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Year 1, issue 4, September 2003

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

American-Bulgarian Cooperation in the Area of Defense and Security
James Pardew

Defense Reviews-The United Kingdom's Experience
Peter Gareh

Communicating Security
Dr. Antoni Galabov

Memorandum #5 of the Security Sector Reform Coalition

Concept of the Security Sector Reform Coalition for the Creation of Security Sector Reform Center in the city of Plovdiv

Events

To Our Readers

This is the fourth issue of Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter. The publication of this issue coincides with the official commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bulgarian and the United States. The last several years have marked the most intensive period of cooperation between the two countries. This process is determined not only by the process of Bulgaria's integration in Euro-Atlantic community but also by common interests and goals in the area of security and defense.

In this issue's first article, James Pardew, the U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, highlights the progress in cooperation between the two states in the area of security and defense and identifies the opportunities offered by assistance programs to Bulgaria's efforts in transformation of the national security sector. Cooperation in this area not only increases the two countries' security but also serves their national interests.

The second article, by the British civilian expert at the Ministry of Defense in Bulgaria, Peter Gareh, provides insightful and useful comments about Great Britain's defense reviews. Bulgaria is currently conducting its Strategic Defense Review and the British experience undoubtedly provides interesting conclusions about the process of armed forces' transformation.

Dr. Antoni Galabov discusses some of the psychological dimensions of the war on terrorism. The author points out that international environment in which we communicate about security is rapidly changing. Despite that, neither does the society possess the social competency to assess the new threats, nor are the governments ready to formulate new communication strategies treating security issues.

The Security Sector Reform Coalition presents a proposal for the creation of a U.S.-Bulgaria Action Commission. The Commission aims to create a community of politicians, business leaders and experts in the United States and Bulgaria, whose aim is to offer the Bulgarian government specific proposals for reforms and actions to increase Bulgaria's political, economic and social prosperity and assist the country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community.

As always, we expect your comments and suggestions about the bulletin and welcome your contribution to the aims of this publication. You may read this and all previous issues of the publication at: http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/index_en.shtml

From the publishers

American-Bulgarian Cooperation in the Area of Defense and Security
James Pardew
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Bulgaria

Cooperation between America and Bulgaria in the areas of defense and security are evident in numerous areas to include bi-lateral and regional conferences and seminars hosted by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, events affiliated with Partnership for Peace, and events under the auspices of the State Partnership Program in which Bulgaria has a long and valued relationship with the state of Tennessee. This article focuses on Security Assistance (SA), which is founded on a tradition of cooperation between the United States and other sovereign nations with similar values and interests in order to meet common defense goals.

Bulgaria's transition to a market -oriented, democratic society, which was started thirteen years ago, continues on a steady and resolute path. After serious setback during the 1997 economic crisis, U.S. assistance has become a key to building new infrastructure to support continued progress. Bulgaria has assumed a leadership role in promoting political and economic stability in the Southeastern Europe region in various cooperative organizations and in 2003-2004 held a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Additionally, Bulgaria showed itself to be a steadfast supporter of U.S. interests during the 1999 war in Kosovo and U.S. military action has received the continued backing of the Bulgarian government for 2002-03 activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bulgaria was invited to join NATO in 2002, and is in the process of reorganizing its defense establishment. Bulgaria aspires to be invited to join the EU in 2007, and is holding the OSCE Chairmanship in 2004. Given Bulgaria's strategic importance to the United States, we will continue in 2004 to signal our support by carrying through on Defense and Security assistance programs that target those areas of reform that are key U.S. priorities. These areas include support for defense reform, equipment modernization, developing NATO niche capabilities, effective Civil-Military relations and military officer and civilian education programs.

Specifically for the Republic of Bulgaria, security assistance consists of a group of programs. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are two key programs this article will address. Foreign Military Sales are managed and operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) on a no-profit and no-loss basis. Countries participating in the program pay for defense articles and services at prices that recoup costs incurred by the United States. The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is the link between the U.S. DoD and the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. The ODC, under the direction of the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, manages FMF and IMET security assistance programs.

