Year 1, issue 2, June 2003

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

Security Environment

Risks and Treats in the New Security Environment and the Challenges Facing Bulgaria

The United States Senate's Resolution and Bulgaria's Integration in NATO

Security Sector

Integrated Defense Management Model in the Context of the Strategic Defense Review

Information Systems as Tool for Integration of the Security Sector

What Secrets Does the State Commission for Protection of Information Guard

By Invitation

Challenges to Modernization of Bulgarian Armed Forces

Memorandum #3 of Security Sector Reform Coalition

Events

To Our Readers

This is the second issue of Security Focus and Security Sector Watch. Following the publication of the first issue, we received valuable feedback from our readers. Hopefully, our joint efforts will help us meet your expectations for reading analytical, interesting, and provocative ideas.

In this issue's first article, Blagovest Tashev discusses the challenges facing Bulgaria in the new security environment. The most serious one is not simply the existence of multiple traditional and non-traditional threats and risks, but rather their combination with the country's relatively poor capacities to guarantee national security on its own. What is more, this challenge appears in a very difficult period for NATO in which the Alliance is in search of security policies to respond adequately to the different security needs of its member-states.
Konstantin Dimitrov summarizes the main conclusions following the U.S. Senate's ratification of the NATO accession protocols with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania. Although the resolution is seen as perhaps the most important phase in the process of joining the Alliance, the debate in the Senate also identified several key steps the candidates must undertake in their efforts to become effective and loyal members.

Velizar Shalamanov once again points out to the need for an integrated Ministry of Defense. The ongoing Strategic Defense Review and the impeding NATO membership certainly provide an excellent window of opportunity for implementing the integrated model. In his next article, Dr. Shalamanov discuses the use of information systems as a toll for integration of the security sector.

Atanas Atanasov touches upon the issue of reform in the intelligence system and analyses some of the serious problems related to the issuing of permits for access to classified information. The coming membership in NATO makes this problem especially significant and hence requires a legislative action.

Dr. Todor Tagarev, this issues' guest writer, discuses the problems of armed forces modernization. Despite the considerable progress made in the armed forces reform in the last years, there is a need for significant changes in the principle approach to modernization in the security sector. We also publish Memorandum #3 of the Security Sector Reform Coalition related to the proposals for hosting allied military bases in Bulgaria.

From the publishers

Risks and Treats in the New Security Environment and the Challenges Facing Bulgaria
Blagovest Tashev

The existing threats and risks in the security environment are hardly new. What makes them non-traditional is their increased intensity and transformation into the most serious threats to national and international security. In other words, in the new environment security is threatened by factors, processes and tendencies, which were not perceived as serious threats during the Cold War. In many respects the period of the Cold War was stable and predictable in terms of threats, and states applied well-structured policies in response to security challenges. In the new environment, however, the early detection of emerging threats and the formulation of adequate policy to address them is a more difficult process. The problem here is not the lack of resources to formulate policies but rather the conversion of available resources into adequate security policies and capabilities in response to multiple threats and risks in the new environment.

National and international security systems appear inadequate in addressing the new challenges to security. States boast national security frameworks designed during the Cold War period, and operate in international institutions, which, save for NATO, were never fully adequate of the security challenges even before the end of the ideological confrontation. States and international institutions now face non-traditional risks and threats while having the traditional instruments for response. Hence the key challenge before these states and institutions is the transformation of security policies in the new environment. This, of course, is a problem facing Bulgaria, too.

The non-traditional threats, risks, and tendencies in the international security environment include:

• proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
• asymmetrical armed conflicts
• international terrorism
• acquisition of WMD by pariah states
• organized crime
• failed states
• diffusion of military capabilities, including WMD, to non-states actors
• environmental degradation
• ethnic conflicts, refugee and migration movement
• growing unpredictability of the location of conflicts
  
  Despite the high degree of integration amongst the states of the Euro-Atlantic community and especially in the EU, different countries face similar threats of diverse intensity. This is hard to change regardless of the process of integration as states operate in different environments and context. It is worth noting that to a great extent the current tension between some of the states in he Euro-Atlantic community is a consequence of diverging perceptions of the most significant security threats and the adequate policies to respond to these threats. Hence one of the most important challenges before the community is to transform NATO into an organization capable of responding to the different security needs of each member.

