existing
battlefield communications and information system (PIKIS),
whose warranty expires in one or two months, along with the
more modern system of the special forces which is still under
construction, the project for the national military command
center and the center for simulation training and other similar
projects must be reconsidered and integrated around the main
task of building, preparing and managing the expeditionary
forces. This would allow for an effective utilization of the
large investments.
This would happen in the context of building
the national sovereignty system and NATO collective defense.
In other words, it will achieve three objectives - effective
participation in operations abroad, effective guarantees for
the national sovereignty, and effective collective defense
of the Alliance.
It is clear that fulfilling one of the tasks
cannot be achieved at the expense of the others; if we are
not able to participate effectively in operations abroad,
it is doubtful we are able to effectively guarantee our sovereignty
or participate in collective defense. How are we to believe
that our sovereignty and territorial integrity are guaranteed,
as required in Article 9 of the Constitutions, if we have
so many problems with the Bulgarian battalion participating
in Iraq? The answer suggests that neither is the sovereignty
and territorial integrity, nor is the effective participation
in Iraq guaranteed. It is high time to change that by formulating
plans, programs and implementation.
The second phase of reform after Plan 2004 must
start with the creation of the expeditionary forces and the
operational command. Both the leadership and the public see
this as a logical response to the problems with the mission
in Iraq. Concurrently, with NATO assistance, the country must
create its air, territorial and sea sovereignty system and
the collective defense system.
The solution of this problem is the sole responsibility
of the defense professionals. It requires the definition of
options, legislative changes and an appropriate budget. The
government and the parliament must take the right decision
since it is very obvious that Bulgaria will participate in
operations abroad with 1-2 battalions and 1-2 companies for
many years to come. It would be a significant problem if we
are forced to alter our security policy, including integration
in the Euro-Atlantic community, due to the inability to build
and sustain capacity to participate abroad and capacity for
collective defense and defense of the national sovereignty.
Unfortunately, this problem is real and the Strategic Defense
Review, although scheduled to conclude by 30 April 2004, has
not produced any final report to be considered by the government,
the parliament and the society at large. We are fast approaching
some very important dates: the Istanbul Summit in June, the
next rotation of our military unit in Iraq, NATO's DPQ, the
European Union first significant operation in Bosnia and the
next parliamentary elections. It is to be hoped that these
pressing events will stimulate real reforms in the armed forces
lest the volunteers for the Iraqi mission continue to decline
in numbers.
Legitimacy and Communication Effectiveness: Situational
Analysis
Dr. Antoniy Galabov
Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Science
The last weeks clearly illuminated some of the
tendencies in the dominant public attitudes towards the Bulgarian
participation in Iraq. The goal of this situational analysis
is to ascertain the state and effectiveness of the communication
behavior selected by the Bulgarian authorities in this issue
area. It also points out to the need for a quick solution
to some of the identified problems. Failure to address these
problems is likely to enlarge the scope of negative public
attitudes, which in turn might endanger the completion of
some of the strategic priorities of the Bulgarian security
policy.
De-personification
In the last six months the only names and biographies familiar
to the public are those of the killed and wounded Bulgarian
soldiers from the contingent in Karbala. The tasks, problems
and achievements of the other members of the battalion still
remain relatively unknown. All this leads to the de-personification
of the public image of the Bulgarian contingent and its mission
in Iraq.
There is no overall strategy offering information
about what is happening in Karbala and Iraq. What is available
in the media is limited to expanded official press releases,
mostly provided by foreign press agencies and usually informing
about other regions in the country and the difficulties facing
the coalition forces.
The Bulgarian institutions fail to provide
a single, clear message defining the nature of the resistance
groups and thus allowed the introduction of an image presenting
the armed militias of al Sadr and similar paramilitary groups
as the elements of "national liberation movement,"
"freedom fight" and "resistance against occupation."
All these images increase the overall level of public uncertainty
and weaken the society's resolve.
There is no systematic attempt to form valid
public attitudes toward the possible scenarios in Iraq, especially
following the transfer of power to a civilian transition government,
scheduled for 30 June. The lack of public and expert debate
about this issue allows the construction of a propaganda thesis
which questions the need for Bulgarian participation in the
coalition mission as well as the role Bulgarian would like
to play in similar conflicts. This propaganda campaign, although
not directly, also questions the need for a membership in
NATO.
Crisis of legitimacy
Some of the reasons for the worsened communication environment
wherein the dominant public attitudes are formed are related
to the crisis of overall political legitimacy in the Bulgarian
society. We are witnessing the lack of solid arguments legitimizing
the Bulgarian presence in Iraq as a consequence of the low
public trust in the institutions, which took and implemented
the decision to participate.
