Year 1, issue 3, july 2003

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

Security Environment

Transformation of the American Armed Forces
Blagovest Tashev

Security Sector

From Reform to Transformation of the Armed Forces and the Security Sector
Velizar Shalamanov

Concept for Reform of the Security Services in the Republic of Bulgaria
Atanas Atanasov

By Invitation

Professionalization of Bulgaria's Armed Forces
Anyu Angelov

Memorandum #4 of Security Sector Reform Coalition

Events

To Our Readers

This is the third issue of the Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter. In this issue's first article Blagovest Tashev discusses some of the main elements of the ongoing transformation process in the American armed forces. The article notes some the transformation's likely consequences for states like Bulgaria, which face not only the challenge of integration in NATO but also new risks and threats to national security.

Velizar Shalamanov continues the discussion on the issue of transformation defining the goals and tasks of this process in Bulgaria. The article not only identifies the transformation' parameters but also provides an approach to its implementation in the national security sector.

Major General Atanas Atanasov offers a specific reform concept for the security services in Bulgaria. As it was discussed in previous issues, security services lag behind in the national reform process. The system needs clear legal framework and the creation of civilian and democratic control over the work of the security services.

Lieutenant General Anyu Angelov, this issue's guest writer, discusses the issue of professionalization of the Bulgarian armed forces. The author points out the many problems facing the process of creating all-volunteer armed forces and provides a model for the successful building of highly effective forces which the country can afford.

As always, you may also read past and current issues of this newsletter at: http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/index_en.shtml

From the publishers

Transformation of the American Armed Forces
Blagovest Tashev

Along with the war on terrorism and formulating a new security policy, the United States is in a process of transformation of the armed forces to adequately meet the security environment's modern threats and risks. The conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the last several years showed that military success can be achieved without the traditional methods requiring massive deployment of troops, the use of mainly heavy ground forces and the attainment of control over territory. While during the Cold War the United States and its allies were ready to defend territory and population from an identified enemy expected to undertake aggression using all branches of the military, future conflicts are expected to involve nontraditional enemies using asymmetrical military means and aiming to cause chaos and break the Western society's will to fight. In other words, the new security environment requires armed forces to adequately meet the new challenges to security.

Consequently, the United States and some of its allies are in the process of not simply reforming but transforming the armed forces. Transformation does not imply to attainment of a fixed goal, but is rather a process of managing a constantly changing environment and factors. In this sense, the transformation of the American armed forces aims to build effective capabilities able to respond to numerous threats and risks instead of capabilities in response to threats from a specific state or alliance. In other words, in the new security environment, there is consensus on the nature of the threats and risks without necessarily knowing their exact sources. Even more, while in the past the enemy-then the USSR-was expected to rationally calculate the risks and consequences of its policies and consequently avoid actions that might lead to an armed conflict, in the new security environment, the potential enemies-rogue states, terrorists groups-are willing to escalate conflicts with little regard for the consequences. Therefore, American security policy aims to build armed forces capable of eliminating these threats and risks wherever they appear and before they have inflicted unacceptable damage.

The armed forces' new missions led to the need for change in their structure and capabilities. It must be noted that this need appeared by the end of the Cold War but domestic and international political conditions did not allow the U.S. to undertake the transformation. The terrorist acts on 11 September 2001 made the public tolerant of a higher defense budget and allowed the Pentagon to initiate the process of complex change in the force structure.

The transformation debate began in the 1990s. Many experts argued that the armed forces of the U.S. have the structure and capabilities for the conflicts of the Cold War and are unprepared to face the risks and threats of in the new security environment. According to one influential school of thought, we are witnessing a new so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) wherein technological change combined with new military strategies lead to military dominance as the German blitzkrieg in WWII and the nuclear weapons in the Cold War. This school insists that the U.S. must build adequate armed forces taking into account the challenges and opportunities crated by the RMA. More specifically, the armed forces must adjust to two main requirements in the security environment:

• Development of precision weapons, allowing the armed forces to fight from a distance without relying on vulnerable aircraft carriers and bases near the combat areas.
• Development of information warfare concepts including the use of satellites, aerial cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles, GPS, integrated C4 systems, etc, which provide complete information about the conflict and lead to information dominance.

