Year 1, issue 5, December 2003

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

The Need for a New National Security Strategy
Blagovest Tashev

Political Dimensions of Bulgaria's Direct Participation in the Post-conflict Stabilization of Iraq
Amb. Konstantin Dimitrov

The New Security Agenda
Velizar Shalamanov

The Security Context in the South-East Europe
Plamen Raltchev

Memorandum #6 of the Security Sector Reform Coalition
Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

To Our Readers

This is the fifth issue of the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter. In this issue's first article Blagovest Tashev discusses the need for a new National Security Strategy. Bulgaria's accession to NATO and the changes in the international security environment make the old National Security Concept hopelessly out of date. The new document must formulate the national security policy as defined by specific national interests and goals in the security area.

In the second article, Amb. Konstantin Dimitrov discusses some of the political dimensions of Bulgaria's participation in the post-conflict stabilization of Iraq. This participation must become an important element in the ongoing formulation of the content and parameters of the country's foreign policy in the context of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Velizar Shalamanov points out that Bulgaria's formal membership in NATO does not end the reform process in the security sector. The political elite and society face the task of formulating and implementing a new generation of reforms whose goal is the building of an integrated security sector capable of providing security.

In the next article, Plamen Raltchev analyzes the processes and politics in the Balkans and points out to some of the current and future challenges and threats to regional stability.

In its memorandum # 6, the Security Sector Reform Coalition proposes the adoption of a Law on National Security. In the new international security environment it is imperative to integrate the functions of all institutions responsible for national security. This integration can be achieved through the adoption of a law which defines the interaction between all institutions and the existence of a strict political and civil control and oversight.

As usual we offer information about events and processes related to the security sector.

Finally, Hristo Chorbadzhiski starts a new section devoted to a short overview of various foreign institutions and think tanks working in the area of security and international relations. We hope this section will assist our readers in the search of relevant information and analyses about international security.

As always, you may also read past and current issues of this newsletter at: http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/index_en.shtml

From the publishers

The Need for a New National Security Strategy
Blagovest Tashev

In the past few years it has been repeatedly argued that Bulgaria needs a new National Security Strategy. There are several reasons for proposing the new strategy: the obvious inadequacy of the old National Security Concept accepted in 1999; the terrorist acts on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing war on international terrorism; Bulgaria's impeding membership in NATO; the ongoing Strategic Defense Review, and others. Yet, the only attempt so far to formulate a new basic document is the proposal for a Bulgarian National Doctrine made by the NIE parliamentary group in the National Assembly.

The choice between doctrine, concep and strategy
One of the issues in the discussion about a new basic document on national security is its nature-the choice between a doctrine, concept or a strategy. The main argument of the NIE parliamentary group and the expert team, which formulated the proposal, suggested that Bulgaria is the only Balkan country without a national doctrine. However, it is important to point out that doctrines long ceased to be the preferred form of formulating national security policy. Besides, it is incorrect to argue that all Balkan countries have official national doctrines. Even more, the Serbian doctrine and the former Greek doctrine are usually associated with two foreign policy adventures-the civil wars in former Yugoslavia and the attempt to unify Cyprus with Greece. The truth is that states with clear domestic and foreign policy interests and goals and corresponding policies do not formulate national doctrines. In any case, it is not the parliament's job to "reckon the Bulgarian idea of the immortality of the Bulgarian nation and language" as suggested in the proposal for national doctrine. This question, whatever it means, can best be discussed by philosophers, psychologists and anyone who finds this problem significant. The parliament, on the other hand, faces more practical problems which need solution.

The arguments for the adoption of a new security concept also have a few weaknesses. Although some countries continue to give official documents formulating security policy the name "concept," their content define them as strategies. The choice of the term "concept" is indicative of a document's purpose and content. It supposes a more theoretical and abstract treatment of security. In other words, the conceptualization of security is something rather different from the policy to attain security. For instance, the conceptualization of security requires answers to questions such as "what is security?"; "security for whom?"; "security for which values?"; "from what threats?"; etc. The purpose of this effort is to define the meaning of security. In other words, this is an academic endeavor. Accordingly, the formulation of security concepts is the work of academia, think tanks, institutes and anyone possessing scientific and theoretical capacities. In other words, this is not the job of governments, parliaments, and political parties. What these institutions do is the formulation of strategies and policies for the attainment of specific goals, including security interests.

