Vol. 2, No. 8, April 2004
Table of Contents:
To Our Readers
A Model of Bulgarian National Security Strategy
Blagovest Tashev
Transparency in Defence Policy - A View from the United Kingdom
Peter Gareh
Security Sector Structure: 2008 Model
Velizar Shalamanov
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
To Our Readers
This is the 8th issue of
Security Focus and Security Sector Watch. In this issue's
first article Blagovest Tashev suggests a model of Bulgarian
National Security Strategy. Bulgaria's membership in NATO
and the changes in the international security environment
require immediate replacement of the old National Security
Concept. The new document have to formulate the national security
policy by pointing out specific Bulgarian interests and goals
in security terms and the adequate policies for achieving
these interests and goals
The second article is by Peter Gareh, a British
consultant at the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. While his
article published in a past issue of the newsletter discussed
transparency in defense policy on conceptional level, hereby,
Peter Gareh shows how in practice the British Ministry of
Defence addressees specific public and politic issues of transparency
and accountability.
In the third article Velizar Shalamanov elaborates
a model for security sector reform and integration - "Model
2008" - based on the reform of the armed forces.
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski offers review of two new
publications. The first one is a new book by Filip Dimitrov,
and the second one is a report by the Center for Strategic
ort by the Center for Strategic ing a model for further transformation
of the US Department of Defense.
Hristo offers reviews of two security institutions'
web sites - NATO and Center for European Reform.
As always, you may also find all back issues
at:
http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/index_en.shtml
From the publishers
A Model of Bulgarian National Security Strategy
Blagovest Tashev
In the previous issue we published an article
which debated some of the challenges to the national security
policy provoked by existing threats and risks in the internatinal
environment. It was not the aim to long-list the new threats
and risks, for it is done many times before, but to point
out that the new environment requires the formulation and
the implementation of a new security policy. The present article
aims to deliniate one possible framework and the content of
a future Bulgarian National Security Strategy (NSS). There
are several reasons why the government should elaborate such
a document:
- " The changes in the security environment
after the adoption of the National Security Concept of the
Republc of Bulgaria in 1999;
- " Blgaria's full-fledged membership
in NATO, which requires the formulation of national security
policy in the framework of a military alliance.
- " The need for transformation of the
national security policy, in order to be adequate of the
new security environment;
- " The completion of the Defense Strategic
Review;
- " Each government should have its own
antional security strategy;
- As it was mentioned in a previous article
(No 5, December 2003), a national security strategy should
perform the following elements:
- " Definition of the national security
goals and interests;
- " Definition of the dimensions of the
international and national security environment and identification
of the main threats, challenges and opportunities in this
environment;
While elaborating the Bulgarian NSS it's important
to avoid including too many issues. Such trend was observed
not long ago while other national security documents were
under elaboration. These documents cover too many issues,
including problems not relevant to security (for example,
see the current National Security Concept). Thus, the document
will not have a proper focus and the definition of the security
policy will be difficult. What should the NSS cover in particular?
National security interests and goals
NSS should not discuss abstract national ideals, but should
instead list security interests and goals, including:
- Sustainable democratic development in the
country, the region and in the world. Democracy is not only
a value but a necessary security precondition. Not only
academic studies but also history proves the correlation
between democracy and security - democracies do not wage
war on democracies. Thus, the spread and introduction of
democracy around the globe eliminates the probability of
armed conflicts;
- The establishment and support of international
system bringing peace, stability and predictability on the
basis of international rules, standards and institutions.
The end of the Cold War and the new emerging challenges
make this not only feasible but necessary;
- The integration into all Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The national security is not possible without integrating
in this community. In this sense, Bulgaria has substantial
interest in the further integration and stability of the
community. Every single process that threatens the stability
and the unity of the Euro-Atlantic community should be recognized
as a direct threat to national security;
- Sustainable and competitive participation
of Bulgaria in the global economic system. There is interdependence
between security, democracy and free market. It is not by
chance that all states of the Euro-Atlantic community are
democratic, capitalist and emjpying a high level of security.