The problems of the post-conflict reconstruction
in Iraq coincided with the final stage of the long-delayed
Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in Bulgaria. Information about
the changing situation in Iraq is assessed in the context
of the ongoing political confrontation related to the SDR
- a process which still remains a mystery to the public. The
lack of effective, integrated command illuminates an increasingly
serious problem - the confrontation between the civilian and
military leadership of the Bulgarian armed forces. All this
deepens the legitimacy of the Bulgarian participation in Iraq
and questions the effectiveness of the defense reform and
the tasks before the country in the context of membership
in NATO.
Lack of focused communication
There is a lack of coordination in the public behavior of
the Bulgarian institutions. When it comes to having opinion
on the Bulgarian mission in Karbala, it is provided by: President
Parvanov; Minister of Defense, Svinarov and his deputies;
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Passy; the Chief of General
Staff, gen. Kolev; the spokesperson of the Council of Ministers,
Tzonev; the Information Office of the Ministry of Defense;
and others. Neither in normal nor in crisis situations is
there certainty as to which institution must offer information
and respond to public inquiries.
Despite the essential need for strict rules
of behavior in crisis situations, there is no legal framework
for crisis management. Instead, in the last several months
we are witnessing ineffective attempts to manage crises including
the creation of temporary crisis centers, which, however,
simply highlight the lack of an overall strategy and standards.
The civilian and military leaderships not only
give separate press conferences and interpret differently
issues of public interest, but also refuse to make efforts
to overcome the tensions between them. All this increases
the public's insecurity and compromises the efforts to build
single, integrated information and communication policies
in the area of security.
Possible solutions
1. It is essential to radically change the form and substance
of the public communication pertaining to the events in Iraq
1.1 Bulgaria cannot afford to communicate about
Iraq simply as a foreign news item. The substantive aspects
of the communication strategy must contain several clear messages.
1.2 The armed groups attacking the coalition
forces are neither liberation forces nor freedom fighters.
Two months before power handover, these groups' only goal
is to attain advantage to their warlords in the process of
power distribution. Their efforts are aimed at perpetuating
a late feudal system of power sharing among clans, which would
not hesitate to use force against each other and neighboring
states.
1.3 The main opponents of these armed groups
are not the coalition forces but rather the emerging structures
of the civilian and secular authority of the future democratic
state. The victims of these militias and paramilitary groups
are the peaceful citizens of the country rather than the soldiers
of the coalition.
1.4 Therefore the mandate of the Bulgarian contingent
in Iraq serves the interests of the local population not only
in the process of post-conflict reconstruction but also in
maintaining public order and a level of security in Karbala.
2. Overcoming the crisis of legitimacy requires
efforts in several areas
2.1 It is necessary to increase the scope of
information relevant to all Bulgarian missions abroad. In
this respect, it is important to design an effective communication
about the mission of the Bulgarian contingent in Afghanistan.
It is necessary to build an information and communication
context within which to fit the mission in Karbala
2.2 The efforts of the Bulgarian diplomacy
to secure NATO engagement in Iraq based on a new Security
Council of the UN's resolution by itself cannot overcome the
crisis of legitimacy. Furthermore, taken out of context, these
efforts to a great indirectly confirm the lack of legitimacy
of the entire allied presence in Iraq.
2.3 The National Assembly must be more active
in exercising control over the preparation and management
of the expeditionary forces. Delaying the exercise of such
control increases the perception chaos, illegitimacy and uncertainty
in decision-making process in the executive power.
3. There is a need for a qualitative change
in the organization and rules of the information and communication
policy
3.1 It is necessary to create and implement
new information standards in the security area.
3.2 Designation of a single institution, which would offer
regular information about developments in Iraq and about the
everyday functions of the Bulgarian contingent in Karbala.
3.3 The creation of a permanent crisis center,
which would possess the capacity to manage communications
in case of crisis of any type. The current practice of waiting
until the members of an ad-hoc crisis center are selected
is simply unacceptable. Such ad-hoc centers have hard time
gathering information and coordinating its work with the other
institutions.
3.4 It is necessary to create a permanent analytical
body, which would produce alternative scenarios for various
crisis situations. Obviously, the current analytical work
is not coordinated and the institutions using the analyses
have no clear guidelines as to how to act in accordance with
the risk assessment provided in the situation assessments.
3.5 The administrative capacity of the Ministry
of Defense in the information area is inadequate. Members
of the administration is unsuccessful in assess and present
before the society the entire information as they simultaneously
deal with the questions of defense reform, army life and the
missions abroad while building the public image of the minister
and the members of his political office.
4. It is necessary to make the transition from
a reactive to proactive security policy. Achieving that is
impossible with the creation of an integrated security sector.