Although the RMA school-there are others, too-does not dominate the current thinking in military affairs, many of its ideas and concepts inform and influence the attempts to transform the U.S. armed forces.

The other main factor leading this process is the U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled at the end of last year. According to the Strategy, the U.S. would act pre-emptively against states and groups, which attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and intend to use them against America. In contrast to the past, when WMD were possessed as a deterrent, currently some states and terrorist groups see them as the only tool giving them a chance for military and political successes against the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. is determined not to permit these states and groups to threaten its security.

According to strategic thinking in the U.S. the main sources of non-traditional threats and risks are the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, North Africa and Asia in general. The armed forces' current capabilities, structure, and posture in Europe impedes their missions in troubled regions. The forces in Europe-more than 70,000 in Germany alone-are located far from the most probable crisis regions; the most modern Air Force bases in Britain and Germany are great distance from the Middle East. For example, during the Kosovo conflict many F-16s had to be refueled midair several times during missions due to the lack of enough bases close to the region. Logically, the U.S. shows interest in locating military bases in NATO's periphery, including Bulgaria and Romania.

Along with considering basing issues in Europe, the U.S. shifts its military presence in other parts of the world: troops are withdrawing from the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, military presence in Saudi Arabia is about to end, and presence in Turkey, especially on the Incirlik air base, is scaled back.

In this process the U.S. interest in Bulgaria as a potential host of military bases is only logical. This is but a small part of the complex process of security policy transformation. Bulgaria is adjacent to volatile regions, possesses the required infrastructure, and military presence here, as opposed to in Germany, for example, seems to make sense financially. Besides, as the case of Turkey during the last war in Iraq shows, military presence in Bulgaria would increase the range of political and military options available to American decision-makers during a crisis.

From Reform to Transformation of the Armed Forces and the Security Sector
Velizar Shalamanov

Article 98 of the Defense Doctrine defines the principles of the development of the armed forces as "process reengineering; consolidation of functions; freeing surplus; and introducing competition in pubic contracts." These requirements were the main elements of Plan 2004, which, according to the political and military leadership, is about to be completed. Of course, there exist further opportunities for maximization of these elements especially in the framework of new processes in the armed forces including modernization, professionalization, participation in operations, etc. Just as Plan 2004 projected, following its successful completion, Bulgaria was invited to join NATO and become a full member in 2004. According to Lord Robertson, however, "This is a new NATO. A NATO transformed in Prague Summit. A NATO able to meet its commitments when times get tough, from the Straits of Gibraltar through the Balkans to southern Turkey. A NATO now preparing to take on a demanding stabilisation mission in the Afghan capital. In short, a NATO transforming its membership, its relationships, its capabilities and its missions."

As a consequence on 19 June 2003 Lord Roberson inaugurated Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia and noted, "Allied Command for Transformation will shape the future of combined and joint operations. It will identify new concepts, and bring them to maturity. It will then turn these transformational concepts into reality; a reality shared by the entire NATO Alliance."

Thus the ongoing Strategic Defense Review initiated by the Council of Minister with a decision #262 of 22 April 2003 should have one main goal-transformation of the Bulgarian defense system in the context of NATO transformation. For several months Bulgaria waited for decisions about NATO's new command structure, issues concerning operations and NATO Response Force-issues, which already have been addressed. In addition, the country received its Force Goals package, began the preparation for its mission in Iraq, initiated a discussion about allied bases, modernization, professionalization, defense industry, and the country's role in the Alliance and soon in the EU.

It is high time, however, to begin discussion of the transition from reform to transformation. The question is not simply about the size of armed forces, its structure or the main armaments; indeed it is a rather more complex issue. If Plan 2004 was seen as the reform plan, Plan 2008 should be designed as the transformation plan based on a vision going beyond 2008.

Transformation is defined as a process of constant and comprehensive change in doctrines, organization, training, equipment, management, personnel, and infrastructure aimed at creating integrated capabilities for participation in a wide specter of operations assisted by the use of new technologies and ensuring relative dominance. This process is not routine; the United States enhanced the role of the USJFCOM and has the Office of Transformation under the oversight of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz. Similarly, NATO created the Allied Command for Transformation--intended to work closely with the USJFCOM-as well as centers of excellence to apply the transformation concepts.

