Year 2, issue 7, March 2004
Table of Contents:
To Our Readers
Threats to Regional and Euro-Atlantic Security
Jeffrey Levine
The Connection between Security Environment and Security Policy
Blagovest Tashev
The role of the parliament in the security sector reform
Velizar Shalamanov
NATO Membership as National Strategic Priority
Prof. Plamen Pantev
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
To Our Readers
This is the seventh issue of the Security Focus
and Security Sector Watch newsletter.
On 26 February in Sofia, the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Security
along with the U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria organized a conference,
Fulfilling Bulgaria's Obligations in NATO. Of the papers presented
at the conference our newsletter publishes the Deputy Chief
of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Jeffrey Levine's presentation which
discusses some of the most important changes in the security
environment and the new challenges facing regional and Euro-Atlantic
security. We also publish an article by Blagovest Tashev,
which is an edited version of his presentation at the same
conference. The author points out that most of the discussions
on Bulgaria's security is limited to listing the new threats
and risks and to the arguments for membership in NATO as a
means for attaining security against these challenges. What
the debate lacks, however, is the discussion of a new security
policy, which is adequate of the new environment.
Velizar Shalamanov discusses the role of the
parliament in the security sector reform in the context of
the concluding Strategic Defense Review. The government of
Bulgaria has a key role in building the national defense system,
but this process is ineffective without the active participation
of the parliament. The parliament assures transparency, which,
on its part, is a prerequisite for governmental accountability
and ultimately makes the security policy legitimate.
In the next article, professor Plamen Pantev
points out to some of the steps Bulgaria needs to take in
order to become a loyal and effective member of NATO. Joining
NATO is not the end, but rather the beginning of the process
of integration in the Euro-Atlantic security system and attaining
this goal requires complex efforts.
And finally, Hristo Chorbadzhiski reviews a
new publication and presents the web pages of two institutions
in the area of security studies.
As always we expect your opinions about the
content of this newsletter. You can find all back issues at
http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security
From the publishers
Threats to Regional and Euro-Atlantic Security
Jeffrey Levine
In 1998, I had the opportunity to attend a Master's
Program at National Defense University in Washington D.C.
This was a very interesting time for anyone in the American
defense establishment involved in strategic planning. The
Cold War was definitively over and most Americans were expecting
a "Peace Dividend" which would allow us to decrease
military spending and lessen our attention to security concerns.
At the same time, our military planners faced
a more uncertain environment, now that we no longer had a
clearly-defined strategic adversary - the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw pact countries. Some in the military establishment
advocated a shift of focus to other countries -- searching
for the most likely adversary. But many of our military strategists
realized that assessing and preparing for future threats to
security required a substantially updated worldview.
For the first time - certainly in U.S. History
-- what has come to be known as the asymmetrical enemy posed
the greatest threat to our collective security. This new enemy
consisted of ideologically-based terror groups, which in 1998
were obviously not as prominent a threat as they became on
September 11, as well as international organized crime networks,
drug cartels, rogue militaries - operating primarily outside
any official government and sometimes from the territory of
failed states. These have become the true security threats
of our time.
These forces are called asymmetrical because
they don't command anywhere near the same capabilities as
their targets, yet they are a credible threat. Use NATO as
example -- When the next round of expansion is completed,
NATO will have more than 2 million ground troops and almost
3,000 combat aircraft. Not to mention its nuclear capability.
In traditional battle, there isn't an existing military in
the world that could predict victory against that force. Yet
NATO countries have been attacked and casualties sustained.
Asymmetrical enemies do not typically seek
victory as traditionally defined - usually as the acquisition
of territory. In some cases, it's difficult to understand
exactly what they are seeking. But the ability to sustain
and protect their own organizations while effectively carrying
out asymmetrical operations constitutes success.
When we talk about real threats to regional
and Euro-Atlantic Security in today's environment, we're talking
primarily about these asymmetrical threats as well as the
conditions that support them.
In this region, it could include potentially
unstable states where the absence of sufficiently strong governments
provides a conducive environment; Organized crime, especially
with its ability to launder funds internationally and evade
border controls; Drug cartels - another form of organized
crime with the ability to amass enormous financial resources,
then available for circumventing and corrupting legitimate
governments.
In identifying these threats, the Euro-Atlantic
community has already made a good start in addressing them.