The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services and training. These acquisitions enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities. Increased capabilities build and strengthen multilateral coalitions with the United States and its allies, foster better bilateral military relationships between the United States and recipient nations, and enable friends and allies to work together and be increasingly interoperable with U.S., NATO and regional forces. FMF is therefore a critical foreign policy tool for promoting U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and to share burdens in joint missions. Initiated in 1996, Bulgaria has received over 50 million US dollars to assist in the reform and modernization of the Ministry of Defense and the Bulgarian Army. Fiscal Year 2004 funds will continue to promote defense reform along Western democratic lines. The majority of funds will support upgrading Communication Information Systems (C4I) to achieve full interoperability with NATO systems. Current projects include an Integrated Pilot Logistics Project, navigational upgrades to airfields and development of a National Military Command Center. With Bulgaria's impending NATO membership next year, FMF stands ready to assist Bulgaria in meeting the challenges of full interoperability and defense modernization.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy - a program with a substantial return on investment. It is a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. While improving defense capabilities, IMET courses offer opportunities to present democratic alternatives to key foreign military and civilian leaders, and further regional stability through mutually beneficial military-to-military relations. The activities under IMET culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries. The IMET program has three main objectives. It encourages effective, positive defense relationships and increases understanding between the U.S. and foreign countries, thereby promoting the goals of international peace and security. It leverages the ability of participating countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and services obtained from the U.S., with greater effectiveness and efficiency, contributing to greater self-reliance. And, it increases the ability of foreign nationals participating in such activities to recognize international norms regarding human rights. Training and education provided under the IMET program is professional and non-political, and reflects both the U.S. tradition of civilian oversight and the operational, rather than the policy, role of the military. IMET has a positive effect on participants and recipient countries beyond actual training. Exposure to American values, quality of instruction, and professionalism of the U.S. military plays an important part in building long-term understanding and cooperation.

Many IMET courses present democratic principles to key foreign militaries and civilian leaders. Military cooperation is strengthened as foreign militaries improve their knowledge of U.S. military doctrine, strategic planning processes, and operational procedures. This cooperation leads to opportunities for military-to-military interaction, information sharing, joint planning, and combined force exercises that facilitate interoperability with U.S. forces.

Since 1992, the Office of Defense Cooperation, through coordination with the Ministry of Defense, has sent over 350 officers and civilians to the United States for training under the IMET program. At this moment, over thirty students are training in the United States in courses ranging from senior service colleges (Air War College, Naval Command College, US Army Command and General Staff) to defense resource management instruction, and the list of prominent IMET graduates grows everyday. Just recently, Mr. Ilko Dimitrov, an IMET student and graduate of the US National Defense University was appointed as a Deputy Defense Minister.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) enjoy tremendous support from all involved and will continue to provide critical support as Bulgaria reorganizes and modernizes her armed forces to best meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Defense Reviews-The United Kingdom's Experience
Peter Gareh
UK Civilian Adviser to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria

Bulgaria is currently engaged in a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) and the United Kingdom has been offering advice in the light of its most recent SDR, presented to Parliament in July 1998, and amplified by a New Chapter, presented to Parliament in July 2002 in the wake of September 11. In this article, I do not want to focus on our latest SDR too much but rather try to put it into a broader context, and to draw some general themes from this context. What I shall aim to convey is:

Firstly, you do not have to have a defense review to bring about major changes in the way in which defense is managed, but you probably do if changes go beyond internal organization.

Secondly, there is no single reason for a government to decide to embark on a defense review although cost, whatever a government might say, is probably an underlying factor in every case.

Thirdly, one review might reverse what was decided in an earlier one.

Fourthly, there can be a real reluctance by a government actually to admit that they are embarking on a defense review. A government might conduct what looks to the whole world like a defense review, but refuse to call it one.

Before moving on to defense reviews, let me address the first point above with a couple of major changes that have been made in the way in which we manage defense without going through the process of a formal defense review. Both cases clearly have implications beyond the defense community, but they are essentially examples of internal restructuring to improve efficiency rather than an examination of commitments.

