Vol. 2, No. 6, January 2004

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

New National Security Policy
Blagovest Tashev

How Many Years are to Pass Before Crisis Management Law is Adopted?
Velizar Shalamanov

Formulating Criteria for Assessment of the Economic Aspects of Security and the Security Sector Reform
Prof. Tilcho Ivanov

Memorandum # 7 of the Security Sector Reform Coalition
Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

Events

To Our Readers

This is the sixth issue of the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter. It begins with an article by Blagovest Tashev, discussing the challenges to Bulgaria's attempts to formulate a new national security policy. The obstacles facing this efforts are both external and internal. The hard-won consensus on Bulgaria's integration in NATO is once again at stake - various visions are emerging on the essence and dimensions of the future security policy.

Dr. Velizar Shalamanov once again tackles the issues related to the formulation of a Crisis Management Law. Such a law is among the government and parliament's priorities and is an essential part of the Membership Action Plan. Its adoption has been constrained by a lack of political will and widespread interagency conflicts. The absence of such law contributes to further conflicts between institutions and obstructs the application of effective measures during crises.

This time we have invited Prof. Tilcho Ivanov to debate some of the economic aspects of security and security sector reform. To a great extend Bulgaria's role in NATO depends on the executive power's ability to conduct economic and defense policy projected towards a better balance between the society's well-being and the external security realities. However, as far as security sector, the theory and practice still have not put forward universal criteria for measuring a country's economic ability to finance defense at acceptable cost for the society and in accordance with the economy's capability to provide resources for defense. However, it is possible to elaborate, in accordance with the security environment, a strategy for building a defense in compliance with the economy's capabilities, which could be a framework for defense policy in the long-term.

The Security Sector Reform Coalition publishes its memorandum of January 6th, 2004, which proposes state institutions establish an independent commission to analyze and assess all decisions that defined the Bulgarian contingent mission, training and management in Iraq, as well as their compliance with the constantly changing environment.

Hristo Chorbadzhiyski reviews two foreign organizations' web sites, which work in the filed of security.

As always, you may find this and all back issues at: http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/

From the publishers

New National Security Policy
Blagovest Tashev

The terrorist attack at the end of the last year in Kerbala, which caused the death of Bulgarian soldiers, provoked a number of diverse reactions and analyses. This diversity of opinions was caused, above all, by the different understandings of the mission's goal and its place in the overall national security policy. Bulgaria is among many to reconsider its security policies and tragedies, like to one in Kerbala, challenges previous consensuses, new approaches and operating systems in the security field.

Despite the forthcoming membership in NATO Bulgaria still faces many difficulties in its efforts to formulate its security policy. Such difficulties are not observed among most other East Europe countries. What is the reason for this specific state? At first one should ignore the fact that our country achieved political consensus on NATO membership very late, while most other East Europe countries embraced the Euro-Atlantic integration in the early 1990s. Second, in the wake of Bulgaria's hard-won foreign policy consensus in 2000, the tragic events of September 11th once again forced the political elite to elaborate new national security policy vision or at least to respond to the rapidly changing international environment. This challenge exposed new differences among the politic elite. Furthermore, such differences reflected existing differences in the society as well. Third, currently Bulgaria has to formulate a new security policy as a NATO member - a challenge, which requires strategic approaches and culture not compatible with the approaches and the culture, which exited while Bulgaria was a member of the Warsaw Pact. Fourth, Bulgaria is in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic community and inevitably in a close proximity to areas posing security threats. This means that Bulgaria must implement policies in response to these threats and to take part in similar Euro-Atlantic policies. The political challenge is that Bulgaria can not opt out of participation in such security policies. More or less this requires strategic culture, which as stated above, Bulgaria still lacks.

Among the usual Bulgarian problems in formulating a national security policy, there are also some external reasons that obstruct this process. Even though the Euro-Atlantic countries admit the new security environment requires new security policy, there is no consensus on what would be its exact dimensions. Meanwhile, many states undertake steps towards transformation of the security policy on national level and as members of international organizations, including NATO and EU. In parallel, there still continues a discussion about reform of the UN aimed at enhancing its effectiveness in bringing peace and stability. Yet there are substantial differences within the international community about the visions on the concrete roles of these organizations. This trend feeds into the existing differences between the society and the politic elite in Bulgaria about the national security policy parameters.