There is growing recognition that NATO's "non-traditional"
roles of peacekeeping and out-of-area deployments are likely
to become much more traditional in order to prevent our asymmetrical
opponents from exploiting unstable areas. The international
effort to identify and seize the financial resources of terrorist
and criminal organizations is becoming increasingly effective.
And numerous international initiatives - formal and informal
- have arisen to control the movements of both light weaponry
and weapons of mass destruction.
There is also the clear understanding that
collective defense really is COLLECTIVE defense. For Bulgaria
and the other new members, this means above all, adherence
to their NATO commitments and the successful development of
a modern, professional, deployable and inter-operable military
that can secure their own territory and contribute to the
defense of others.
Following Sept. 11 -- I, like many Americans,
searched for historical parallels that would make the terrorist
attacks more understandable - and more importantly - how to
protect against them. The closest I found were the pirates
of the 18th and 19th centuries who primarily attacked the
merchant ships of the Atlantic Ocean, who were under the protection
of their country's Navy. There were also famous pirates sailing
from the Barbary Coast. Today, the pirates have been romantized
- but during their time they were a real threat who terrorized
merchants and passengers on the high seas. Like our asymmetrical
opponents of today, these pirates lacked the force of the
Navies they challenged, but could be effective against individual
targets. They existed with some state sponsorship and also
in areas beyond any state's control. Their reign ended when
stable and cooperative relationships developed between seafaring
nations. The pirates' safehavens were eliminated and it was
no longer in any state's interest to protect them. That same
kind of regional, trans-Atlantic and international cooperation
today, backed by the right military capabilities again offers
our best collective defense.
The Connection between Security Environment and Security
Policy
Blagovest Tashev
The current national security discourse in Bulgaria
is dominated mainly by listing the various nontraditional
threats, risks and challenges as well as by the insistence
that the integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures is the
means to address them. What is worrisome in this discourse
is the evident lack of understanding of the new security environment
and the ensuing need for transformation of the national security
policy. Instead, the discourse includes a modern rhetoric
which does not necessarily display a comprehensive understanding
of its meaning. Consequently, the popular thinking about security
sees membership in the Euro-Atlantic security system as the
panacea rather than as a significant element of the national
security policy. This poor explication of the connection between
the new threats and Bulgaria's membership in NATO stems from
the inadequate conceptualization of security in the new environment.
This newsletter has published-and will continue
to publish-numerous articles discussing the new security environment
and especially the new threats, risks and challenges facing
national security. This article, however, devotes attention
to the challenges to national security policy caused by the
existing threats and risks. In other words, what are the consequences
of the new threats including international terrorist networks,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states,
ethnic conflicts, failed states, migration processes, international
criminal networks, environmental degradation and others?
The role of the armed forces
One of the consequences of the new threats is the declining
and changing role of the armed forces in security policies.
In the past, the traditional threat had been associated with
armed aggression, i.e. threat to the state's territorial integrity
and sovereignty. Since most of the new complex threats are
nonmilitary in nature it is logical to expect that the adequate
security policy must integrate various instruments for response
including political, military, police, economic, intelligence
and others. Not surprisingly, the tendency in some states
is to build security policy within a network of integrated
institutions including the institutions of foreign partners
as well.
Preventive security policy
One of the important consequences of the new threats is the
necessity for the formulation and implementation of preemptive
and preventive policies. In the new environment, the states
cannot wait the threats to materialize before they get the
legitimate right to respond. During the cold war, security
policy was based on the concept of deterrence-system of policies
aimed at dissuading the opponent from striking or taking some
other specific steps. In the framework of this strategy, the
weapons of mass destructions (WMD) were considered weapons
of last resort; a deterrent to be used only after all other
means have failed. In the new environment, however, terrorist
groups regard WMD as weapons of choice; a weapon giving them
the ability to cause heavy losses to states possessing superior
military force. Therefore, the states cannot afford to use
the strategy of deterrence against an enemy who is not amenable
to deterrence. Alternatively, the state is compelled to apply
strategy, which seeks to eliminate the threat before the enemy
strikes first, i.e., preemptive action. This strategy is part
of the so-called preventive policy, which includes not only
military but also political, economic and other strategies.
The preventive policy is applied not only toward terrorist
groups, but also in maintaining stable institutions and building
democracy in weak states, the elimination of crime networks
and the conditions which create them, maintaining the nonproliferation
of WMD regimes and others. In any case, these policies are
essential less the risks turn into real threats.