Therefore, a further liberalization of the global and the
Bulgarian market is an important national interest and goal,
- Integration of the Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic
community. The new international environment makes the national
security difficult to attain if Bulgaria's neighbors stay
out of the Western community. In other words the national
security is indivisible from the security of neighboring
states. The overall security in the region could be achieved
solely by integration in the Euro-Atlantic community.
The dimensions of the international and national
security environment
One of the consequences of Bulgaria's ongoing integration
into the Euro-Atlantic community is the indivisibility of
the national security from the security of the community.
Logically, it's possible to expect that the outcomes of the
national analysis and assessment of the security environment
would not differ much from the ones in the other Euro-Atlantic
states. It's not by chance that the resemblance between the
recently adopted Security Strategy of the EU and the National
Security Strategy of the U.S. adopted in 2002. They define
almost identical threats, risks and challenges to security
icluding: international terrorism; proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; regional conflicts; the gap between the
prosperous West and the undeveloped and poor Third World;
lack of democracy and good governance in many parts of the
world; natural degradation; organized crime; failed states.
Of course, the NSS should prioritize the threats.
A reality of the new environment is the diverse combination
of threats, risks and challenges that the states face. For
example, in tersm of security Bulgaria is mostly concerned
with the challenges posed by organized crime and regional
conflicts, while other European countries have other security
priorities. However, the document has to indicate the relation
between internal and external sources of threats to national
security, as well as the relevant consequences for the national
security policy. In this part of the document there should
also be formulated the new commitments steming from membership
in NATO and the future EU membership.
Policies to achieve security goals and interests
This part of the NSS is the most important. It defines
the specific government policy to achieve security. Therefore
it should be to the highest degree concrete but not necessarily
averally detailed. The Bulgarian NSS has to define the following
elements of the policy:
- Active membership in the Euro-Atlantic security
structures, including NATO and the newly established EU
defense and security structures as well as those of the
OSCE;
- Active participation in the policie of the
Euro-Atlantic community and the international community
in the spread of democratic values and liberal economic
rules and principles, strengthening the institutional and
multilateral approach to global issues and the rule of international
law;
- Active participation requires not only specific
political behavior but also building structures and capabilities
in order to realize this participation. It means that the
institutions in the national security sector should have
adequate capabilities in order to implement the politic
decisions;
- Further improvement of the security policy
coordination between Bulgaria and the states of the Euro-Atlantic
community;
- Elaboration of strategies and mechanisms
for active participation in preventive measures, including
utilization of political, economic, intelligence and military
means;
- Building military capabilities for participation
in NATO and EU military missions. Priority should be given
to development of capabilities for missions beyond the national
borders;
- Building an integrated national security
sector, including. integrated Ministry of Defense and Ministry
of Internal Affairs. For that purpose, the NSS must include
a list of specific legislative, political and institutional
steps for integration. The integration aims not only the
clear definition of a particular institution's role in the
security sector, but also the effective use of expensive
capabilities;
- Security services reform - transformation
of the security services into an integral element of the
security sector under a real democratic oversight;
- Defining the regions and states which are
a priority for Bulgaria's security. Bulgaria's behavior
and attitude towards these states and regions should be
analyzed and described in details;
- Building a civilian and infrastructure protection
system;
- Good governance of the security sector through
effective utilization of the information technologies. The
relation between E-government and the management and functioning
of the security sector. Elaboration of development strategy
of integrated information systems coordinated by a Chief
Information Manager;
- A military infrastructure development plan
as a part of the national infrastructure,
- Headline goals for development of the Bulgarian
military industry and improving its legislation basis in
accordance with the processes of integration in NATO and
transformation of the security sector.
It is evident that the NSS is inevitably a complex
document notwithstanding attempts to focus on security issues
alone. Therefore, the framers of a future NSS must resist
the temptation to include issues that are not directly related
to security, such as economic development, health issues,
education, etc. Those should be the topics in in other documents.
Trying to "insert" such issues into the NSS text
under the pretext that they are relevant to security, will
inevitably lead to a "watered down" document.