The content of the national security strategy
Another main issue related to the formulation of a national security strategy is defining its content. Given the ongoing theoretical discussion about the meaning of security and the example of the old National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria, there is a real danger the future National Security Strategy to include too many things. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in Bulgaria, and not only here, to view most problems and areas in the framework of national security, to treat everything as a security matter. The nuclear energy plant, education, tobacco, even spiritual development in Bulgaria are only few of the areas treated as related to national security. Therefore, it is likely the future National Security Strategy to include too many areas, to define too many priorities and formulate many policies and ultimately render the document irrelevant.

The Strategy must have a clear focus and purpose. Generally, the document should include the following elements:

• Definition of national security interests and goals;
• Definition of the main parameters of the international security environment, including main threats, risks, challenges and opportunities;
• Definition of the policies to attain national goals and interests in the security environment.

In contrast to doctrines, which claim to define national ideals, the national security strategy defines specific interests and goals, for example, integration in the EU and NATO. Although every government is supposed to publish it own national security, it is expected that the interests and the goals are relatively constant. The next part of the strategy - the definition of the security environment is comparatively more dynamic, depending on the changes in this environment. For example, Bulgaria's accession to NATO and the events following 11 September 2001 led to dramatic changes in the security environment. Thus identifying the new threats, risks and opPORT 85,196,175,184,128,98 turns into an important process of defining the international environment in which the national security system operates. The last part of the Strategy is the most important-the formulation of the national security policy aimed at attaining national security interests and goals. This part defines the national security sector's role and functions and its participation in the Euro-Atlantic security sector as well as the country's place in the international security environment. The Strategy should avoid discussions of policy areas which have no direct relevance to security such as economic and educational policies. These policy areas should be treated in other types of documents.

Every government must formulate a national security strategy. Preferably, this should be required by a law, for instance by the future Law on National Security, which in addition should stipulate the publication of annual reports on the state of national security. Strategies may be revised in case there occured changes in the international security environment. The parliament also has a significant role in the Strategy's formulation as it presents a chance to exercise control and oversight over the national security policy.

Political Dimensions of Bulgaria's Direct Participation in the Post-conflict Stabilization of Iraq
Amb. Konstantin Dimitrov
Director, Institute of Euro-Atlantic Security

The political dimensions of the direct Bulgarian participation in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq should be examined in both the international and domestic contexts.

International political dimensions:
1.The Bulgarian mission in the city of Kerbala is a continuation of the series of national commitments in the promotion of global and regional security. This participation adds an extra political weight to the country in the international environment even before its accession to NATO. The success of the Bulgarian mission would be a proof of the country's ability to recognize the neons and coalitions of the willing led by a NATO member.
3.2. Interaction issues between the UN and regional organizations including NATO and the EU, and between the UN and coalitions of the willing led by NATO members.
3.3. Interaction issues on the ground between "new" and "old" NATO allies during out-of-area operations of the Alliance.
3.4.The problems confronting occupation forces in their efforts to establish democratic governance. The balance between measures intended to impose democracy and measures aimed at stimulating domestic democratic capacity.
3.5. Political and religious struggles and tendencies among key political and economic players in Iraq.
3.6. The scope of influences of neighbouring states and other regional factors on the long-term geopolitical orientation of Iraq and on the chances of establishing the rule of law, order and security in the country.
3.7. Identifying common issues as a part of the strategy for the eventual democratization of the Middle East.
3.8. Problems confronting the reform of Iraq's security sector (armed forces, police, intelligence services, civil protection agency, border control). Civil-military relations issues. Analysis of the potential implementation of the Iraq-after-Saddam approach to other states in the region in the efforts to establish civilian and democratic control over the security sectors.
3.9. The "Iraqi" experience of the Bulgarian military diplomacy in the context of the regional Mutual Confidence and Cooperation Building Measures in the Middle East similar to those of the OSCE's. The conclusions may be useful in the context of Bulgaria's responsibilities as the chair of the OSCE in 2004.