Security policy far away from national borders
In the new security environment it is more likely for the
threats to emerge far away from the national territory. The
traffic of drugs, for example, begins in regions of production,
which might be thousands of kilometers away from the recipient
market or from the state wherein the profits from the trade
are laundered. Consequently, the adequate security policy
requires actions against threats in regions very distant from
the state facing them. In other words, the states cannot afford
to act against threats only on its territory but must "go"
to the sources of threats. This is one of the most controversial
strategies because the international law still conservatively
holds the national sovereignty as inviolable and forbids interference
in internal affairs of another state. There exists a clash
between the principle of noninterference and the need-already
recognized by most states-of preventive and preemptive actions
in regions which are sources of threats.
Indivisible security
In the past, traditional thinking about security very often
considered security policy as zero-sum game-the more powerful
a state compared to another state the more secure the state.
In the new environment, however, the security of the state
cannot be gained at the expense of other states. In other
words, security is becoming indivisible-insecurity in one
state breeds insecurity in other states. Therefore, every
adequate security policy requires multilateral approaches,
which do not exclude regions and states; states are not able
to achieve security on their own any more. As a consequence,
the state does not need to develop the full spectrum of security
capabilities as allies and partners may provide many of them.
Thus national security policy must achieve a high level of
integration within the framework of an allied security system.
It might be argued that this is a process of denationalization
of the security policy-transition from a national security
policy to a community security policy. Logically, we speak
of Euro-Atlantic security rather than of the security of separate
states in this community.
Prioritization of threats
During the cold war, defense systems were built to participate
in high-intensity, total conflicts. In the new environment,
such conflicts are highly unlikely. Instead, the most likely
conflicts are nontraditional. Furthermore, many of the threats
cannot be eliminated by military force. Therefore, it is essential
that the security systems are transformed for adequate responses
to the new threats. In other words, security systems must
be ready to operate in the most likely conflict scenarios
rather than in the most unlikely. This need is defined by
the existence of a new balance between likely and unlikely
conflict scenarios born our of a new set of threats and risks.
For example, it is more likely for a security system to face
threats posed by the international drug trafficking than by
the participation in a nuclear war.
The purpose of this short article is not to
provide an exhaustive list of challenges facing the modern
security policy in the new environment. Instead, it intended
to suggest ways for conceptualizing the relation between the
new security environment and the adequate security policy.
In the next issue of this newsletter another article will
discuss more specifically the consequences for the Bulgarian
security policy.
The role of the parliament in the security sector
reform
Velizar Shalamanov
Co-chairman, Security Sector Reform Coalition
It has been already more than a year
since the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was initiated. The
National Assembly, following serious discussions, just recently
approved the SDR's Political Framework, prepared in September
2003. The next task is the debate about the first serious
changes to the Law on Defense and the Armed Forces related
to Bulgaria's participation in operations of NATO, the EU
and the coalition of the willing in response to the new risks
and threats to national security. The parliament also ratified
the Washington Treaty and at the end of April will have to
vote on the final report of the SDR. Most importantly, the
parliament will have to define the security reform agenda
for the next several years.
At this time, the conclusions and recommendations
of the SDR-initiated according to decision #262 of the Council
of Ministers on 22 April 2003-are still unknown. For example,
the results of the important seminar on the review held in
Plovdiv in February have not been made public. At the same
time, a series of conferences were organized by various NGOs
participating in the Security Sector Reform Coalition, which
offered a variety of expert opinions and expectations about
the ongoing review. Only recently, the Coalition presented
to the parliament its Report #6 discussing the challenges
of membership in NATO. In fact, most of the expectations are
towards the parliament, and more specifically its Commission
on Foreign Relations, Defense and Security and the Commission
on Internal Order and Security, which should organize hearings
with experts and initiate a wide public debate on the status
of the security sector-how it should look like and how to
achieve it given the availability of resources.