A major internal review was undertaken in the early sixties, leading to the Ministry of Defence Act of 1964, which created an integrated MoD. Until then the MoD had been a small policy driven organization, divorced from the single services. It replaced the separate ministries, each with their own Secretary of State of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry into one department with one Secretary of State.

In 1990 the New Management Strategy was introduced. This transferred responsibility for managing budgets from the center to commanders, called Top Level Budget (TLB) holders. The concept was radical, because responsibility for the way in which military and civilian chiefs spent their money was being delegated to them. Now the consumer of resources was directly involved in the way in which those resources were used and consequently had a direct interest in ensuring that they were used as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.

Turning now to defense reviews, there have probably been eight over the past fifty years, five of which have been called defense reviews. This implies that defense policy can never be static and a defense review cannot be regarded as a once and for all event. Too many of them in too quick succession, however, is not to be recommended either, and it is probably arguable that this happened on occasions in the United Kingdom.

The Sandys Review in 1957 was to some extent a response to the Suez debacle of the previous year, which was a diplomatic disaster and had revealed the poor state of readiness of British Forces and the obsolescence of much of their equipment. It was conducted over a very short period - only two months - and placed the priorities on nuclear deterrence and missiles. It proposed the phased ending of national service with the last call up in 1960, reducing service manpower from around 700,000 to around 400,000 by the early sixties. Overseas garrisons were to be reduced, replaced to an extent by aircraft carriers. The rebalancing of forces away from East of Suez and towards Europe was, however, frustrated by events. One of the proposals of this review was that fighter aircraft would in due course be replaced by a ground to air guided missile system. Forty-five years later, we can see the danger of making premature predictions.

The following quote from the Government's White Paper at the time will not be unfamiliar in the context of Bulgaria's SDR.

"A defense plan, if it is to be effective and economical, must be based on a clear understanding of the military responsibilities to be discharged… The aim must be to provide well-equipped forces sufficient to carry out these duties, while making no greater demands than are absolutely necessary upon manpower, money and other national resources."

The newly elected Labor Government launched a defense review in 1965 under the Secretary of State for Defense, Denis Healey. The Healey review was in essence a series of separate studies, which unlike the Sandys review, took two years to complete. The review was clearly resource driven, and whilst the process did involve a review of foreign commitments, it followed after decisions had been taken to make substantial savings by canceling major equipment orders and reorganizing and reducing the Territorial Army, but forewarned that defense policy can never be static and that the review had produced the framework of policy within which further decisions would be taken in the years ahead. In the event a White Paper in 1968, only one year later, in an attempt to stay within a ?2 billion cash limit, proposed accelerated withdrawal from east of Suez, and signaled the end of further aircraft carrier construction. Ten years earlier the Sandys review had proposed that overseas garrisons should be replaced to an extent by aircraft carriers! The following is a quote from the 1968 White Paper:

"Long-term planning is essential in defense. An advanced weapons-system may take up to ten years from its inception to enter service and, in some cases, may then have a further twenty years of operational life. If we are to have forces with the right balance of skills and ages, capable of giving a worthwhile return on their expensive training, we need a stable long-term program for manpower and recruiting."

There was a four-year spell of a Conservative government between 1970 and 1974, without a defense review and when little was done to slow the pace of cuts, other than to reverse some of the decisions on the Territorial Army. When Labor came back to power in 1974, the Secretary of State for Defense, Roy Mason, announced a defense review on his first day in office. It was declared to begin first with a reconsideration of the UK's defense commitments, but, it was, nonetheless, preempted by a government decision that defense spending should drop from around 5% of GDP to around 4.5% over ten years, a decision founded on the presumption that the UK's spending should move towards the NATO average. The nature of the cuts caused the Expenditure Committee at the time to comment that the direction away from mobile forces and reinforcement capabilities was contrary to NATO's Cold War strategy. The SDR in 1997/98 was to go in the other direction, although in response to a very different world situation.