What are the main transformation issues in Bulgaria?
First, it is necessary to have a clear definition of the types of operations Bulgarian armed forces are going to take part in, either independently or in coalition, including places, time, level of participation, etc. Second, what forces and their status in the operations-forming a concept of expeditionary task force based on modules? Third, what is the equipment, structure of personnel, training and logistics required? Fourth, it is necessary to guarantee the connection between expeditionary task force and the forces guaranteeing the country's territorial security-developing a concept for the development of infrastructure of national, joint, and allied military bases in Bulgaria. Fifth, it is essential to ensure all forces with defense and civilian resources-developing a concept for the use of defense capabilities to assist civilian authorities. Sixth, there is a need to define the relationship between the armed forces and the other institutions of the security sector; the role of the defense industry. Seventh, what is the system of control and management of the transformed forces?

One of the crucial issues in the transformation of the Bulgarian armed forces is the extent of use of new technologies allowing participation in allied missions based on network-centric warfare. This issue cannot be addressed by simply reorganizing and adopting doctrines and training with the available equipment, which was designed in the 1960s and very rarely in the 1980s. What is needed is a technological leap supported by the integrated efforts of the Ministry of Defense, Bulgarian Academy of Science, defense industry and Western defense companies in the management of the modernization programs. These modernization programs, based on strategic partnership and wide-ranging offset arrangements, should be supported at the highest political level including the Government and Parliament which would guarantee the sustainability of the programs and the final success of the modernization process and which would span more than one parliamentary term. Postponing the process the lack of stable political choice lead to serious problems as evident in the case of PICIS and the MiG-29 modernization project wherein the armed forces, despite the significant financial cost, did not gain new capabilities for participation in missions.

The transformation's technological aspect is crucial and it cannot be substituted for by geostrategic position, hosting military bases, traditional forces or logistical and repair functions in the Alliance. The right approach to the issue of technological leap requires modern organization, which according to the Law on Administration could lead to the creation of a Modernization and Rearmament Agency managing the programs' implementation. The Agency receives the requirements and provides a working system through integrated program teams including clients, scientists, engineers and traders in close cooperation with the NATO counterparts. The Agency provides technological demonstrations; creates and analyses concepts assisting the transformation process; creates expert centers which participate in the NATO arms programs; and in the future in the EC's, and in the centers of excellence of the Allied Command Transformation of NATO. The Center for the Study of National Security and Defense at the Bulgarian Academy of Science, the Institute for Space Research, and the Institute for Metal Studies are the Agency's natural partners as they have created technological centers and have accumulated expertise in this area.

Without the technological component of transformation, Bulgaria will be unable to become an effective NATO member. However, with very few exceptions, Bulgarian industry does not possess this component. This is barrier to implementing offset programs, creating joint ventures, and joint projects in third countries. The state still has three instruments in this area-investment program for arms modernization, NATO and EC's military assistance programs, state owned defense companies and technological centers in BAS. The quick integration of the three instruments in the currently positive military-strategic, political and economic international environment under an affective management can make the transformation of the technological aspect possible.

A specific international assistance in the technological component of the security sector can turn out to be the crucial incentive motivating other important transformational processes. This assistance will help to define the specific Bulgarian technological products on the defense market. In this sense, the Modernization and Rearmament Agency can assist the state policy of technological modernization and assistance to national exports especially to countries where Bulgaria participates in international forces and other military diplomacy programs.

Concept for Reform of the Security Services in the Republic of Bulgaria
Major-General (ret) Atanas Atanasov

Introduction
The place and role of the security services along with reform in the justice system is one of the most debated topics today in Bulgaria. The debate takes place in the context of Bulgaria's upcoming membership in NATO following the invitation at the Prague Summit in November 2002.

There exists a consensus among all interested sides that the most important mechanism to ensure national security in all its aspects is the function of the authorized institutions. The challenge now is to reach a consensus for reform of the security services corresponding to Bulgaria's needs: to achieve effectiveness and responsibility in the services and avoid costly radical changes.

The approaching Bulgarian membership in NATO makes this reform necessary. Currently, there exists a status quo formed at the beginning of the 1990s including structures created under conditions of rapid reform and functioning without a legal framework.