Transparency in Defence Policy - A View from the United
Kingdom
Peter Gareh
The first thing that I would say about defence
policy is that defence is a part of overall government policy.
Transparency in government policy is important in defence,
just as it is in education, foreign affairs or transport policy.
There has, however, traditionally been a tendency for people
involved in defence to be more secretive than perhaps in other
areas of government work, and this applies not just in Britain,
but around the world, I would suggest. I have been into several
ministries of defence in several countries and many share
the feature of long corridors with closed doors and confusing
geography. Whilst open rather than closed office doors are
usual these days in the British Ministry of Defence, it will
be interesting to see what effect open plan offices will have
when the refurbished MOD Main Building in London re-opens
later this year.
Why is transparency important? It is important
because governments in democratic societies are accountable
to society. People have a right to know on what their taxes
are being spent and that they are being spent properly and
efficiently and represent value for money. In terms of expenditure
profile in the United Kingdom, the percentage of GDP is quite
low on defence compared with some other sectors of government
expenditure - roughly 2.5% compared with 11% on social security,
7% on health and 5% on education. But in terms of public opinion
profile it can run very high as we have seen in the context
of the Iraq war. There was considerable opposition at the
start of last year to the United Kingdom going to war and
there continues to be scepticism, despite the outcome of Lord
Hutton's enquiry into the death of the MOD official, Dr David
Kelly, which effectively exonerated the Government. Lord Hutton's
enquiry, however, was quite narrowly based. It was not about
the decision of the British Government to engage in a war
and I believe that there will continue to be public concern
until that issue has been properly addressed.
Defence has become a lot more open in recent
years than it was when I joined. I should like to address
the issue of openness on two levels. The first level concerns
availability of information within the defence community itself.
The second level concerns the availability of information
more broadly.
Turning to the first level, within the defence
community itself there is much more information than there
used to be about what is going on in the MOD. Does that matter?
I believe that it does. I personally find it helpful to know
what is going on in the large and diverse organisation, in
which I work. I know that colleagues share this view. Monthly
journals, such as "Focus", which has been available
now for about ten years, are widely available, free of charge,
and keep people informed on what is happening in the defence
world and make an important contribution to people's understanding
of the broader picture. There has, not surprisingly, been
a lot of reporting on Iraq in "Focus" over the past
year, but there is still space for articles on the Navy's
role in drug busting, or a day in the life of the registrar
of the MOD's art collection. "Preview", the monthly
publication of the Defence Procurement Agency, has articles
on MOD's acquisition activities and is an imPORT 85,196,175,184,128,98
to one's understanding of how 40% of the defence budget is
spent each year. The monthly publication "Paper Clips"
covers civilian personnel issues within the Ministry of Defence.
The monthly "Money Matters" deals with issues of
defence finance. These are just a few of the internal publications.
Whilst it is important to keep those who work
in or with the MOD up to date with what is going on, at the
second level, transparency of government policy to the general
public is politically a bigger issue. Annual Defence White
Papers, Statements of Account, Defence Statistics have been
a long-standing source of information. Today, there are more
publications than there used to be and they are less dry.
For example, the publication of the Strategic Defence Review
in 1998 was a departure from the past, in that it was written
in clear English, has several pictures and is informative
about the Government's vision of defence. These publications,
however, are not free. For example, the latest Defence White
Paper, published in December 2003 comes in two parts, costing
a total of ?23 (about BGL 65). It is not going to be on everyone's
essential reading list, but frankly, neither would it be if
it were free. The point is that there is a raft of information:
the White Paper sets out the Government's policy on defence;
the Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts set out how
the budget has been spent; an annual Performance Report analyses
how well the Department has met its targets; the annual publication
on Defence Statistics provides extensive details on numbers
and percentages. These are just a few of the publications
available for public scrutiny. Additionally, there are several
publications, which are available free of charge to the general
public, and which aim to explain what defence is all about
- Defence Matters, Explaining the Defence Mission, Defence
Policy 2001, Defence Diplomacy, Joint Forces, Respecting the
Environment, to name a few. They are all available on the
web. Moreover, there have been roadshows around the country
to explain defence to the general public. This is part of
the process of greater openness.