The Nott review which ran from January to June 1981, in the early years of the new Conservative government and against a background of a Soviet military build up, a severe economic downturn domestically and the introduction of cash planning to control public spending. In his introduction, the Secretary of State said that the right balance must be established between inevitable resource constraints and necessary defense requirements. In order to retain the strength of the British Army on the Rhine and re-equip it and retain the nuclear deterrent, the main cuts under the Nott review were to be borne by the Navy. Many of these cuts had to be scrapped in the following year in the light of the Falklands conflict.

Three reviews took place in the first half of the 1990s, but the government maintained that they were not reviews and were not forced on the MoD by the demands of the Treasury. The first of these, Options for Change, described as a process rather than a one-off review, was the response to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Options for Change was widely described as delivering the "peace dividend", a term which to many might suggest an exercise to make savings, just as many countries within NATO were doing at the same time. But savings or not, the world situation had changed radically and it would not have made sense to carry on without looking at what defense structures were more appropriate to this new situation. As with the Falkland Islands, eight years earlier the hypotheses of Options were tested by reality, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Two major lessons came out of this operation. The first was the vulnerability of ground troops and equipment, in particular to chemical and biological weapon attack. The second was evidence that the operation had stretched logistical sustainability beyond a safe level.

1993 saw a mini review, which partially restored previously announced cuts in Army manpower. Major cuts, however, were made in the Navy, including loss of its Upholder submarines before they had all entered service. This review was followed almost immediately by another called "Front Line First: The Defence Costs Studies". The title suggests that it was resource driven, perhaps implying that Treasury were not happy with the outcomes of Options and the Mini-Review. Defence Costs Studies made a number of significant changes. Very significantly, it pushed hard at greater jointery between the services, which saw the formation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters, the establishment of a new tri-Service Staff College and reorganization in a number of areas, including the defense estate, medical services, recruitment services, the co-location of the Procurement Executive (now the Defense Procurement Agency) at a single site.

The 1997/98 SDR, like its predecessors, was a reaction to changed world circumstances. The new Government, far from being defensive about the need for a defense review did not maintain that it was anything other than a review. It still shared features of earlier reviews and many of the refrains are familiar. Although, it was clearly a commitments driven review, the Treasury did say at the outset that they did not expect the defense budget to be greater than it currently was. It also reversed recommendations of earlier reviews. By way of example, much of the specialist capability in the field of chemical and biological defense was provided by the Territorial Army. SDR saw the creation of a regular joint Army/RAF organization. And, as in the case of the Falkland Islands and Kuwait, events resulted in a further examination of requirements with the publication of the New Chapter, and an increase in expenditure.

There is not space in this article to detail the many far-reaching recommendations of the SDR. Both the SDR and the New Chapter are available on the web for anyone interested in reading them. I would, however, like to quote from Chapter 10 on resources, because this is a bedrock for any review of any defense system if it is to be effective and able to deliver:

"This Review addresses the long term. If its plans are to be effective they must be affordable. It is also vital to the confidence of the forces that the plans are properly resourced. And if defense is to command the support of the nation it must be seen as good value for money. In defense, one constantly needs to be looking at ways of making savings. The plans set out in this White Paper require substantial investment to improve inherited areas of weakness measured against future operational needs. They also require us to fund a continuing major equipment modernization program to ensure that our forces cannot be outmatched and to enable us to benefit from new technology. The resources needed will come from savings generated within the Review. Savings will come from rationalization in the support area, an increased efficiency program and smarter procurement."

Let me conclude with a quote from Australia's most recent defense review:

"Following the last federal election, the Government made a commitment to publish a Defence White Paper in this term of parliament. That decision reflected a recognition that the Defence Force was under real pressure to meet an increasingly complex and diverse range of tasks within a budget that had remained relatively constant in real terms over the past fifteen years. The Government had become concerned that a mismatch had arisen between our strategic objectives, our defense capabilities and our levels of defense funding."

Communicating Security
Dr. Antoni Galabov
Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Science

Undoubtedly, one of the most radical changes to take place after 11 September 2001 pertains to the perception of the dynamics of the security system and the range of contemporary risks. In the last two years, it became clear that modern society needs new criteria in assessing risks and new dimensions of security perceptions.