Therefore it is essential to formulate a comprehensive general concept for reform in the security services to be offered to state institutions and political parties for a debate. The debate's goal must be a maximum consensus on the future legislation in this sphere. In this respect, it is of utmost importance to ensure transparency in the decision-making process in this area and the wide participation of all interested sides, including state institutions, civil society and the professional sector.

Scope of Prerogatives of the Institutions in the Area of National Security
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the institutions, which have authorities and responsibilities in the area of national security include the National Assembly, the President, and the Council of Minister. Of them, the Council of Ministers has the most extensive prerogatives as assigned by Article 105 of the Constitution:

"Article 105. (1) The Council of Ministers shall head the implementation of the state's domestic and foreign policy; (2) The Council of Ministers shall ensure the public order and national security and shall exercise overall guidance over the state administration and the Armed Forces."

The National Assembly as the legislative power through its legislative functions formulates the national security policy. The President's prerogatives include the right to appoint the high command of the armed forces as well as other officers determined by laws.

This distribution of responsibilities necessitates a legal framework determining the structure, functions, management mechanisms and coordination of the institutions authorized to ensure public order and security. Along with formulating this framework it is essential to define the oversight and control functions of the National Assembly over the security services.

The legal mechanism for management of the security services must guarantee that the three institutions would receive an equal quantity of information including information pertaining to the way services are managed. Currently only the National Security Service, which is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is legally required to provide information to all three institutions.

Direct operational control over the institutions of national security must be the prerogative of their leaders. Along with fulfilling their functions, operational autonomy implies autonomous budget and full control over personnel policies.

Operational control-defining strategic tasks in ensuring national security, control over implementation and coordination among various bodies-must be the prerogative of the Council of Ministers or its Security Council.

System and Institutional Structure of the Security Services
The system of security services, which have functional responsibilities in security, must be built on the basis of the existing institutions while taking into account the new domestic and international challenges to national security as well as the country's international commitments. There exist several models of structuring the system of security services. One model divides them into:

• civilian intelligence and security services;
• defense intelligence and security services.

Other criteria in creating the system are based on the territory of functional responsibility:

• counterintelligence and security services functioning on the territory of the country;
• intelligence and security services acting abroad.

The future legal framework in the security area must solve the problem of institution building in the security services. It is desirable that all services reach a degree of equality.

For the sake of better management it makes sense to merge functions into two services-intelligence and counterintelligence. Given Bulgaria's small territory and population, and the need for speed and effectiveness in fulfilling their functions, it is recommended to adopt a simple model of organizing the system of security services. One such model is presented above is based on territorial functions and implies the creation of two services. The first one deals with counterintelligence and internal security and the other one analyzes external threats to national security and provides intelligence.

What are the arguments in support of this model?
First, the management and control over the activities of the services in the country and abroad will be centralized. On the other hand, in addition to the territorial principle, these activities are going to be based on functional principle as well. In other words, state functions in counterintelligence are going to be controlled by a single body; the same is valid for intelligence gathering functions.

The current structure of the security services and their division into civilian and military have a negative effect on coordination. Conversely, whenever there is a need for action by more than one service in one area, there emerges competition, turf conflicts and withholding of information instead of cooperation.

Joint structure and leadership will eliminate these negative processes and will lead to more effectiveness. This approach would solve the problem of duplication of functions and tasks. Currently civilian and military services very often work on the same task. Usually this problem becomes apparent at the end of an operation. It is then realized that what one services has been trying to find out had been known by another service from the very beginning or the vice versa. The most disappointing experience is when one service eliminates the other service's operational capabilities and opportunities.

The current state wherein the services are seen as catering to the interests of those leading the institutions is another argument for the merger of civilian and military services. Past experience points out that precisely the leadership should be the focus of surveillance.

Adopting such a model would allow the security services to fulfill their legally prescribed functions. Currently, some services, particularly military services, are carrying out tasks not associated with their missions. For instance, because of tradition and lack of political control in recent years military intelligence frequently have received and used information outside the area of defense and armed forces. Instead of transferring the information to civilian security services this information was either left unused or used for non-military purposes.