The short review of the public debate on this
issue reveals the following list of questions pertaining to
the role of the parliament:
- Forming a professional contingent of forces
for participation in operations including armed forces,
police, Civil Defense forces, medical and evacuation teams,
civil-military cooperation teams and post-conflict rehabilitation
teams. Whether these forces are called rapid reaction forces,
expeditionary forces, or deployment forces is less important;
- Defining the components of the forces which
are going to be part of NATO's Response Force, the EU's
Rapid Reaction Force, NATO's collective defense, missions
of the UN, OSCE, coalitions of the willing, as well as the
mission in Bosna, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq;
- Legal regulation and the creation of body
responsible for the planning and command of joint operations
of national forces in peacetime. Defining the responsibilities
of all participants in the decision-making process as well
as the autonomy of the officer commanding the operation
within the provided mandate including in relation to the
chief of general staff and the general secretary of the
Ministry of Interior
- The approval of a legally defined program
for professionalization of the security sector and elimination
of the draft service in an acceptable timeframe.
- The approval of a modernization program in
the security sector, changes in the Public Procurement Law,
the creation of agency responsible for the development of
defense capabilities, research and procurement.
- The approval of a schedule for review and
changes in the constitution, the laws, and the political
documents associated with security and the security sector
including concepts, doctrines and strategies.
- Legal regulation of the area of civil protection
during disasters, accidents and incidents and other extraordinary
situations including the consequences of terrorist acts.
- Review of the existing legal regulations
of the functions of intelligence and special services aimed
at the creation of an effective and coordinated intelligence
community.
- Review of the state and perspectives of the
Bulgarian defense industry and the capacity of the academic
and research community in the security area. Proposals for
legislative changes increasing the effectiveness of the
defense industry and research community in the process of
integration in NATO and the EU and the security sector reform.
- The introduction of an integrated system
for resource management in the security sector, which guarantees
the existence transparency, accountability and effectiveness.
Security Sector Reform Coalition is in the process
of translating and distributing the already famous Parliamentary
Oversight of the Security Sector, a handbook published a year
ago by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces in association with the Interparliamentary Union. If
the National Assembly is willing, the Coalition is capable
of providing expertise to the process of formulating a national
plan for security sector reform. In fact, this joint effort
is the most appropriate way to "celebrate" the country's
joining NATO and the EU-a real illustration of both the national
consensus and the topical cooperation on a significant national
issue including the security of citizens, the society and
the nation.
Along with these internal aspects of security
sector reform other important issues also require the attention
of the parliament even before the NATO summit in Istanbul:
- Allied presence in Bulgaria;
- Bulgarian presence in the Alliance and the
member-states;
- Vision of Bulgaria's non-military participation
in NATO-science and technology; education, civilian infrastructure,
business;
- Bulgaria's role in the Partnership for Peace
in the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region; Caucasus and
Central Asia;
- The country's participation the Mediterranean
dialogue as well as in the grater Middle East;
- The development of security-business relationship
in those regions;
- The coordination and effective integration
of the Bulgarian policy within NATO, the EU, OSCE, the UN
and other organizations while maintaining good relations
in the Balkans
The review of these issues suggests that
the administration needs assistance in addressing them. The
parliament has an essential role in the development of a public-private
partnership in solving the problems discussed in this article.
The year of 2004 is not the end of the reform in the security
sector. Plan 2004 must be succeeded by Plan 2009, which addresses
the remaining issues in the reform of the security sector.
NATO Membership as National Strategic Priority
Prof. Plamen Pantev
The Bulgarian historical memory and recent experience
from the last 14 years embedded the society's traditional
need for preservation, development and prosperity in a conscious
national interest in NATO membership. Despite the joint influence
of numerous internal and external factors and interests this
priority was not the result of a compromise. Membership in
NATO, without contradicting all private interests, reflected
simultaneously and equally the needs of all groups in the
society. The problems of transition from one political system
to another in the context of nearly ten years of conflicts
near the national borders motivated the need for a membership
in NATO.
The priority of this national interest should
not be contested in the short or long term because of private
or other, more general, interests. The dynamics, even the
turning points, in the internal developments would not influence
the national interests related to membership in NATO without
causing overall damage to the entire system of national interests.
We should not forget how hard it was to achieve consensus
and internal stability as a result of recognizing this interest.
The likelihood of the interest in joining NATO clashing with
other national interests, because of internal or external
reasons, should not decrease the significance of the policy
choice. This is an interest, which guarantees the security
of the entire system of other national interests.
NATO membership is the guarantee for attaining
the values the Bulgarian society holds vital-freedom, peace,
security, democracy, private property, free private initiative,
rule of law, human dignity and individual liberty, developed
civil society, democratic civil control, Bulgaria's participation
in the civil democratic space and security zone called Euro-Atlantic
community.