The terrorist acts in the United States had psychological dimensions, too. What the terrorists tried to convey to the world was that there is no defense guarantee, as even the most powerful state in the world is vulnerable. The strategy of psychological terror included attempts to present the ensuing "war against terrorism" as a cultural conflict, a clash of civilizations, even as a war between rich and poor. The destructive force of this new ideology of international terrorism could potentially be greater than the specific physical threat.

In response to this form of terrorism, American society articulated a powerful message of solidarity in upholding the values of freedom and democracy. This message was not understood and accepted equally by all. Nonetheless, it turned into one of the most significant elements of the context in which confronting terrorism in all its forms became a new mobilizing factor.

The antiterrorist coalition had another significant achievement. As one of the sought-after consequences of their actions, the terrorists attempted to provoke a massive perception of insecurity and fear, even paranoia. The allies did not allow any of the elements of the terrorists' ideology to gain a hold over mass perceptions. They did not allow terrorism to become the "invisible enemy" who is everywhere and hence invincible. The connection between totalitarian regimes, organized crime and international terrorism define the range of threats as well as the specific dimensions of the new risks facing the international community.

The war against the invisible enemy produced its own system of images. The world media had already formed perceptions about the risks and scope of threats. Therefore, the leaders of terrorist organizations sought revenge and a chance to dominate the agenda precisely in the media space. They sought to tailor their message to fit the media requirements and to bring it maximally close to the appeals of the various diverse, but progressive proponents of anti-globalism.

The military action in Iraq attempted and succeeded in introducing new information standards. The price of this effort was high, but the result is to define the main parameters a new communication environment wherein the war against terrorism gains its real dimensions.

The society is still unprepared for such a change. Global access to information forms new expectations about the informed mass public. The globalization of information creates an expectation of an informed public yet, in fact, it does not significantly alter the level of social competency and the ability for objective assessment of the risks. Compounding this problem is the lagging formulation of a new communication strategy.

The environment in which we communicate about security and risk perceptions is rapidly changing. Secrecy is not anymore the basis for imagining security. Secretive secret services form a mass perception for security only in the context of a high level of public trust in institutions. Such trust has never included a high level of knowledge and civil control of the public institutions of security. In the modern world, only totalitarian states and states at the beginning of transition to democracy can rely on all secretive agencies as a model for building security perceptions. This is precisely why they turn into part of the problem in the fight against terrorism. This is way modern terrorism effectively copy the structures build in totalitarian states, using the lack of civil control over their functions.

The achievements of civil societies in democratic states produce critical, informed and active public opinion. The public cannot simply accept for granted the secretive competency of various secret agencies, whose functions are financed with public funds. Transparency and informed public require the building of a different kind of perceptions and images of security.

The nature of the contemporary international environment, which is to dominate the next at least five-to-ten years, necessitates to a much greater degree that the security sector became an integral part of the national and regional policies. Any detachment and isolation of the security sector may lead to decrease in its effectiveness and inability to perform its functions in crisis situations.

There is a need for a new communication strategy about security and risks in modern society. There is a need for courageous recognition that no one is capable of providing absolute security guarantees. This is the only way to generate public support and trust. And the perhaps the only barrier the international terrorism cannot overcome is the shared will of free people to defend the values of freedom and democracy.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria in cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Centre for National Security and Defence Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

ÌÅÌORANDUM # 5
Proposal for the Creation of a U.S.-Bulgaria Action Commission

This memorandum is intended to outline the Bulgarian Security Sector Reform Coalition's proposal for the creation of a U.S.-Bulgaria Action Commission whose goal is to achieve a viable and sustainable partnership between the United States and Bulgaria.

Background
In the last several years, the international environment and the process of Bulgaria's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community let to mutually beneficial cooperation between Bulgaria and the United States. At the moment the international and bilateral context facilitates the creation of a long-term, sustainable and beneficial enhanced partnership which serves both countries' long-term interests. The creation of such enhanced partnership, however, requires leadership, imagination and specific steps to make it a reality. Only then can the combination of international environment, coinciding interests and goals, and opportunities for mutual benefits lead to the specific partnership to the benefit of both nations.