4.The Bulgarian experience at Kerbala could be valuable also in terms of preparation for national participation in the future out-of-continent EU missions in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy.

5.The Bulgarian military presence in Kerbala should serve as a way to define realistic trade and economic interests in the framework of national participation in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.

Internal political dimensions of Bulgaria's participation in the stabilization of Iraq
An analysis of the preparation, launching and the first phase of the Bulgarian contingent's mission, indicates that:

1. Public opinion is divided in terms of its readiness to accept the "price" of the Bulgarian participation in Kerbala.

2. Every serious future incident, especially one that might affect the life and health of our men and women in uniform, would polarize the public into two groups, in support and opposition to the purpose and continued participation in this undoubtedly dangerous mission.

3.The training of the contingent was accomplished without an overall conception about Bulgaria's participation in peacekeeping, allied operations abroad, including guarantees for financing such participations.

4.The financing of Bulgaria's participation faced problems concerning the amount of payments of our military personnel. These problems led to unnecessary public quarrel between the political leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Bulgarian armed forces. To some extent these problems vulgarize the public debate on the meaning and benefits of our military participation in Kerbala.

Public attitudes towards the Bulgarian military mission in Iraq reflect the existing differences in the interpretations of the concepts of solidarity, allied responsibilities, and foreign policy defined in terms of economic interests. The timid, unclear, and often contradictory position taken by state representatives on various aspects of our participation in peacekeeping missions confuse citizens and undermine public support for the main priorities of Bulgaria's foreign and security policy.

The New Security Agenda
Velizar Shalamanov
Co-chairman, Security Sector Reform Coalition

The presidential campaign of Petar Stoyanov placed NATO at the center of the national security agenda. It marked the beginning of several important phases of the process of attaining a membership: the decision of interim government of Stefan Sofiyanski to seek NATO membership; the formulation of national NATO integration program; the creation of a inter-departmental NATO integration committee; the decision of the government of Ivan Kostov to send military contingents to Bosnia and Kosovo; the adoption of the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine; the creation of the Security Council at the Council of Ministers; the formulation and implementation of the Ministry of Defense Organizational Plan and the Membership Action Plan until 2004; real participation in the Kosovo crisis management.

The tragic events of 9-11-2001 let to mainly reactive changes in the existing agenda-the participation in the mission in Afghanistan and the beginning of the Strategic Defense Review following the invitation in Prague. However, the impeding membership in NATO in 2004 and in the EU possibly in 2007, the transformation processes in the Alliance and the EU, the expansion or changes in the post-conflict operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the security situation in Bulgaria require recasting the current reactive security agenda of 1999 and the formulation of a new security agenda and more specifically security sector reform agenda.

All commitments of the sorts of "until the Spring of next year," "until the end of the month," "by the week's end" as the usual way of dealing with specific issues or reacting to scandals are not going to turn the country from a candidate into a successful and effective member of both NATO and the EU. The civil society has to a much greater degree formulated a vision of security agenda but that remains unnoticed by the government and the parliament. Instead, the president of Bulgaria convenes the National Security Consultative Council to discuss the military and political aspects of the country's integration in NATO against the backdrop of still raging controversy caused by scandals in the intelligence services (the attempt to appoint Brigo Asparuhov and the Bulgarian connection in a German espionage case), the murder of yet another organized crime boss (the Samokovetzh Konstantin Dimitrov), the stalled process of the Strategic Defense Review, the failed modernization of MiG-29 fleet, and other events. Are we to expect the Consultative Council to formulate the security agenda? An agenda that is not imposed by NATO and the EU but is rather a national response of the political elite to the numerous proposals and demands of the civil society. We would wish the answer were "yes."