Several elements of the security policy define the different approaches in obtaining security. First, it is the role played by the UN. Many see it as the only organization within which security problems can be solved and insist that before undertaking any actions other security organizations should seek a mandate from the UN. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that very few conflicts, including some after the end of the Cold War, were solved mainly by a UN intervention. According to another vision, the sovereign state has the right to pursue its security without the approval of the world organization. Following this assumption, it is impossible a state's security, especially if the state is a great power, to be a hostage of the good will of the states composing the UN's Security Council. However, this approach also has some shortfalls - the impossibility to generate legitimate policies. The lack of legitimacy inevitably hampers the stability of any policy and its acceptance by the international community as fair and right. Second, even though it is agreed that the new threats require more active policy, including preventive actions, there is still no consensus on the role of the military within this policy. Some think that the conflicts cannot be resolved by force. Instead, the efforts have to be focused on the reasons causing the conflicts. This assumption, even though thoroughly legitimate, does not suggest a clear approach to counteracting direct threats caused by existing conflicts. According to another approach, the use of power in international relations is still a legitimate policy instrument and in case all other means are not applicable its use as a last resort is justified. In the last two years the role and the functions of the military in the national and international security system have been sufficiently changed. It's due to the altering security environment and the role of power. Thus, the assumption of using power contradicts to one of the most important realities of the international environment, namely the continuing trend towards gradual decrease in using the armed forces as an instrument in international relations.

In the last centuries, national armed forces have been trained to defend the national interests in traditional conflicts between states. Тhe armed forces performed this mission during the Cold War. Furthermore, the use of armed forces was part of international law, including the UN Charter which allowed states to create military alliances, to use force in case of aggression, etc. But in the new security environment neither is the international law nor the national armed forces able to respond adequately to the prevailing threats, risks and challenges that national and international security face. Civil wars, ethnic conflicts, terrorist networks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime are the contemporary threats, which require new security policy, for it still misses widely legitimate laws and force instruments accepted by the entire international community.

These realities additionally polarize and even perplex the process of formulating a new security policy in Bulgaria. The hard-won consensus on integration in NATO is not the final step of security policy formulation. In the end, this process will define Bulgaria's role and behavior in the Euro-Atlantic community.

How Many Years are to Pass Before Crisis Management Law is Adopted?
Velizar Shalamanov

It was the Annual National Program under the Membership Action Plan which called for the creation of a Crisis Management Law. Prior to this in the context of the first Bulgarian Military Doctrine, in the early 1999, Prime Minister's Security Council elaborated and adopted a Crisis Management Concept. This concept was successfully tested throughout the Kosovo crisis. Then the Council of Ministers, on the basis of the Crisis Management Concept, established the Interim Interagency Situation Center. Then the adoption of Crisis Management Law seemed so real that even the reform of the Civil Protection Agency within the Ministry of Defense was delayed for it was anticipated that the Agency status will be clarified by the expected law.

However, 3 problems emerged:

• The scope of the draft law was excessively wide - it was striving to cover all four types of crises: security and public order, defense, infrastructure and civilian protection, protection of citizens and property abroad (similar problem with the draft of the Information Law was solved by splitting it in three laws - Public Information Access Law, Personal Data Protection Law and Classified Information Protection Law)
• The Law considered at least two main agencies - Civil Protection and State Reserve. This led to tensions between the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affaires, Economy and Regional Development and Public Works. The preparation of the law was given to the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works, which at this moment was not really focused on this problem.

Due to changes of priorities and changes within the government and the National Assembly's Standing National Security Committee the political will for adoption of such law decreased.

However, the implementation of Plan 2004 continued. So the absence of Crisis Management Law imposed continuation of the reform, in this particular case through the Decree of the Council of the Ministers on establishing the Civil Protection State Agency. This created favorable pre-conditions for the development of the Agency, but the lack of law created real problems in using equipment and personnel from the Ministry of Defense.

Nevertheless, a Crisis Management Law continues to be among the main priorities of the government's program after the elections, and it is a priority of the Parliament as well as a part of next year's annual programs under the Membership Action Plan. After the elections, there were established commissions another Minister of the Regional Development and Public Works was replaced without having a chance to put forward the law preparation and the line deputy ministers could not finish their work on the law elaboration. This hampers administration decisions and issuing decrees by the Council of Ministers. An example is the death of four officers - three from the air forces and one from the Fire Safety National Service - as well the loss of a Mi-17 helicopter, while fighting fire in the heart of the Rila Mountain. There are also some signals for misappropriation of the State reserve.

Taking in consideration that the state is often in the midst of a crisis situation under the four main crisis fields:

• Internal Security - organized crime, leading to disturbance of public order and the increasing public perception of insecurity;
• Serious disasters such as fires, floods and other natural calamities (some of them inflicted by organized crime - for example the fires);
• Serious Bulgarian engagement in international military missions, leading to crisis situations with our contingents (the attack in Kerbala);
• Serious threats to Bulgarian citizens abroad (terrorist attacks, trials against Bulgarian Fleet's ships, the trial in Libya),
• it is of a high necessity to legislate the system of crisis management.