In the last several years the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC has administered commissions whose main purpose is to develop practical actions that will have a near-term impact on the economic development and the security and foreign policy of Poland and Slovakia. Those commissions are known as the US-EU-Poland Action Commission and the US-EU-Slovakia Action Commission. A similar commission existed for Romania until 2000. The commissions operate in the context of the countries' quest for full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and support their polices in selected areas.

The Commission includes commissioners (39 commissioners in the Polish and 42 commissioners in the Slovak Commission) who are CEOs of major companies with business interests in the country and political leaders from the country, the US and the EU. The Commission creates a venue for collaboration and cooperation among the commissioners and experts from numerous countries aimed at creating practical recommendations to the government in order to achieve reform and improvements in the economy, security, and foreign policy.

The two existing commissions involve over 400 leaders and experts from 30 countries in the following areas (the list is not exhaustive):

  • Job creation and unemployment
  • Energy sector restructuring and privatization
  • Telecommunications and information technologies
  • Transportation modernization
  • Cross border operations
  • Defense industry cooperation
  • Pension reform acceleration
  • Strengthening capital markets
  • Tax code improvement

The Commission operates at two levels:

  • The Commissioners hold a plenary session once every 9-12 months, and approve and propose to the government recommendations; set new directions for future commission work.
  • The Working Groups, formed at the direction of the Commissioners and including superbly qualified experts, provide a source of continuous activity to develop practical recommendations in the selected areas.

Proposal
The Security Sector Reform Coalition proposes to coordinate the establishment of a joint Bulgaria-U.S. Action Commission, including business leaders, politicians and think-tank representatives in both countries, whose main goal is to set up the agenda and action plans for achieving the goals of the partnership. The Commission will create a venue for collaboration and cooperation aimed at creating action plans and practical recommendations to both governments in order to achieve transformation of Bulgaria's society, improvements in its economy, security, and foreign policy.

Bulgarian Commission's Potential Areas of Operation
The CSIS is capable of offering a 15-month Action Commission, with the possibility to continue depending on business and Bulgarian government's renewed interest. Based on the existing Commission's experience to date, CSIS proposes four major areas of activity of the Bulgarian Commission (based on interest other areas could be considered):

  • banking and capital formation;
  • rule of law;
  • defense and security cooperation; and,

Euro-Atlantic integration.

Potential Benefits to Bulgaria
Bulgaria should carefully consider the setting up of a U.S.-Bulgaria Action Commission as a timely endeavor.

  • The Commission would create a powerful group of leaders and experts capable of providing practical recommendations to the Bulgarian government and administration in their reform efforts and the nation's quest to join the Euro-Atlantic community.
  • The Commission would create an influential lobby for Bulgarian interests, especially in Washington, DC. CSIS would increase Bulgaria's "visibility" in the American capital.
  • The Commission would create a pool of experts and leaders who would have interest and stake in Bulgaria's progress.
  • The Commission would increase the Bulgaria's ability to utilize previously untapped expertise and resources.
  • The Commission would be non-partisan and thus bring together diverse political actors in Bulgaria.

    Concept
    for the Creation of a European Center for Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
    Security Sector Reform Coalition

    In June 2003 the Security Sector Reform Coalition (SSRC) held a round-table discussion to present a concept for the creation of a European Center for Security Sector Reform and Post-conflict Reconstruction and Integration in the city of Plovdiv. Along with members of the SSRC, the event was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Solomon Passy, parliamentarians, deputy-ministers of defense and foreign affairs, members of the local government, representatives of the national business elite and journalists among others.