Status and Tasks of Security Services
Security services should be constituted as state institutions with national jurisdiction and independent budget. In constituting the services, decision makers should seek to create a separate law instead the current Law on State Administration and the Law on State Employees.

Security Services' Jurisdiction
A law should define the security services' jurisdiction and responsibilities. Their main mission is the collection of information about threats and risks to national security. Directors lead the services and exercise control over operational functions. Decision makers should consider the principle of appointment and mandate of the services' leadership. It is possible to adopt the principle of appointment by the President on proposal of the Council of Ministers or alternatively appointment with a decision of the National Assembly on proposal of the Council of Ministers.

Coordination and Information Exchange among the Security Services and Other State Institutions
A special body in the executive branch of government should guide and control the process of coordination and information exchange among security services and other public order bodies. Operational coordination must be legally defined by agreements signed by the directors of various security institutions. One example of such model is Hungary where the Law on National Security Services of 1995 created a mechanism for coordination among the services based on legal agreements.

Management Mechanism and Civilian Control
The Council of Ministers, through its Security Council led by the Prime Minister, exercise overall control over the security services. The Security Council's main focus is coordination of functions, information analysis, and control over the security services. These prerogatives should be defined further in the new model so that the Council does not interfere in the management autonomy of the services' leaders.

The need for coordination among the services is a key factor in their work. The lack of coordination often leads to duplication in their work and could possibly lead to disinformation of state institutions. Creating a body to coordinate the work of security services and to analyze the collected information commonly solves this problem, having different solutions in various countries.

It is essential that citizens have the opportunity to exercise control over the work of the security services and thus protect individual rights and freedoms. Future legal arrangements should provide every individual the right, whenever its rights and freedoms are thought to be violated, to lodge a complaint with a specifically created body to investigate the matter.

It is essential to create a consensus for a fundamentally new personnel policy in the security services. College students should be the main source of candidates thus creating a pool of individuals with various qualifications and skills. Furthermore, such candidates come with diverse backgrounds, which is a significant advantage in their future work. It is also essential to create clear criteria for professional growth as a barrier against political interference and arbitrariness. A special law should deny individuals who have started their carriers during the communist rule or had had ties with the communist secret services any leadership positions in the security services.

Professionalization of Bulgaria's Armed Forces
Lieutenant-General (ret) Anyu Angelov

Is there a political decision to move from draft to all volunteer armed forces?
At the end of 1995, the National Assembly passed the Law on Defense and Armed Forces, which for the first time allowed for the hiring of professional soldiers. The Law and its numerous amendments, however, still preserved the draft as the main approach to filling the soldier's ranks.

Article 93 of the Defense Doctrine requires that the armed forces' professionalization be complete by 2010. The document does not, however, determine the nature of the process leading to creating all-volunteer forces. Furthermore, the government's agenda does not even mention the words "professionalization" and "armed forces."

The draft of the Political Framework of the Strategic Defense Review made public in April of this year does not explicitly call for transition to all-volunteer armed forces and does not define the political and economic context of the transition.

Unlike the other documents, Article 3.1.1 of the Defense White Paper, approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2002, defines all-volunteer armed forces as an option without alternatives.

Given numerous official statements by the Minister of Defense and the Prime Ministers, it appears that there exists a political decision to adopt all-volunteer armed forces. At the same time, the Chief of General Staff called for a public debate on the merits of having draft armed forces. In his remarks during the opening session of a conference held at the G. S. Rakovski Defense Academy, the Minister of Defense noted that the draft has its positive aspects. These and similar statements lead one to suspect that the political and military leadership lacks confidence in the decision to adopt all-volunteer forces. The main reason for this is the lack of a comprehensive state strategy based on thorough comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the two main approaches to filling the military ranks.

In order to overcome these doubts, it is helpful to remember the conclusions of some comparative assessments and point out the elements of the strategy for successful transition.