How would this security agenda look like? What happened to the Measures for Effective NATO Membership presented by the UDF and supported by the president at the Consultative Council? Did members of the Consultative Council find the time and read Report # 6 of the Security Sector Reform Coalition discussing the challenges of NATO membership and presented before the parliament in mid November? Will the new security agenda appear on the website of the president? Will the president as head of state and commander-in-chief guarantee the implementation of security and defense reforms? As elected by direct popular vote, will the president create a body to oversee, assess and correct eventual mistakes in the reform implementation?

Just listing the questions would take pages, while the answers should take simple "yes" or "no." What is important to take specific steps and achieve results including enhanced real and perceived security for the Bulgarian citizens wherever they are; effective participation of our armed forces in missions and operations and the deployment of allied bases on our territory leading to increased investments in the local economy; security sector modernization and the participation of Bulgarian business it the process.

There is another unresolved security problem-population and infrastructure protection in cases of disaster, incidents and other extraordinary situations-in other words, crisis management. Crafting a law in this important security area has stalled since 1999 and requires a serious political will to achieve its passing especially in the context of a growing terrorist threats. Unfortunately, the tragedy this summer when the helicopter crew of four was lost during a fire disaster did not stimulate the solution of this problem. The legal regulation of population and infrastructure protection and the functions of the Civil Protection State Agency will end existing lack of clear authority and prerogatives, which leads to waste of resources and unaccountability.

In order to assist the voters who seek the answers of these and many other questions here is one option of formulating the new security agenda:

1. Submitting to the parliament annual National Security Reports assessing the level of security of th

citizens, society and the state, and define the security policy for the next year.

2. The parliament approves a National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Public Order Strategy defining the goals, tasks and end results in the area of security. Passing a Law on National Security defining an integrated security sector and overcoming the problems posed by article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic Bulgaria.

3. Creating an intelligence community by reorganizing the existing special services in a legal framework.

4. Passing a new Law on Defense and the Armed Forces in the context of institutional transformation of NATO and the EU.

5. Passing a new Law on Public Order in the context of the serious threats posed by terrorism, organized crime and illegal traffic through Bulgaria.

6. Passing a Law on Diplomatic Service to include the effective protection of national interests abroad.

7. Passing a Law on Crisis Management, which will guarantee the coordination among various institutions in protecting the population and infrastructure during disasters, accidents, catastrophic events and other extraordinary situations, including terrorist acts.

8. Formulating a Law on Security Sector Modernization to include provisions guaranteeing the participation of the Bulgarian industry.

9. Creating the right organization for the maximum utilization of the Bulgarian scientific capacity in the modernization of the national security system.

10. Formulating a strategy of participation in NATO, EU and coalition of the willing operations.

11. Formulating a strategy for the deployment of American military bases and other allied presence in Bulgaria.

12. Putting in place the modern resource management in the security sector to guarantee transparency, security and effectiveness.

The list can be extended even further. What is important, however, is to reach specific results while meeting due dates, to have responsible institutions and a system of oversight, assessment and responsibility. This is actually what is meant by good governance, which is capable of producing security. If these conditions are not met, the security sector would waste public resources and would produce insecurity, leading to low incomes, higher mortality rate, growing labor force migration abroad and growing organized crime in Bulgaria.

The Security Context in the South-East Europe
Plamen Raltchev
Institute for Regional and International Studies

After the Cold War the security context in South-East Europe (SEE) witnessed several changes. They were caused by the long bloody conflicts, which marked Yugoslavia's disintegration, the Kosovo crisis, the international intervention and administration of Kosovo, the end of the Milosevic's regime and the crisis in Macedonia in 2001 which still continues with a varying intensity. Another significant factor in the regional security context is the growing importance of the Balkans in the war on terrorism.

One of the most important changes in the regional security context is Bulgaria and Romania's impeding membership in NATO following the invitation to both countries at the Prague Summit in November 2002. In the long run perspective, the eventual establishment of NATO/U.S. bases in the region would enhance the stability factors in the Balkans.