    Background
    The reestablishment of long-term security and stable development in conflict areas goes through several important phases:

    • military operations to resolve or prevent conflict
    • reform of the security sector in the post-conflict area
    • administrative and economic reconstruction in environment in which security is guaranteed
    • gradual integration of the post-conflict area into the larger region and the international community

    In the post-September 11th 2001 period once again the international community confronts the issues of failed states, state-building, post-conflict reconstruction and more generally, the establishment of security and sustainable political stability. The conduct of military operations to address the problems presented by failed states and states which are sources of threats to international security is a process which has been perfected in the last several years by NATO, the United States and its allies. Yet the international community lacks a solid capacity to establish stable institutions and long-term security in the post-conflict areas. The cases of Bosnia and Kosovo are only two examples. In other words, the last three phases in the process of reestablishing long-term security and development are the most complex and difficult. Without a reform of the security sector (as defined by Working Table III of the Stability Pact), administrative and economic reconstruction, and a plan for reintegration of the region into the international community, there cannot be a long-term stability and the security achieved through the operations of the military forces would inevitably disintegrate.

    Bulgaria's Experience
    Along with the integration of Bulgaria in the Euro-Atlantic space the country is in a process of defining its place and role in the community of democratic states. One of the requirements of the effective membership in the Alliance is the ability to contribute to the security and stability of the community. Bulgaria, as a future member of NATO and the EU, has the ability to contribute to both institutions' capacities to address not only traditional security problems but also the soft-core issues of security. The country has accumulated considerable governmental and non-governmental experience in the reform of the security sector and continues on its path of successfully implementing political, economic and administrative reforms in the process of integration in NATO and the EU.

    The city of Plovdiv is a symbol of cooperation and integration. In the last several years Plovdiv became a center of the structures of Bulgaria's armed forces and a host of Southeastern Europe's multinational SEEBRIG. The city also plays host to the Hemus International Defense Hardware and Technology Exhibition as well as other specialized exhibitions relevant to the issue of post-conflict reconstruction and development. Plovdiv has a favorable geographic location and a well-developed infrastructure including roads, rail-roads, and airports. The city is also a key educational center, host to universities specialized in agriculture, food-processing, healthcare, and engineering-areas important to any post-conflict reconstruction effort. Historically, Plovdiv is an example of tolerance, cooperation and integration.

    In this context the NGO sector in Bulgaria proposed several projects to be based in the city of Plovdiv:

    • European Training Center for Security Sector Reform as a part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
    • Center for Operational Interoperability of Communication and Information Systems in NATO/PfP
    • Center for Information Infrastructure Development and Training, jointly with the Bulgarian Academy of Science and the EU
    • Southeast European Center for Crisis Management and Civil and Infrastructure Protection
    • Center for Air Force Equipment Modernization, Repair and Maintenance
    • Joint Operations Command (Joint Operational Command for ground forces and air force as well as the other elements of the security sector)
    • Regional Transportation Hub for South-East Europe, the Black Sea Zone and part of the Middle East

    The proposal
    Bulgaria is about to accomplish two important projects-NATO and the EU. It is now time to think of the Project Bulgaria, which includes a number of regional and national projects. As a part of Bulgaria's contribution to the security goals and functions of NATO and the EU, the SSRC proposes the creation of a European Center for Security Sector Reform and Post-conflict Reconstruction and Integration (ECSSRPCR), to be based in the city of Plovdiv.

    The end of major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the pacification of the Balkans, and the political will of former Soviet republics to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic space provides Bulgaria with an excellent opportunity to share its knowledge and expertise in the reform of the security sector and democracy building. In fact, in the post-communist transition process, Bulgaria was a good example of an effective recipient of expertise and knowledge on bilateral and multilateral basis. The country is now capable of providing the same assistance to other states.

    The Center's main functions will include:

    • The study of security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction
    • Training of Bulgarian and foreign experts in security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction
    • The implementation of modern information and communication technologies in security sector integration and post-conflict reconstruction

    The Center will employ experts with practical, hands-on experience in the administration, military officers, academics, NGO representatives and business leaders. It will develop projects, strategies and analyses of the security sector and post-conflict reconstruction for both the Bulgarian government and foreign clients. The Center will seek financial assistance from international organizations, including the UN, OSCE, the EU, the World Bank, NATO, business clients and governments.