The preservation of national interest in NATO
membership faces an issue of domestic and international-systemic
character-how the country would be up to the challenges of
being a loyal and effective ally in the context of domestic
disagreements in a transforming Alliance and still develop
the economic, political and social structure of a society
in transition. The answer to this question could be found
in two issue areas:
- What kind of a member-state will Bulgaria
be?
- What will be Bulgaria's role in the Black
Sea-Caspian region?
What kind of member-state will Bulgaria
be?
The short answer to this question goes that the country will
maintain and probably increase the NATO-required share of
the GDP devoted to the defense budget. The last year decrease
to 2.4% does not breach the 2% limit, but the absolute amount
responding to 2.4% is still rather law and requires an increase.
Bulgaria successfully participates in peacekeeping
and post-conflict rehabilitation operations under UN mandate
or in coalitions of the willing. The Bulgarian soldier deserves
more of the society's attention and care during the period
of training and preparation as well as during all the phases
of the missions abroad.
Bulgaria proved to be an adequate ally in the
process of taking hard decisions in international organizations
about security matters. Upon completing its two-year turn
as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the UN,
the country became chair of the OSCE. The Alliance will expect
its policies to be implemented through Bulgaria's chairmanship.
The ongoing tensions between NATO and the EU
and between the U.S. and the EU require a delicate balancing
act. Every specific complex situation will need an analysis
and decision, but Bulgaria will have to insist that the current
environment is an area of cooperation between the EU and the
U.S. rather a place for competition and balancing against
"dominant America." Only in such a context is the
preservation of the Bulgarian interest in all its dimensions
possible.
The ability of Bulgaria to reform the intelligence
services and the allies' assessment of the process is the
key factor in determining the country's loyalty to NATO and
the member-states' trust. NATO's concerns about the reform
in the intelligence services in Bulgaria and the other would-be
members are caused by four factors:
First, the degree of democratic civilian control
over the intelligence agencies and their operations. In this
area, it is important to educate the citizens about intelligence
issues so that they are capable in exerting control. This
process requires de-mystification of the agencies' functions
while increasing their effectiveness in guaranteeing national
security and allowing for civil control.
It is essential to assist the formation of a
political culture, which supports the legal functions of the
intelligence community in democratic environment and which
at the same time does not allow intelligence leaks for personal
and political reasons. This culture must prevent the dominance
of the intelligence community in the society through the use
of its information power.
Another important issues is related to the selection,
training and, in general, the personnel policy in the intelligence
community. It must be pointed out that this profession, in
contrast to most other occupations, including in democracies,
is under the control of internal rules and much less often
under external control. However, because of the danger posed
by the lack of oversight, especially in the context of transition
to democracy, there is a need for more accountability to and
control by the states and the society. Even in the context
of developed democracy, there is a need for an intelligent
solution to the dilemma posed by the need for democratic control
and the requirement for the effective functioning of the intelligence
community.
The second factor is related to the degree of
harmonization of the standards and procedures guiding the
Bulgarian intelligence agencies with those of the Western
partners'. The key problem in this area is the issue of early
retirement of the high-ranking officers from the totalitarian
past and the recruitment of new officers with pro-Western
attitudes. It can be argued that this issue is a matter of
party-political analysis.
The third factor is related to the degree to
which the national intelligence agencies have severed relations
with the Russian intelligence community. Both the U.S. and
NATO have evidence of the Russian intelligence services' implementation
of disinformation campaigns and intelligence operations in
the member-states and would-be members of NATO. These activities
are accompanied by the ongoing Russian policy at the highest
level to consider NATO's expansion as a mistake and unfriendly
to Russia act. It will be na?ve to expect that our NATO partners
will cease to see this as a problem, regardless of the existence
of cooperation with Russia on various other issues.
The sovereign behavior after 1989 entails a
multidimensional and deep strategic analysis and assessment
of the security environment and adequate reactions and policies.
Part of this activity requires the assessment of our allies'
opinions, perceptions and assessments. Furthermore, we need
to formulate our positions without necessarily having the
influence of our allies. The positive content of our relations
with Russia must be realized in other manners, for example
in the context of the international fight against terrorism
rather than in the cost-free abuse of national sovereignty
by capable intelligence services.
The forth factor relates to the degree of financial
resources devoted to the intelligence functions so that agencies
are adequately provided for.