Factors of stability and instability in the region
Along with the future stabilizing effect of Bulgaria and Romania's membership in NATO, there still exist sources and factors of instability in SEE. Most of them are correlated and therefore they are not going to be classified in accordance to their level of threat. In other words, this is simply a list of the important factors of instability as the order of their presentation is irrelevant.

One of the sources of instability in the region derives from the unclear status and future of the international protectorates-Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially Kosovo. Despite the efforts of the international administration and the multinational military forces the protectorates retain their characteristics of weak states and the associated negative consequences for the security of all neighboring states and the entire region. This insecurity leads to the growing debate about the eventual independence of Kosovo, relations with Serbia and the future of Southern Serbia (the valley of Preshevo).

One example of the correlation between the sources of insecurity is the unsettled status of Kosovo and the situation in Macedonia. The infiltration of Albanian extremists from Kosovo into Macedonia, reaching its peak in 2001 and continuing with a varying intensity, seriously threatens the viability of the Macedonian state. The crisis has its manifestations in direct confrontations between armed Albanian groups and Macedonian forces as well as the inability of the political system to exert control over the violent process. The recent proposal of Albania's minister of defense, although later retracted by the Albanian prime minister, to send peacekeeping troops to the crisis zone in Macedonia possibly adds to the conflict yet another variable.

Despite the attempts of the Macedonian state institutions manage the crisis, the conflict remains in a latent state, which will maintain its characteristics until: 1) the status of Kosovo remained unsettled; and 2) the state implemented serious social and political reforms aimed at overcoming ethnic divisions and consolidating state institutions and the civil society.

Albanian extremism, currently the greatest challenge facing the state authorities, has no public support among the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Nevertheless, there exists a deep division along ethnic lines, which dominates all spheres of social interaction. It is reasonable to argue that there exist in Macedonia two parallel and incompatible societies-Macedonian and Albanian. The interaction between the two societies is possible only on the level of elites and intellectuals. This tendency, which is becoming ever so evident, presents a serious threat to the integrity of the state. Instead of reversing this tendency, the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 seems to have bred even more division and antagonism including among the political elite. Postponing the implementation of the some the Agreement's provisions, including the decentralization and empowerment of local governments, only confirmed the prevailing view that stability in the short run is very difficult, if not unlikely, to achieve. The presence of EU forces as a part of the CONCORDIA mission indicates that the international involvement in the crisis is ineffective or insufficient at best.

Another challenge to regional security is organized crime. Although less prevalent compared to past years, there still exist transnational smuggling rings of goods and drugs. Although not a classic security threat illegal trafficking has tangible effects on regional stability. In addition, the internationalization of organized criminal webs facilitates the illegal arms trade and trade in dual use goods and technologies in the region as well as in crisis regions in Asia and Africa.

Along with the crisis in Macedonia the post-conflict rehabilitation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remains a challenge to regional security. A major part of the post-conflict reconstruction includes the building of institutions and administration, the return of refugees and the collection of small arms from the population.

Institution building is closely related to the issue of managing interethnic relations and maintaining interethnic peace as ethnicity will continue to be a key factor in regional security. Managing relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and Southern Serbia, and between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia will be the most challenging task, as frequent clashes between them attest.

The Western Balkans, too, has not witnessed the end of the transformation process of the political systems, social structures, the economy, states institutions and, above all, the security sector. In this respect, the reforms in Serbia are of key importance. The security forces' ties to the Milosevic's regime and to illegal crime networks in the region, Europe and beyond represent a serious threat not only to regional security but also to Serbia's perspective of integration in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Along with these factors of instability, the last years also witnessed intensifying cooperation and partnership among the countries in the region, including Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey. Although the interaction among the states takes place mostly in the area of political and defense cooperation, the common approach to attaining security is multilateral.