    Bulgaria needs an integrated approach to the participation in post-conflict reconstruction, assistance to transition states, democracy building, and reform of the security sector in other countries. It is essential that this approach is coordinated with international partners and embraced not only by the state institutions, but also the NGO and academic sector, the business community and the public at large. Therefore, the SSRC presents the current proposal to the widest possible public and seeks the participation of all interested parties.

    The establishment of the Center requires cooperation and coordination among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), NATO, the EU and the Security Sector Reform Coalition as well as the formulation of a mandate by the MFA, MoD and the parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security and the SSRC, which has a wide political support and takes into account the interests of various interests in the society including the Bulgarian business.

    What makes the city of Plovdiv appropriate for the location of the Center is its history as an international center including:

    • the first location of the SEEBRIG Headquarters
    • adjacent to the main training facilities of the Bulgarian armed forces
    • the presence of the Operational Forces Command, tactical air wing and special forces troops
    • military jet repair facilities
    • three airports, railroad, highway
    • universities and Bulgarian Academy of Science's institutes
    • close proximity to Sofia, Burgas, Istanbul, Aegean Sea ports and others

    The Center will be a major contribution to the country's participation in the Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (CDASSI) and will actively assist Bulgaria's policy of projecting security and stability to volatile adjacent regions. The ECSSRPCR will also be a significant contribution to the functions of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, in which Bulgaria as co-founder participates in its Consultative Board. Bulgaria also has significant experience in managing PIMS-PfP information system-which would allow the Center to apply new information technologies in the process of security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction.

    The main engine of this project will be a consortium of local government structures, NGOs and business organizations in coordination with the Parliament and the state administration including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Civil Protection State Agency, and Bulgarian Academy of Science. The leadership of an individual, who is well known abroad, would be an additional guarantee for the success of the endevaour. It is also essential that the Bulgarian parliament provide support, preferably without partisan divisions.

    Currently, Bulgarian is the only country in the region without a PfP training center or another facility. Establishing such a center will enable Bulgaria to participate more actively in the web of centers of excellence and expertise in various areas associated with the EU and especially with the NATO's newly established Allied Command Transformation (Poland and Norway are the latest two countries to have such centers of excellence). Although the country's armed forces have attempted to create such centers, including the Interoperability Department, they still remain isolated and incapable of seriously affecting the processes discussed in this article.

    The institutionalization of the Center as a joint governmental and NGO structure, which is assisted by the business community and international participants will make the endeavor transparent and of a high quality. This will improve Bulgaria's image and attract international expertise as well as entice Bulgarian experts to gain further foreign expertise. In other words not only will Bulgaria export stability and security but it will also gain more of both. The creation of such as center outside Sofia is also an essential element in the policy of reversing the tendency of concentrating structures and facilities in the capital.

    At the end of the round-table the Coalition called on both the government and the business community to invest politically and financially in the project and suggested the end of the year as the possible start of the real work on the Center.

    Events

    04 - 05.09
    		 Shaping a Common Security Agenda in Southeast Europe, international conference organized by the Center for the Study of Democracy and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Sofia.
    18.09
    		 Applying European Standards to the Integration of Minorities into the Bulgarian Armed Forces, international conference organized by the Atlantic Club in Bulgaria, Sofia.
    19.09
    		 The Bulgarian-American Relations: The Way Ahead, international conference organized by the Atlantic Club in Bulgaria, Sofia.
    21 - 23.09
    		 16th meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Security Study Group, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, organized by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Cracow, Poland.
    22 - 25.09
    		 Trans-Atlantic Cooperation in the New Strategic Environment, conference organized by SAIC and Wilton Park, London.
    25.09
    		 Risks and Threats to Regional and Euro-Atlantic Security After 9-11, round-table organized in Sofia by the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security.
    25.09
    		 Transparency in the Management of Defense Budget, roundtable discussion organized in Sofia by the George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria
    25 - 26.09
    		 Defense and Security Policy-The Challenges of the New Millennium, seventh international workshop organized by the G. S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College, Sofia.
    29 - 30.09
    		 The Bulgarian Navy-New Missions, Roles and Capabilities, 2nd International Conference, organized by the AFCEA, Varna.