In the case of Bulgaria, there is another concern
related, at lease until recently, to arms traffic to the Middle
East, dictatorial regimes, or states supporting terrorism,
an issue that also is relevant to the functions of the intelligence
community.
Regarding these issues, it is recommended that
the number of people having access to classified information
is limited from the current 1,500 to not more than 200. There
should be no doubt that NATO is going to conduct its own investigation
before issuing permits for access to classified information.
Bulgaria needs to address this issue lest it compromise its
image of a loyal ally.
What will be Bulgaria's role in the Black
Sea-Caspian region?
Numerous conflict areas will continue to attract NATO's strategic
attention regardless of the recent orientation to other areas
including Afghanistan, Iraq and the Mediterranean. One of
these regions is the Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo. The integration of Croatia, Macedonia and Albania
in NATO and the participation of Serbia and Montenegro in
the Partnership for Peace program are the next challenges
facing the Alliance. As a loyal and effective ally, Bulgaria
will have to define its tasks, missions and responsibilities
in the context of the Alliance policies in the Balkans.
The Alliance faces another set of challenges
in the regions of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian
Sea. Bulgaria is not only a country joining NATO and the EU
but also a country, which possesses an intricate knowledge
of these regions. Therefore, the country should respond to
the expectations of the allies according to its capacity and
resources.
New publications
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Konstantin Dimitrov, ed., Implementation
of Bulgaria's Membership Commitments. The Road after Prague
(Sofia: Procon, 2004)
As part of the Implementation of Bulgaria's
Membership Commitments: The Road after Prague project, the
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security recently published a
book of the same name. This book is the first attempt for
concise and at the same time all-round survey of Bulgaria's
Euro-Atlantic choice.
A team of security and defense experts endeavours,
within a hundred pages, to present in a simple way the most
important issues of Bulgaria's membership in NATO. The book
is divided in three main sections. In a chronological way,
each part discusses one of the main stages of Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic
choice: pre-accession, accession and full-fledge membership
in the North-Atlantic Pact.
In the first part, the analysis of the
new security environment, following the end of the Cold War
and September 11th, is combined with historical overview of
the political and the public choices Bulgaria made in the
path to membership in NATO. The second part provides a comprehensive
review of the political, military, structural, financial and
juridical changes implemented after the Prague Summit on 21
November 2002. The last part of the book discusses the general
challenges to the security sector transformation in Bulgaria
after joining the North-Atlantic Pact. The book also attempts
to provide answers to the question "What would be Bulgaria's
contribution to NATO as a full-fledge member?"
Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
The International Crisis Group (ICG),
Brussels, http://www.crisisweb.org/
The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent,
non-profit, multinational organisation, with staff members
on five continents, whose goal is to prevent and resolve deadly
conflicts.
ICG's approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.
Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces
regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations
targeted at key international decision-takers. ICG also publishes
CrisisWatch, a monthly bulletin, providing short overview
about most significant conflict or potential conflict situations
around the world. ICG's reports are distributed widely by
e-mail and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries
and international organisations and made generally available
at the same time via the organisation's Internet site.
ICG works closely with governments and those
who influence them, including the media, to generate support
for its policy prescriptions.The ICG Board - which includes
prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy,
business and the media - is directly involved in helping to
bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of
senior policy-makers around the world.
The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, (IISS) London,
http://www.iiss.org/
The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
(IISS) is an independent source of objective information on
international strategic issues for politicians and diplomats,
foreign affairs analysts, international business, economists,
the military, journalists, academics and the informed public.
The IISS's work is based on the analysis of the various political,
economic and social problems that cause instability, as well
as the factors that can lead to international cooperation.
The IISS publishes annual The Military Balance,
a review of the world's armed forces; Strategic Survey, an
annual retrospective of the year's political and military
trends; the Adelphi Paper analysis of general strategic issues;
Survival, a quarterly international relations journal; Strategic
Comments, containing short briefings on breaking strategic
issues, which is widely syndicated in the international press,
and Strategic Pointers, shorter 750-word assessments carried
on its web site.
Because of its network, international reach,
and high-level contacts with governments throughout the world,
the IISS, more than any other institute of its kind, has tremendous
'convening power', and regularly brings together ministers
and government officials from different countries in order
to discuss problems that divide or unite them. Indeed, the
Institute's increasing 'paradiplomatic' activity has made
it an actor in discreet international relations.