So far I have written only about examples of
the Government's own presentation of information. A media,
free from government control or interference, has a key part
to play in questioning governments, holding them to account
and keeping pressure on them to be as open as possible about
policy and performance. Some do it more responsibly than others,
and some parts of the media are certainly more trusted than
other parts by the general public for their general impartiality
and accuracy in reporting. By and large, the media and the
British public are not anti-defence. But this is not a reason
to remain passive, neither to refrain from saying things that
might not be music to everone's ears. Unsurprisingly, there
has been a great deal of coverage on Iraq. A recent edition
of "The Spectator" argued that Britain was wasting
billions on useless planes and ships. Despite critical reporting,
relations today, I believe, between Government and media have
improved greatly. Twenty years ago, relations between the
media and the government reached a very low point at the time
of the Falklands Conflict, when the media was accused by military
commanders of revealing operational information and, thereby,
putting lives at risk. In the intervening period a lot of
effort has been put into establishing sensible modi operandi
with the media. Nowadays, reporters and cameramen seem to
be almost part of the operation.
The media are not the only detached watchdogs
of Government performance. Parliament has to approve a Department's
budget each year. At the end of the financial year, the National
Audit Office (NAO) audits a Department's accounts and places
the Consolidated Departmental Resource Accounts before Parliament.
The NAO can examine any aspect of Government performance about
which they have concerns, regarding economy, efficiency and
effectiveness in the use of resources. The head of the NAO
- the Comptroller and Auditor General can be described as
a semi-parliamentary official and he works closely with another
watchdog - the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). This committee
has been in existence since 1861 and its function is the "examination
of the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted
by Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and other such
accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think
fit. The sixteen members of the committee are politicians
and the committee is traditionally chaired by a member of
the opposition. The members are not necessarily experts in
the fields, which they are examining, but rely on well-researched
preliminary reports provided by the NAO. They can cross examine
the most senior officials of Government Departments and Agencies.
There is usually great media interest in both NAO and subsequent
PAC reports, which can be critical and hard-hitting.
Should there be limitations on government transparency?
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 received Royal Assent
in November 2000. It establishes a general right of access
to information held by public authorities, subject to certain
exemptions. Full access rights will come into force in January
2005. The legislation covers a wide range of public bodies
- Government Departments, non-departmental public bodies,
the Armed Forces, the National Health Service, local government,
the police, colleges and universities, schools. Some private
sector organisations are included, insofar as they undertake
public sector functions. There are, however as you might expect,
exceptions. The Freedom of Information Act does not override
other legislation, which controls or prohibits the release
of information. In particular:
- The Data Protection Act 1998 sets the rules
for disclosure of personal information.
- The Environmental Information Regulations
1992 protect certain environmental information.
- The Official Secrets Act 1989 makes it an
offence to release information without authority to do so.
- Information held by the Security Service,
the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ), the Special Forces, or any unit or
part-unit assisting GCHQ is exempt.
Apart from these exceptions, in a nutshell,
the Act is based on the premise that members of the public
have a right to know about the work, activities and decisions
of all public authorities in the United Kingdom. "All
public authorities" includes the MOD and the Armed Forces.
By way of conclusion, openness is, by and large,
not a natural inclination of those in public service. By saying
nothing, or hiding behind secrecy, it is harder to be held
to account. A culture of openness is by no means inherent
in the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, but I have observed
that a predisposition towards openness has come a long way
in the time that I have been a civil servant. Fifteen years
ago, talk of Freedom of Information would have been anathema
to many. In less than one year from now Government Departments
will be obliged by law to make official information available
to those who ask for it. All change is possible with time.
If transparency matters, and in my view it does, there has
to be commitment, not just in word but also in deed.
Security Sector Structure: 2008 Model
Velizar Shalamanov
The definition of the security sector structure
is closely related to the current situation, risks and threats
assessment, society's understandings, traditions, alliance
dimensions, resource basis, etc. But optimization will become
simply a technical issue if only the political process replaces
the vagueness of "task definition" with clear goals
and limitations.