The formation of public attitudes is mostly the result of
the lack of coordination in the presentation of information
and analysis rather than the logical consequence of a clear
and cohesive policy in the security sector.
Postponing the changes in this area deepens
the risks and the crisis of legitimacy, which, in turn, affect
negatively the process of formulating and implementing an
effective security policy. The refusal to make changes simply
means that there is no political will.
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
David Greenwood and Sender Huisman, Transparency
and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and
Intelligence Agencies (Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, Centre for European Security Studies,
2004)
In 2002 the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), jointly with the Centre for
European Security Studies (CESS) conducted research on transparency
and accountability of a particular part of the security sector
in seven countries in the Euro-Atlantic area - Bulgaria, France,
Poland, Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom and the USA. The
two organizations recruited security sector experts from each
of the selected countries. The experts were provided with
preliminary elaborated analytical framework to apply in their
study of the national security sectors.
The principle objectives of the project were
to: analyze the nature and the effectiveness of the implemented
policy in the security sector, parliamentary and judicial
oversight, plus internal control of police forces, other internal
security forces, security services and intelligence agencies
(the accountability aspect); to describe the institutional
arrangements and current practices on provision of information
about the organization, planning, budgeting, administration
and operations of these forces, services and agencies in the
selected countries (the transparency aspect); and, finally,
to offer a preliminary comparative evaluation in order to
highlight good practices in controlling these bodies.
Blagovest Tashev and Konstantin Dimitrov,
Transparency in the Formulation and Implementation of Defense
Policy (Sofia: George C. Marshall Association - Bulgaria,
2004)
Parliamentarian and civil society oversight
of governmental policies is a basic principle and value of
democracy. This ensures the public accountability and transparency
of the executive branch. This principle applies to the formulation
and implementation by the government of defense policies.
The main objectives of the brochure is to analyze
the degree of transparency in defense policy in Bulgaria and
to provoke public debate on the issues and the challenges
facing the process of democratization in the national security
sector.
The brochure discusses several issues related
to transparency of defense policy. First, it provides a theoretical
and methodological concept of transparency of defense policy,
and focuses on the methods of measuring the level of transparency
in security sector. Next, ti gives gives examples of best
practices in parliamentary oversight of defense policy in
countries from the Euro-Atlantic area. It pays special attention
to the delicate issue of the balance between secrecy and transparency
in defense policy. The next section, on the basis of the main
documents and current practices, analyzes the state of transparency
in the Bulgarian defense policy. Finally, the authors identify
some of the problems facing the transparency of defense policy
and provide some recommendations for improving the transparency
in the area including: enhancing the Parliament's role in
managing the security and defense resources; introducing a
modern resource management system, etc.
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
George C. Marshall Center for the
Study of European Security, Germany
The mission of the Marshall Center is to create a more stable
security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions
and relationships; promoting security cooperation; and promoting
stable partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe
and Eurasia.
The need for an institution such as the
Marshall Center was identified during the failed August 1991
coup attempt in Russia. The U. S. European Command began to
develop proposals to expand defense and security contacts
with the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,
and Eurasia. The goal was to positively influence the development
of security structures appropriate for democratic states.
In October 1991, a proposal was accepted to use the facilities
of the former U.S. Army Russian Institute in Germany to create
a European center for security studies where could be developed
opportunities to work with Central and Eastern European, and
Eurasian defense organizations and institutions.
The Marshall Center focuses on the most
important issues confronting the region, including: global
war on terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
internal instability jeopardizing the territorial integrity
of nations and implications for regional stability; security
implications of the information revolution, revolution in
military affairs, and; transnational threats; crisis management;
European Union enlargement; the role of NATO, etc.
Detailed information about the Marshall
Center can be found at http://www.marshallcenter.org/
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF), Switzerland
DCAF is an international foundation made up of 45 governments,
including Switzerland, 40 other Euro-Atlantic States, 3 African
States, and the Canton of Geneva. It was established in 2000
on the initiative of the Swiss government. The Centre's mission
is to support state and non-state institutions in their efforts
to strengthen democratic and civilian oversight of armed and
security forces, and to promote security sector reform under
the democratic standards.
To implement its objectives, the Centre:
- collects information and undertakes research
in order to identify problems, to gather experience and
to propose best practices in the field of democratic governance
and reform of the security sector;
- provides expertise and support to all interested
parties, in particular governments, parliaments, international
organizations, and academic circles. Emphasis is put on
encouraging the principle of "self-help" and on
studying the experience of countries that have already gone
through transition processes.
Detailed information on Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces' organization and activities
can be found at http://www.dcaf.ch/