Main arguments for the transition of the Bulgarian armed forces from draft to all-volunteer forces

• The draft must be seen not as an end in itself but rather as a political means of state authority. The draft is introduced in a certain political environment and the need for it disappears when the requirements leading to it disappear.
• The draft is not compatible with the values of democracy and is inherently undemocratic. The draft imposes unnecessary and, under certain conditions, compulsory measures leading to limiting or denying constitutionally guaranteed personal liberties and freedoms (Article 30 of the Constitution).
• The dramatic changes in the political and strategic environment after the Cold War require new missions, tasks and defense capabilities from the armed forces. Accordingly, the personnel of the armed forces face growing demands in regards to its effectiveness. These demands can be met only by well-prepared professional personnel in the context of strong public expectations for shortened draft service.
• Bulgaria's full membership in NATO and the EU and the country's effective contribution to collective defense requires a quick decision making process and mechanisms for the armed forces' participation in out-of-the-country operations. Due to the high risks, the national practice requires the explicit consent of every draft and professional soldier. While from professional military such consent can be expected, it is rather unrealistic to expect it from draft soldiers.
• Introducing all-voluntary armed forces will provide the society with a more effective instrument for defense, which possesses greater and more sustainable effectiveness.
• All-voluntary armed forces would diminish the negative effect on society and the economy of taking young people away to the barracks for a certain period.
• All-voluntary armed forces' better preparedness and effectiveness make it possible to cut the size of personnel and consequently the size of the budget for personnel.
• In a society with modern all-voluntary armed forces there is a contradiction between the values and moral convictions of the armed forces as an institution and the values and ego of the individuals. Young people do not generally wish to serve; their personal evaluation of the service's benefit is most often negative.
• The distribution of the draft burden among the population is unjust. The decreasing size of the armed forces provides dwindling services opportunities to a great number of young people. This leads to the introduction of further tacit criteria denying service including education, ethnicity as well as easing the conditions for postponement or skipping of service. In this respect, the armed forces' past social function of being a tool for national integration is turned onto its head, promoting further divisions in the society.
• The shortening of the draft to 6-9 months significantly limits another social function of the armed force; it used to provide professional skills knowledge in certain areas to a great number of young people after their service.

What do we lose by adopting all-voluntary armed forces?

• The draft service prepares all males to act in extreme war- and peace-time situations. The draft provides a natural link between society and armed forces. It is a mirror image of the society with all its positive and negative characteristics.
• Having no draft eliminates the state's ability to rapidly increase its armed forces in case of imminent danger of massive aggression and no opportunity to use the instrument of collective defense.
• The transition to all-voluntary forces creates the danger of insulating the armed forces and turning them into a cast organization and an instrument for forceful regime change in the country. There emerges the problem of "guarding the guardians" and creating effective civilian control of the armed forces.
• Maintaining all-voluntary forces is significantly more expensive than the draft, size being equal. The cost of maintaining one professional soldier is two and a half times as high as maintaining a draft soldier. For example, estimates in the German armed forces indicate the overall payments for a professional soldier is 29,300 euros, while the draft soldier's is 11,500 euros (2.54:1). For Russia the ratio is 41,000 rubles versus16,000 rubles (2.56:1). For Bulgaria, the comparison is 5,900 leva versus 2,340 leva (2.52:1).

Comparing pluses and minuses should not be absolute. They are correlated to a great extent and the decisions of the political and military leadership could increase or diminish the relative weight of each factor regardless of their positive or negative side. In any event, the specific Bulgarian political, economic and demographic tendencies make the adoption of all-voluntary armed forces desirable. The political choice is correct. What is left is to analyze and define the strategy for implementing the political decision.

What are the main negative tendencies in the transition from draft to all-volunteer armed forces in Bulgaria?
It must be noted that Bulgaria has made achievements in the professionalization of the armed forces, particularly the rapid increase in the number of professional soldiers. In the September 2000-March 2001 period their number increased three times and reached 1,897 non-officer personnel. This tendency continued and by August 2002, 5,745 professional solders served in the armed forces. There exist the right conditions for their main and specialized military training. The armed forces are gradually moving to manning whole units with professional soldiers, particularly Navy, Air Force and the deployable troops of the ground forces. There are also attempts to use legal opportunities to enlist women as professional soldiers. For now, they are employed in a very few positions. The number of female soldiers by mid-2002 constitutes approximately 10 percent of all professional soldiers.