Possible threats to regional security
Among the analyzed factors of instability, the eventual independence of Kosovo and the deepening crisis in Macedonia are the most significant ones. Belgrade and Pristina recently held their first negotiations on the future of Kosovo. The negotiations will most likely revise Resolution #1244 of 1999 of the Security Council of the UN, which does not stipulate for Kosovo's independence. However, attitudes among both moderates and extremists coming from the AOK lean towards independence. This will lead to a serious tensions and hard negotiations with Belgrade.

Along with Kosovo's independence, the crisis in Macedonia is another significant threat regional security. The disintegration of statehood is the worst-case scenario. In this scenario the inability of the EU's CONCORDIA mission to settle the crisis will discredit the EU's capacity in crisis management and its goal of achieving a common security and defense policy.

In the context of a growing threat from terrorism next year's Olympic games in Athens will present another potential terrorist target. Increased safety measures and most importantly cooperation between security institutions in the region are necessary for holding a problem-free event.

Although undergoing a significant change in the last years the security environment still experience the effects of the conflicts of the past decade, which let to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Both Kosovo and Macedonia are some of the consequences in the disintegration process. Along with factors of instability such as organized crime and economic backwardness, there appeared another sources of threats-international terrorism. In this context, one of the few positive developments in the region is Bulgaria and Romania's impeding membership in NATO and respectively the Alliance's stabilizing presence in the Balkans.

Bulgaria and Romania's membership in NATO and the EU, however, are expected to increase the dividing lines in the Balkans. As members of the Alliance both countries will have specific security responsibilities in the region. Along with Greece and Turkey, the two countries will form a part of the region wherein the interests of NATO and the U.S. will dominate. This group will distinct and distant from the so-called Western Balkans, which the U.S. has indicated to be the EU's primary responsibility. This division of responsibilities is reinforced by the EU's provides different speed tracks. Bulgaria and Romania's track is different from the one of the older members' and from the one of the future members' in eventual next expansion. Thus, the countries of the Western Balkans are the subjects of a different EU policy. This tendency will have an impact on the regional process and more specifically on the regional security dynamics. Thus, the region will be divided and one of the reasons is going to be the often diverging interests and priorities of the EU and NATO and their consequences in the region.

An additional challenge to security is the growing Russian interests towards the energy sector in the region. The Russian companies' economic interests usually mask and compensate attempts at political presence and influence. Russian politicians never miss an occasion to point out that the Russian owned Lukoil oil company is the biggest taxpayer in Bulgaria. Although following the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Russia was able to deploy first its troops to Pristina, in the future Moscow will plan to establish its influence through massive presence of Russian capital in the energy sector in the region, as already evident in Bulgaria and Romania, and undoubtedly to follow in Serbia and beyond.

The presence of multiple, often diverging, interests in the region puts in doubt not only the usefulness of perceiving it as an unified entity but also perceiving it as a single security environment. The security environment is likely to remain fragmented as one part of the region including Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey will represent an institutionalized and stable element within the NATO security framework while the rest of the region, although under an EU patronage, will sustain its non-institutionalized and unstable environment.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria in cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Centre for National Security and Defence Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

МЕМORANDUM # 6
Proposal for the Adoption of a Law on National Security

This memorandum includes a proposal by the Security Sector Reform Coalition for the adoption of a Law on National Security (LNS). In the months following the Prague Summit in November 2002 when Bulgaria was invited to join NATO, it was repeatedly argued that the country needs a new national security policy. The new policy must take into consideration the changes in the security environment following 11 September 2001, the Prague invitation and the existence of nontraditional challenges facing the state.

In the new environment, national security is guaranteed neither exclusively by military might nor by the exclusive focus on the state security. Instead, national security is considered as a more inclusive concept including not only military elements but also societal, political, economic and individual elements. Therefore, guaranteeing security requires multiple policies, which accordingly require the participation of numerous institutions. Thus, in the new environment, this is achieved in the framework of the security sector, where the different institutions in close cooperation and coordination under strict democratic political and civilian oversight and control, perform their functions. Specifically, those institutions include:

• Diplomacy
• Armed Forces
• Security Services
• Police
• Civil Protection
• Customs
• Judicial system (including prisons)
• Defense industry (including research and development/ technological institutes, dual use technologies etc.)
• Parliamentarian, legal and administrative agencies for management and control.