The debate in the Bulgarian society leads to
a balanced security sector, including the Ministry of Defense,
Civil Protection State Agency, security services, as well
as other agencies' departments. The most advanced is the debate
on the Bulgarian Army - as a result of the ongoing reforms
and NATO integration there has been achieved a fragile consensus
on its structure, namely:
- land forces of five 5 brigade size formations
(of them two general and at least three specialized), as
well as some reserve units;
- air forces of two brigade-size units - air
defense, tactical aviation and various reserve units;
- naval forces of two brigade-size units -
naval bases on the north and the south Black Sea coast and
some reserve units;
- Three central brigade-size units - communication
and information unit, intelligence unit and logistics unit;
- Ministry of Defense along with its excutive
agencies and the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces.
Such army would be commanded by some 30 generals
(20 of them will be brigade generals and only one will perform
the function of a corps general, in compliance with the army
strength within a single corps). Each year, the army will
require at least 200 new officers, 400 sergeants and some
4000 soldiers (for the army will be entirely professional)
prepared by a training command.
This army would need armaments, equipment, goods
and services for approximately 400-500 million lv. per annum,
provided by provisional agency for acquisition and technologies.
The operation command will manage our contingents
numbering 1500-2000 troops in operations wherever in the world.
At least two of the contingents will be structured as battalion
groups, and other smaller contingents will function as special
units. Regarding the army strength, Bulgaria will spend some
1-1,5 billions lv. per year.
The border police will adopt the European standards
for EU external borders protection. Moreover Bulgaria will
have Gendarmerie of several regiments or particular independent
battalions with overall strength of up to 5000 men. Functionally,
the Gendarmerie will be in between the land forces and the
police.
The Civil Protecitn State Agency will sustain
up to 3000 men for civilian and infrastructure protection
in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry
of Defense.
The police will be evidently present in inhabited
localities all around the country guaranteeing public order
and fighting crime.
The security services will be consolidated into
well coordinated intelligence community with opportunities
for information integration and distribution to its legal
users, both in national and international terms.
Thus the security sector will number axpromitaly
100 000 people and will cost more than 2,5 billion lv. in
the state budget.
A more elaborate analysis of the Ministry of
Interior and the Civil Protecitn State Agency on the basis
of the method used in the case of the Ministry of Defense,
will allow simultaneous optimization of strength, training,
provision, as well as elaboration of coordinated strategies
and programs for transformation into an integrated security
sector.
The integration of this sector into the public
management system requires the establishment of respective
commissions under the Council of Ministers' Security Council.
These commissions will be directed by the relevant ministers
- of Defense, Foreign Affaires, Civil and Infrastructure Protection.
The Security Council will need its own administration and
mechanisms for joint work with the intelligence community.
Furthermore, such a system could incorporate
the Ministry of Interior, elements and structures of other
ministries, district and municipal administrations, the defense
industry. A general definition of such a plan and the definition
of the mechanisms for its functioning on political level will
allow the full optimization on professional level, i.e. implementation
of modern methods and establishment of management and procurement
structures without losing the operational and the institutional
independence.
To a great extent the analysis of such model
will allow the most important and fundament issues to be defined
even on Constitution level. It is what will make the security
sector, the governance and the system of democratic civil
control sustainable.
The operational aspects could be included into
a national security law (or crisis management law as a basis
for guaranteeing security nowadays), and the specific issues
in each area could their place in the respective functional
law on defense, public order, intelligence, foreign policy,
civil and infrastructure protection. The institutional structures
and internal mechanisms are to be defined by the Rules of
procedure in compliance with the Law of Administration.
The 2008 Model could be an aim for the next
parliament - it could be realized in one parliamentary mandate
and will end after accession to the EU, thus the full-fledge
membership realities will be incorporated in the model. If
an integrated security sector is achieved by 2007 then a period
of 4-5 years will be needed in order to optimize the model.
The 2008 Model concept is based on the security sector network
which is flexible and can be easily oriented toward a particular
security issue - foreign policy, defense, public order, civilian
and infrastructure defense. Depending on the circumstances,
one institution of the sector sector is leading it gets the
support of the rest, so that all sector resources are in use.