Unfortunately, the growing number of professional soldiers is not accompanied by a growth in personnel quality. The lack of clear and precise criteria for professional qualifications of the candidates, rather than only their educational level, and their social behavior until their enlistment constitute a serious threat to the future effectiveness of the professional soldiers. These problems are apparent when the vigorous selection process for units to serve in missions abroad eliminates approximately 50 percent of the candidates.

The requirement that each candidate for professional soldier has completed the draft further restricts the number of willing to pursue professional military carrier and doubles the cost of their training.

The effective organization of marketing and selection plays a prominent role in ensuring the quality of enlisted soldiers. In this respect, the introduction of enlistment centers in 2000 is a step in the right direction. However, the functions of these centers limited to accepting the applications and preliminary interviews with the candidates as well as the creation of additional selection commissions with the sole purpose to determine whether the candidates meet legal requirements is hardly the best option. The distribution of one and the same functions-selecting the candidates for professional service-among many bodies leads to lack of responsibility and numerous bureaucratic hurdles.

Living conditions for professional soldiers, especially in barracks, do not still meet the standards. Similar problems are to be found in conditions for sports and leisure. These shortcomings directly affect the attractiveness of professional service.

The profession's attractiveness is also determined by the scope of responsibilities assigned to professional soldiers. Basic responsibilities, limited to maintaining military facilities, equipment, and arms as well as patrol duties every other day in no way increase the professional satisfaction. The attempts to redistribute responsibilities among commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and professional soldiers have so far been rather halfhearted.

Despite the existing legal mechanisms for education and the consequent transition from soldier rank to non-commissioned officer rank, it is still not a widespread practice. In most professional armed forces the main source for non-commissioned officer ranks is the professional solders.

Despite the upbeat reports about the completed ahead of time Plan-2004, Bulgaria still does not possess all-voluntary deployable forces-brigade or battalion of the armed forces:

• immediately capable of deploying abroad following a political decision;
• possessing high combat readiness in a wide specter of missions and tasks;
• possessing high mobility and logistical autonomy for an extended period of time.

The "volunteer principle" applied in completing joint units for participation in missions continues to cause problems. These, hastily formed and prepared units, will be vulnerable on the ground during peacemaking and peacekeeping duties. The risk to the life and health of participants in such join units is extremely high. The collective professional experience gained in such operations is lost when upon their completion the participants in the unit rejoin their original units.

What state strategy is required in order to avoid the shortcomings and eliminate the negative tendencies?
The state and military leadership owe a debt to the ongoing process of professionalization. The transition form draft to all-volunteer armed forces must be defined as a national priority. A successful strategy contains the following elements:

• The ongoing Strategic Defense Review must define the transition to all-volunteer armed forces as a main goal, make comprehensive political, military-strategic, personnel and economic analysis of the current state of the transition and formulate the main programs towards its successful end by 2010.
• The National Assembly must formulate and pass a long-tem program for improving the professional soldiers' living conditions.
• An end must be put to the practice of selecting volunteers to joint unites for missions abroad which are disbanded upon the completion of the mission.
• There must an end to having units including both professional and draft soldiers.
• The military leadership must overcome its policy of selecting as many as possible professional soldiers at the time when the national economy is coming out of a deep slump and instead adopt a more moderate pace consistent with the country's development.
• Formulate a general concept for new legislation for the defense, armed forces and the military service.
• The National Assembly must pass a number of laws including the Law on Defense, Law on the Armed Forces, and Law on the Military Service.
• There must different bodies of legislation for the various categories of professional personnel, as there exist significant differences in the requirements for selection, training, and assignment.
• The requirement for draft service before applying to professional service must be rescinded. For certain positions there must be qualification prerequisites instead the current requirement of high school diploma.
• There must be a new system of ranks for professional soldiers, which must stimulate interest in professional growth-three ranks for the current rank of private and two ranks for the current rank of private first class.
• In their contracts soldiers must consent to participation in military and non-military operations abroad.
• There must be separate legal requirements for the draft. The legislation must introduce the lottery principle for selecting the draft personnel until the draft is gradually phased out.
• New legislation must clearly define the functions and responsibilities of each category of military personnel and introduce new ranks in the armed forces. It must introduce the tendency of transferring functional responsibilities from commissioned officers to non-commissioned officers and from non-commissioned officers to professional soldiers. The legislation must formulate procedures and system allowing for the transition of professional soldiers to higher ranks. The main source of the non-commissioned officer ranks must be the professional soldier ranks.
• There must be introduced a new category, called candidate officer, containing two or three ranks between the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.
• There must be a system for voluntary military education in the middle school and training for extreme situations in the high school. There must military education centers in colleges offering basic and specialized training to candidates for professional service and the reserve as well as officials from the Ministry of Defense under contract for future study in the National Defense University or service as commissioned officers.
• There must be introduced a single system in the selection center for candidates for professional service.