The more often the President interferes in solving issues such as crime fighting, military contingents' management, etc, the more evident becomes the absence of a legal basis and political will of the Parliament, government and the respective ministries. The last often puts the country into "state of emergency", which needs the involvement of the President as a "reserve institution" for crisis management. This challenges the President' authority and questions the democratic maturity of the institutions. The President is directly elected but he is not accountable to the parliament, even though Bulgaria is parliamentary democracy and the people are the sovereign - directly and by its representatives.

What can be achieved and what is about time to be done in the next months:

• To elaborate and develop a National Security Law, after all concerned parties agree that security is Bulgaria's number one priority.
• Immediately after adopting the new National Security Law, there should be adopted a set of at least five legislation acts:

а. Civil and Infrastructure protection
b. Defense and participation in multinational operations
c. Public order and internal security
d. Diplomatic service
e. Investigation and information gathering

• To make sure that the overall security sector reform is in compliance with both the above mentioned laws and forthcoming government and parliament's programs for integration in NATO.

This program will most likely become reality on the basis of the Strategic Defense Review. Unfortunately we have lost the direction and the pace set by the first strategic defense review, which led to the adoption of the Military Doctrine, Plan for Organization and Development of the Ministry of Defense and Membership Action Plan 2004.

At this moment as a model could be used the present civil and infrastructure protection system. There are several reasons behind this argument:

• In comparison to other security sector elements this one is nо subject to secrecy. It's an advantage for keeping the right pace;
• Besides accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters, the civil land infrastructure protection system is in direct relation with the war against terrorism, as a system obstructing terrorist actions,
• The civil and infrastructure protection system has integrating impact onto:

a. the Parliament and the President;
b. the central administration - defense, internal affairs, foreign affaires, economy, health, education, etc.;
c. local authorities - districts and municipalities;
d. civil society;
e. academic community;
f. business;
g. International organizations and the neighborhood states.

The issue of the civil and infrastructure protection is a priority for NATO, still more for the EU, and it is topical for the UN. Bulgaria, due to its Civil Protection State Agency has serious positions in these organizations and in the region (Bulgaria is a initiator of a regional civil protection councill in SEE).

There are national situation center within the agency, a permanent commission under the government, district and municipal commissions, rescue tams,and a practice (even though it's not a best one) for equipment utilization (incl. helicopters) by the Bulgarian Army, Ministry of Interior and other agencies. Bulgaria is a side in international agreements related to chemicals weapons, the Danube River watch, etc. The project for space monitoring center and the realization of a single phone number for emergency calls as in the EU and the US have reached an advanced phase; early warning systems and systems for monitoring risk processes are operating. The Civil Protection Agency has a number of successes, as well as an effective interacting within it agencies for civilian and infrastructure protection. Not long ago under the initiative of Minister Husmenova there was established a research coordination council including seven expert councils.

At the same time there are coordination problems (which caused even loss of people and expensive equipment), interagency conflicts, which caused over-expenditure of public resources, taxes, and low effectiveness of the civil and infrastructure protection, as well as loss of other national resources. Negative in results are the conflict between the Fire Safety agency and Civil Protection State Agency, the unwillingness of the Bulgarian Army to give up resources, and the vagueness of the decision-making process and restoration of the resources used by the army while carrying out additional tasks.

At the end, it is about legislation, structures and rules of procedure, which are issues of expertise and civilian protection. Logically this problem should be solved by the Civil Protection State Agency, under direction of the government and with the direct participation of security experts. It is important to conceive a debate over the participation of local authorities, the society, business, the academic community and others in solving the problem of civil and infrastructure protection. The last is necessary for a change cannot be achieved only through legislation and administrative structures, but through the adopting of a new protection model in accordance with the increasing risks for the civilian and infrastructure security. A further development of this process would provoke further EU, NATO and US support. It's obvious that becoming a part of this community we will need changes and support. But these will happen only if we understand and pursue these changes.

Formulating Criteria for Assessment of the Economic Aspects of Security and the Security Sector Reform
Prof. Tilcho Ivanov

The analysis of the financial and economic dimensions of the defense policy displays ability and readiness of Bulgaria's economy to address in the short-term (2004) and in the middle-term (2007) the NATO commitments. But being a full-fledge NATO member state in the short-term and in the long-term depends on executive power's ability to implement economic and defense policies, which are in conformity with people's well-being and with the external security realities for the country. This would be the way to become a member of the democratic Transatlantic community.