The high effectiveness of the security sector requires not only a new National Security strategy but also new LNS. The Law should define the following:

• national security and national security sector;
• functions of the national security sector;
• interaction and collaboration among the various institutions of the security sector;
• power relationships between the security sector and the other state institutions aiming at achieving democratic and civilian control and oversight;
• the rules and procedures of formulating, passing and publishing of laws and documents relevant to national security guaranteeing transparency in the security sector;
• institutionalize the Security Council to the Prime Minster, which in addition to its current functions, should have more functions including information analysis, operational coordination, and overall management of the security sector.

Several times in the last years there were attempts to begin a debate on the need to reform the national security system. Unfortunately, most of the ensuing proposals, including on the highest political level, suggest only partial changes in only few institutions in the security sector. Furthermore, the debates and proposals usually appear as a consequence of external or domestic crises as in the case of the tragedy during the fire disaster in the Razlog region and the terrorist attacks in Istanbul. In the first case, it was argued that it is high time to pass the long-ignored Law on Crisis Management while in the second case it was proposed that the intelligence services need more coordination. If the political will to reform is stimulated only by crises, however, it is inevitable that the ensuing reforms are going to be partial. What the national security system needs is a comprehensive reform aimed at the integration of the security sector.

Web sites
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, USA
www.csis.org

CSIS is one of the largest non-governmental research centers in the field of international relations worldwide. Its leading goal is to provide world leaders with strategic insights on - and policy solutions to - current and emerging global issues. The CSIS staff of 190 researchers and the support staff are focused primarily on the full spectrum of new challenges to national and international security, and on developing new methods of governance for the global age. The Center maintains as well resident experts on all of the world's major geographical regions.

CSIS's activities are concentrated intо the following fields:

Generating strategic insights through assessing political risk; analyzing regional affairs examining international security and stability, and through looking "over the horizon"- i.e. to identify longer-range consequences of current practices and policies and to carry out a range of contingency and scenario - based analyses;

• Developing strategic networks through convening current and future world leaders and building structures and partnerships for policy solutions;
• Crafts policy solutions through applying the insights of its experts and its strategic networks to craft targeted policy solutions,
• Developing today's and tomorrow's leaders.

The web page of CSIS provides sufficient and daily updated information on the Center's activities, including: round tables, lectures of invited American and foreign politicians and experts, researches and activities of its own experts (Janusz Bugajski, Henri Kisinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski), a large number of publications, past current and future projects, publications, and information about the numerous programs of the Center.

The EU Institute for Security Studies, EUISS, Paris, France
www.iss-eu.org

The setting up (July 2001) of the EUISS is a illustration of the determination of the 15 EU members to push ahead with the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP). The Institute contributes to the development of the CFSP by performing three functions:

• Research and debate on the major security and defence issues that are of relevance to the EU;
• Forward-looking analysis for the Union's Council and High Representative;
• Development of a transatlantic dialogue on all security issues with countries of Europa, Canada and USA

The Institute's activities follow from the comparative advantage it has in 'thinking European', looking collectively at issues that are normally dealt with separately and providing constructive criticism on all subjects pertinent to the EU's European Security and Defence Policy. All of the Institute's activities (such as seminars, transatlantic conferences, task forces made up of leading specialists from the various European institutes, fellowships) are directed towards analysis and recommendations that are useful and apposite to EU policy-making.

The Institute is a non-profit-making organization. It distributes its publications, free of charge, to some 3,000 people in Europe and the rest of the world who represents the core of the international strategic community. Its flagship publication is its series Chaillot Papers. Written by external experts as well as the Institute's research fellows, they deal with all subjects of current relevance to the union's security. The ISS publishes a three-monthly Newsletter giving information on its activities and commentary on international affairs. It issues also occasional papers through which rapidly distributesthe best papers by visiting researchers.