This is the first level. The second and the third along with
mobilization of internal resource are the external "reinforcements"
provided by NATO and the EU.
If such a model is approbated on both politic
and public level, even though it will undergo some changes
in the latter, there will be a clear action plan for the complex
legislative work ahead.
If there is no such a vision then every single
agency will wage its own small turf war - first facing its
natural partners and secondly itself. Under these conditions
the terrorist networks and the organized crime will find us
vulnerable and will take advantage to attack us or they will
skillfully "withdraw" resources of ours in order
to attack some of our allies through bases on our territory.
A model like this at least could help the elaboration
of a questionnaire for assessment of the different security
sector reform programs. The questionnaire would assess the
institutions in the framework of the sector, their structures,
their personnel resources and budget, how they interact, how
they are managed and controlled, how the execute operates,
how they cooperate on international level, etc. All these
questions should have their answers - specific and understandable
for the taxpayer. The answers should be documented and they
should guarantee the transparency and accountability of the
implementation.
In general this would be the framework of the
security sector governance, which is our next task in the
context of our full-fledge membership in NATO and our future
EU membership.
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Filip Dimitrov, The New Democracies and the
Transatlantic Link
(Sofia: Siela, 2004)
The last decade of the XX century was a period of crucial
changes. In Eastern Europe out of the Warsaw Pact ruins a
group of states emerged - the so called New Democracies -
which has become orientated towards the West. Several years
later was founded the European Union - a serious step forward
to a political unification of Western Europe. A new enemy
emerged - global terrorism.
Naturally, these changes have had serious impact
on the Transatlantic relations and security. A lot of questions
were raised about: the New Democracies and their Western affiliation;
Russia's attitude towards the Central and Eastern Europe;
Russia and the Transatlantic Link; the USA-European Union
relations in respect of the political development of the New
Democracies and the new dimensions of the Transatlantic security,
and so many others.
Filip Dimitrov tries to find answers to these
questions in his book "The New Democracies and the Transatlantic
Link". Having in mind that the author has been in the
center of or close to the key events of the late 20th century,
it is apparent that the book presents a salutary picture of
the historical events and political trends last 15 years.
Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for
a New Strategic Era -Phase 1 Report, 2004
In the mid-1980s, US
experienced a series of operational military failures-Iran,
Beirut, Grenada. This convinced the US Congress that the Department
of Defense (DoD) was not functioning effectively. Then was
enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 (G-N), which identified a huge problem - inability
of the military services to work effectively together jointly
in conducting military operations. And this document addressed
this problem. The G-N intended to accelerate jointness within
the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally reshaping the way in
which they were organized, trained, commanded and employed.G-N
affected all major elements of the US DoD. Afterwords, many
considered G-N as the reason for the overwhelming successes
of U.S. forces in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan.
But the security environment has changed since
the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. Thus CSIS has undertaken
an effort to explore the next phase of US defense reform.
The two-year project Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform
for a New Strategic Era (started 2002), conducted by the International
Security Program at CSIS, attempts to address the contemporary
defense reform issues.
Recently, in the framework of the project, was
released Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era-Phase 1 Report, which summarize up to date the
research results and the recommendations for defense reforms
of the US DoD. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team, realizes
that today the failures are "hidden" and mostely
unknown to the broader public. While the U.S. military is
extremely good at conducting military operations, it does
so very inefficiently.
In its approach to defense reform, the study
team used on several guiding principles: preserving civilian
control over the military; the institutional vitality of the
Military Services must be maintained; jointness needs to be
extended in terms of achieving superior military, interagency
and coalition operations; the Combatant Commanders (CoComs),
Military Services and defense agencies are the operating elements
of the Department of Defense; a healthy competition of ideas
on major issues among the CoComs, Military Services, the Joint
Staff and Îffice of Secretary of Defenese must be ensured.