Practically, the Bulgarian economy now has the formal market institutions, which happens to be the reason the European Commission in its Regular report (2000) to recognize it as '… functioning market economy, capable to cope with the Single market competition pressure in the middle-term". But in respect to security sector the theory and the practice do not offer universal criteria for measuring a country's economic capability to uphold the defense necessities. Such a criteria would find what is acceptable by the civil society and what is the economy's capability to source the defense. The only observable trends are these by which it's hardly to assess in quantity term the allied defense benefits for the economic development and people's well-being. But it is possible to elaborate a strategy in accordance with the security environment for building defense consistent with economy's potential. Such strategy would be a framework for the defense policy in the long-term. Thus on the basis of traditional country's interests will be given continuity to the changing political courses.

Economically, the on-going strategic defense review should refocus the state's defense policy on building defense organization pursuing the foreseen country's security results and complied with the national finance and resource capabilities. This means a strategic guideline for establishing a defense organization, which is able to transform the already achieved capabilities into real security effects and to contribute to the economic development. The new goals and results of the allied defense complied with Bulgaria's economic interests, the ways these goals and results will be achieved, as well as the forces' framework should be balanced with the national resources in the long term.

Financially and economically, a result focused defense strategy should perform three political lines:

• Capability for democratic and competitive, taking into account all the different public sectors, forming of sufficient and society acceptable defense budget. This line considers the development of civil society and parliamentary dialog about providing necessary and society acceptable defense resources;
• Capability for economic, effective, efficient and with high benefits for the tax payers management and utilization of allocated resources for defense. This capability considers, in quality terms, the economic activities under the defense sector and the transparency and accountability of the administrators while utilizing the defense resources, and
• Capability for transforming the already built defense capability into results and effects for the economic and social development of the country. This policy refers the necessity of defense for the country's economy.

The first political line is based on civil society democratic control of the national resources allocation. It presents the maturity of the democratic changes in Bulgaria and the administration preparedness to use NATO member states best practices for management of defense resources. It's related to the question of a proper defense strategic line in accordance with the real and expected threats, national priorities, defense weaknesses and the new defense opportunities. It follows the analysis of the current situation and the conclusions of the Defense Strategic Review, as well as .the Defense Strategic Review relation to economic stops and opportunities for the country's development.

The basic financial and economic indicators for assessing the criteria for elaborating modern defense strategy are:

• strategic balancing between the threats, NATO commitments, defense capabilities and the national defense resources;
• competitive definition of the defense expenses regarding other public goods;
• the level and the quality of introducing program management of the defense capabilities and resources;
• the achieved level of publicity, transparency and accountability of the defense results, effects and expenses.

The second political line displays the already achieved quality of defense resource management. It considers the issue of allocation and management of the national resources for defense. But the scope of the issues considered by this line is wider: from personnel professionalization and capital modernization to review of basic economic functions - defense planning, personnel management, financial management, accountancy, defense innovation and investing, defense logistics, generating operational requirements by armed forces, etc.

A traditional question is the transition from functional economic management to program management of defense resources. We witness already the effects of introducing modern methods for strategic management of defense resource and particularly the system "Planning-Programming-Budgeting" within the Ministry of Defense. Main results out of this are increasing transparency of the defense planning and budgeting, activities targeting, program and project management of the activities, analytical base of decision making, and more operative accounting of the expenses. But parallel, there are some unsolved and unfinished problems and tasks regarding improvement of resource management.

The main financial and economic indicators for assessing this policy are:

• Expenses programming and establishing adequate sets of programs and projects for defense modernization;
• Increasing and re-balancing the share of the innovation and investment in defense expenses;
• Modernization of the traditional procurement system and building of a modern acquisition system which should integrate studies, production and procurement of high technologies;
• Improvement of the financial defense system, incl. market evaluation of long term assets, introducing bilateral accountancy and management accountancy of defense expenses, thus, allowing better argumentation of decisions on defense organizational structures.

The third line measures the ability of the policy to transform the defense capabilities into a major factor for economic growth and development. It includes the assumption that in order to achieve positive effects for the national economy a better targeting of defense activities effects should be implemented. Furthermore, it should be taken into account the criteria for economic rationality.