The successful solution of the problems and overcoming the shortcomings would determine the success of this complex process, undertaken for the first time in Bulgaria's history.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria
In cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Center for National Security and Defense Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

МЕМОRANDUM # 4
Modernization and Transformation

Bulgaria is about to achieve one of its most important foreign policy priorities - NATO membership. Being part of the Alliance, however, does not in itself guarantee national security. In the future, attaining security would depend on Bulgaria's ability to participate politically and militarily in allied missions and operations. Although the government alone is responsible for shaping national security policy, successful implementation of policies increasingly depends, among other things, on the possession of well-trained and properly equipped national military forces. The maintenance of effective military capabilities, in turn, can only be accomplished in partnership with leading American and European defense industries.

The national defense capabilities are currently at the heart of the issue of determining Bulgaria's ability to participate in operations and missions. The national defense budget is around $500 million (close to 3 percent of the GDP) and is projected to grow in absolute terms, given the attitudes of both the political elite and the public at large toward defense expenditures. The presence of recognized military requirements and political and public support for relatively high defense budgets bodies well for the future business opportunities of defense contractors in Bulgaria.

There is a growing realization in Bulgaria that enhanced national security requires not only a successful political partnership with the United States / EU but also effective defense industry and business cooperation with leading American / European defense contractors. For U.S./EU defense contractors, clearly there are technological and business opportunities in Bulgaria, which they can explore by cultivating new relationships. The formation of joint ventures and cooperative technological programs and the acquisition of manufacturing assets will allow them to utilize future program opportunities over the long run. In addition, the need for an immediate modernization of parts of the armed forces provides further business opportunities.

Achieving a productive partnership between Bulgaria and American/EU defense contractors serves both countries' interests as the United States/EU gains not only a political but also a military ally and Bulgaria attains a more prominent and active role in the Euro-Atlantic community and ultimately more security. To reach these objectives Bulgaria and the United States / EU, as well as American/EU defense contractors, need to engage in a discussion on the following issues:

• strategies for cooperation;
• planning for Bulgarian military capabilities;
• programs for modernization and restructuring of defense capabilities;
• budget management;
• development of specific, but clear defense acquisition rules;
• research and development as well as education and training;
• " direct investments;
• program management and training.

Currently Bulgaria is engaged in a process of planning its short- and long-term defense needs and seeks to formulate programs for building adequate capabilities. In the short run, decision makers are seeking to establish the country's future specialization within NATO as identified by the Prague Capability Commitment from the November 2002 Prague Summit. Bulgarian military planners have listed the following capabilities as the possible areas of specialization in future allied missions and for building joint expedition task force:

• special operations module;
• combat and transport helicopters;
• engineering and chemical warfare modules;
• mechanized (police, gendarmerie) module;
• logistics module;
• medical support module;
• civil protection module;
• C4 module to integrate the above capabilities.

Meanwhile decision makers are planning to build defense capabilities to be used on the national territory and when needed to support allied missions. These goals require:

• integration in the NATO air defense system;
• developing a system for sea sovereignty compatible with NATO standards;
• developing a system for land sovereignty compatible with NATO standards.

Finally, the long-term goal of this modernization process is to achieve the following:

• modernizing the entire security sector;
• achieving integration of the institutions and elements of the security sector;
• integrating the national security sector in the Euro-Atlantic security sector.

Main tools to implement ideas for strategic partnership are: long-term parliamentary approved modernization program; restructuring of national defense industry own by state around this program implementation; inserting of technological centers from R&D / E&T institution in the defense industry package for deeper industrial partnership with NATO-countries defense companies.

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