The study team has identified six specific problems
for the US defense:
- Organizational Structures in DoD -
the current organizational structure of the Military Departments,
the Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense
(OSD) are unnecessarily duplicative and overlapping and
in overly large staffs that require wasteful coordination
and impede necessary innovation.
- Joint Procurement of Command and Control
- the CSIS study team recognizes that the armed forces of
US are increasingly waging joint and interdependent combat
operations.
- Resource Allocation Process - the
Department of Defense's resource allocation process often
stifles innovation by making it extremely difficult for
defense leaders to make important trade-off decisions across
mission areas.
- Strengthening Civilian Professionals in
Defense and National Security - the civilian professionals
in the Defense Department, and the national security agencies
more broadly are losing the ability to provide strategic
guidance and policy oversight".
- Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations
- the U.S. operations over the past decade, from Somalia
to Iraq, have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of
effort not only from the armed forces but also from across
the U.S. government and an international coalition.
- Strengthening Congressional Oversight
- the issue of the declining congressional oversight of
the defense, critically important to the nation's ability
to identify and defeat extant and emerging threats to US
security and that of US allies across the globe.
The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study team concludes
that the U.S. national security requires significant reforms
to meet the challenges of a new strategic era. Òhe Department
of Defense must adapt not only to the post-Cold War, post-9/11
security environment but also must cope with many "hidden
failures" that impede necessary innovation and continue
to waste critical resources in terms of time and money. Many
organizational structures and processes initially constructed
to contain a Cold War superpower in the Industrial Age are
inappropriate for 21st century missions in an Information
Age. All practical measures and recommendations for transformation
of the US defense developed by The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols
study team can be found in full text of Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:
Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era-Phase 1 Report, available
at
http://www.csis.org/isp/0403_BGN.pdf. Viewing this report
might be of a great benefit for Bulgarian security experts.
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Brussels
http://www.nato.int/
What is NATO? What does NATO do? How does NATO
work? What is on NATO's agenda? Need more information? The
best way to find quickly salutary answers to such questions
is to visit NATO's web site. It's a large web site befitting
to the size of the Organization. Any basic information about
NATO can be found on this web site. The operations, the partnerships,
the organization, the documents, the analyses, and etc., are
presented on the web site mainly through attractive multimedia
presentations.
Those who open the web site in order to get
acquainted with the nature of the Organization it's advisable
to go to the following link: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm.
On this link is distributed the NATO Handbook which covers
a wide range of facts about the development of NATO from its
foundation in late '40s of 20th century till September 11th
in relation to the altering security environment. The NATO
Handbook is available in Bulgarian as well. In fact on the
web site most of the basic NATO documents and publications
are distributed in all member state languages.
Most of NATO's publications are available on
the web site through the On-line Library http://www.nato.int/docu/home.htm:
books, official texts, speeches and opinions, news and updates.
On this link can be found the World Wide Web version of the
Alliance's principal periodical publication: NATO Review.
Here all articles from 1991 to present can be viewed on-line
in English or in French, but some of the articles have other
languages version.
Centre for European Reform (CER), London
http://www.cer.org.uk/
The Centre for European Reform is a forum for
discussion of the many political, economic and social challenges
facing the integration of Europe. CER is a European think-tank
that seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries,
in North America and elsewhere in the world. The CER aims
to promote new ideas and policies for reforming the European
Union. The CER favours a competitive, outward-looking Europe
that has strong links to North America.
One of the main fields of research of CER is
the EU Security & Defence Policy. The Centre has a specific
Security and Defence Policy Programme which puts stress on
four headings: EU institutions, EU capabilities, EU-NATO relations,
and EU-UN relations. The CER's Security & Defence Policy
Programme is run by the well-known researcher Daniel Keohane.
The CER produces a lot of occasional working
papers and other publications on security and defence policy
issues. As the web site says several publications have helped
to set the agenda in the debate on European Defence, such
as Can Britain lead in Europe?(1998), European defence post-Kosovo
(1999), Intimate relations: Can Britàin play a leading role
in European Defence - and keep ist links to US intelligence?
(2000). All these papers and publications on other EU issues
as well as the CER's Bulletin are available on the CER's web
site.