Main financial and economic indicators for assessment of the policy for transforming the defense capabilities into a factor for economic growth (incl. enhancing the abilities of the business to contribute to the capabilities and the economic effects of the defense and to use in an effective and economic way some of the defense budget) are:

• modernization of the public procurement system through introducing the defense trade sector to offset contracts focused on attracting strategic investing and stimulating the production capabilities;
• organizing wider outsourcing of by-defense activities;
• assistance for building of defense infrastructure, incl. bases and firing grounds, which are to attract direct investment from NATO member states or other states funds and thus contributing to the regional economic development;
• establishment of a new "creative partnership" between defense and defense industry enhancing the development of the "contracting out" system and leading to strategic reorientation of the industry production to modern high technologies;
• implementation of the international standards for control of the illegal weapon and double use goods export in order to limit potential undermining of the Bulgaria's prestige and role in supporting regional and global security.

This criteria is limited by the current macroeconomic conditions (standard of life, economic growth, fiscal policy and budget capabilities). But if the defense policy is in compliance with the new security environment challenges and with common allied security policy the result would be transformation of defense from a user of the national resources into a factor for enhancing the industry capabilities and restoring country's economy. A proper policy could transform the traditional role of the defense as security guarantee into a more challenging one: a guarantee of the foreign policy and a substantial factor for the economic development.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria in cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Centre for National Security and Defence Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

МЕМORANDUM # 7
January 6th 2004, Sofia

The tragic incident in Kerbala makes us grieve over the perished Bulgarians, fellow-countrymen, brave soldiers. We pay dear price the national security as well as dear are our national goals. Bulgaria has chosen its way and a persistent security policy is the guarantee for success. The experts, diplomats and scientists of the Security Sector Reform Coalition strive to contribute through objective analysis to the effectiveness of the executive power as well as to the introduction of democracy culture to the processes of management and reform of the national security sector. Sympathizing with the grief over the perished Bulgarians we are convinced that it's a question of responsibility and dignity to take measures for the quick adoption of mechanisms for formulating and implementing national security policy that takes active role in the international efforts to counter terrorism, prevent and settle conflicts, especially, active participation in missions carried out with the participation of Bulgarian troops and security organizations.

The sacrifice of the Bulgarian soldiers in Kerbala obliges us to be active and insistent on making clearer the decision-making in participation in multinational missions, as well as the management of such missions by the political, administrative and military institutions. Under the conditions of a severe battle with dangerous enemy, such as terrorism, the society expects both competent information and adequate management actions by the official institutions. We propose that the President, The Prime-Minister and the National Assembly's Chairman create an environment and opportunities for objective and constructive analysis and evaluation of the mission and the circumstances surrounding the incident in order to formulated immediate and long-term measures for improving the entire decision-making system, preparation, provision and conduct of peacekeeping and counter terrorism missions.

In democracies such initiatives are implemented through commissions - departmental, parliamentary, governmental, presidential and independent, including representatives of the non-government sector. In this connection, we propose that the National Assembly or the Prime-Minister establish an independent commission for overall analysis and assessment of the decisions which defined the mission, the preparation and management of the Bulgarian contingent in Iraq and the decisions' adequacy to the altering situation there. We suggest that the commission include independent, former diplomats and army officers. The Security Sector Reform Coalition is ready to offer experts to join the commission, as well as questionnaire as a framework for its work.

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

The Seven Revolution Initiative
http://csis.org/7revs/index.htm

On the web site http://csis.org/7revs/index.htm is presented one of the most strategic and, at the same time, intriguing projects of CSIS: Seven Revolutions Initiative. It is an ambitious effort at CSIS to answer the question: What will the world look like in 2025? The goal of the project is no less ambitious--to promote strategic, forward-looking thinking among current and future leaders about how the world will change over the next 25 years and what that change will mean for international leadership.

The seven areas of revolutionary change, the "Seven Revolutions," are: population, resource management, technology innovation and diffusion, development and diffusion of knowledge, conflict, economic integration, and the challenge of governance. Trends in these areas will no doubt transform the world and present new and even more complex challenges to policy makers. What are the implications of population growth for the developing world, which will absorb 95 percent of total growth by the year 2025? How can the environmental effects of industrialization in the developing world be minimized? How will advances in technology and communication transform the ways that government and companies do business? What impact will accelerating economic integration and has on the world economy? Is the era of conflict between great powers at an end? Are we on the threshold of cultural wars? These are the kinds of "big-picture" questions addressed in the initiative.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
www.osce.org

The web site www.osce.org provides detailed information about the largest intergovernmental regional security organization in the world - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE has 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America.

It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.The Organization's field activities are concentrated in the most unstable regions in Europe. It has missions located in South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. They work 'on the ground' to facilitate political processes, prevent or settle conflicts, and promote civil society and the rule of law.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

Events