In this sense, Bulgaria, too, faces a specific assortment of threats and risks, which can be divided into few categories:

• Bulgaria is in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic space, adjacent to volatile regions and sources of threats and risks including the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Asia in general. The emergence of terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and organized crime as the most serious threats to international security inevitably turns Bulgaria into one of the first potential victims of these threats. What is more, the ongoing process of integration into the Euro-Atlantic community makes Bulgaria a logical target and a place wherein these threats and risks could materialize. As a country in the periphery of the community, Bulgaria is expected to provide a major contribution to the security policies in response to these threats. This expectation itself is emerging into a major challenge to the ability of Bulgaria's political class and society to embrace the country's important role in the Euro-Atlantic security system and accordingly to create the essential political, military, and social capacities to meet these obligations.
• The second category of challenges is related to regional processes. Despite Bulgaria's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, the country is physically located in the Balkans, a region which witnessed a series of civil wars and conflicts after the Cold War. While there appear to be no challenges to the territorial integrity and independence of European states, the political map of the Balkans changed violently numerous times in the last decade. Even more, although with weakening intensity the tendency of challenging territorial status still exists in the region. This process, although not leading to direct challenges to Bulgaria's territorial integrity and independence has numerous negative consequences for the national security. The constant political instability in the region, the sometimes palpable lack of law and order, and the proliferation of small arms cause extremely negative consequences for Bulgaria including the influence of organized criminal groups in the political process, the difficulty in increasing bilateral economic and social interaction with neighboring states, and the unwillingness of foreign investors to seek business opportunities in the country. One of the examples for the direct negative impact is the proven connection between organized crime in Bulgaria and the illegal traffic of people, arms and drugs in the Balkans.
• The third category of challenges is indigenous to the country. Bulgaria is not only in a unstable region, adjacent to dangerous to the entire Euro-Atlantic community sources of threats, but also lacks sufficient capacities and capabilities to face threats, new and old. In other words, the country is in a threat-rich environment, having scarce independent power to achieve a satisfactory degree of security.

Security is the dynamic balance of threats and capacities to face these threats. According to this logic, Bulgaria's major challenge is how to increase its capacity to attain security, while at the same time implements policies aimed at improving the regional security environment. Obviously, a small country like Bulgaria, possessing limited capacities, has no other choice but to seek integration in capacity-rich institutions, including the EU and NATO. In the past, the traditional security policy sought to increase military power as a means of attaining security, which in its part turned out to be a great burden on the society, especially in countries with limited resources. In the modern security policy, states possessing limited resources seek integration in international institutions which not only strive to eliminate the threats in the security environment but also increase the national capacity to achieve security. Hence a threat to the process of integration in such institutions constitutes an indirect threat to national security.

The United States Senate's Resolution and Bulgaria's Integration in NATO
Konstantin Dimitrov

The United States Senate's resolution giving assent to the ratification of the NATO accession protocols with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania is perhaps the most important phase in the process of gaining membership in the Alliance. Specific texts in the resolution and statements by the senators during the debate mark some key requirements facing the new member states in terms of their becoming effective and loyal allies. Out of these texts and statements there come into light certain conclusions and tasks related to Bulgaria and the other states:

1. The resolution states that regardless of the collapse of communism in most of Europe and despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies still face threats to their stability and territorial integrity. Therefore, according to the Senate, despite the altered geostrategic environment after 1989, NATO preserves its main role as a collective defense organization. In other words, Bulgaria needs not only to develop capabilities for participation in the Alliance's new missions, including out-of-area peace-making and preemptive operations, but also to preserve its capacity to contribute forces to the territorial defense of NATO. This capacity, however, must be adequate of the new threats to the stability and territorial integrity of allies and avoid the reliance on doctrines and defense structures designed to during the Cold War.
2. The resolution requests that no later than 1 January 2004--before the accession of the seven states--the President of the United States shall submit a report to the Congress evaluating each candidate country's progress in the protection of classified information. In addition, no later than three months after accession to the Alliance, the director of the CIA is requested to provide a report evaluating the measures taken by the new members in meeting the requirements for protection of the classified information and for applying NATO standards in intelligence work.
These requirements directly arise from a decision in 1998 of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence. In connection with the ratification of the accession protocols with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the Select Committee formulated requirements still deemed relevant. According to these requirements, in evaluating the new members' protection of NATO information, the following factors must be taken into consideration:

• stability of democratic reforms;
• state of political (ministerial) and legislative oversight over intelligence agencies;
• degree of reform in civilian and military intelligence agencies, including the ability of these agencies to hire and retain highly qualified and pro-Western oriented employees;
• evolution of public support for the work of these agencies;
• identification and response to the efforts of Russian intelligence agencies in the new members, including disinformation campaigns aimed at stopping, slowing down or discrediting these states' integration in the West;
• evaluation of counterintelligence and other activities, and their adequate resources management; and
• evaluation of cooperation between NATO and the new members in meeting the security standards before their accession to the Alliance.

During the debate in the Senate, it was concluded that it was still unclear whether significant progress was made in meeting the requirements defined in 1998, especially in the critical areas of counterintelligence and the response to Russian attempts to influence the politics of new members. Despite the dramatically improved environment in the last five years and the positive changes in NATO-Russia relations, the Senates expects the Administration's report to address the indicators formulated by the legislators in 1998 and again confirmed in 2003.

This part of the resolution and Senate debate point to the need for some immediate legislative, structural and, if needed, personnel changes in the national security sector, which would satisfy in the short- and medium-term NATO and U.S. requirements for Bulgaria's loyalty to the Alliance.

3. In the course of three years following the official accession of the seven countries, no later than 1 April every year, the American president is expected to submit to the Congressional committees reports evaluating the members' defense reform measures.

The debate paid special attention to the need for niche specialization in the framework of NATO Response Force and for the collective defense. In this respect, the new members, including Bulgaria are expected to make efforts in:

• heavy airlift capabilities;
• precision weapons; and
• highly mobile forces ready for rapid response in out-of-area operations, and more specifically, special forces, especially expeditionary forces capable of operating in mountainous areas; nuclear, biological and chemical defense; engineering troops.

The report evaluating the progress of defense reform is supposed to contain an analysis of each country's financial contribution to the overall NATO defense expenditures as well as the size of the national defense budget. The requirement for analysis of the countries' financial capacity was included as result of the report of the Congress' General Accounting Office submitted to the respective commissions in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The report noted that the U.S. Congress has not received form the White Hose a convincing proof of the candidate countries' ability to bear the financial burden of membership.

4. The debate in Senate touched upon the possible deployment of military bases on the territory of the new member-states, specifically in Bulgaria and Romania. The following arguments in support of moving some American/NATO bases to the east were presented:

• It would provide easier access to the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf. Statements explicitly pointed out that airfields in Bulgaria and Romania are included in the Pentagon's informal planning for defense posture transformation. The ports of Burgas in Bulgaria and Konstansa in Romania were also mentioned.
• Governments and political classes in both countries express an active interest in hosting such military bases. Public polls indicate pro-American attitudes in Romania and Bulgaria.
• Additional argument for moving American military bases was the conclusion that this wave of NATO expansion would increase the stock of long airfields by 6 % for the entire Alliance, and 13% for Europe.

5. The Senate resolution recommends that Bulgaria and the other countries formulate public mechanisms for compensating the victims of nationalization during the Holocaust and the communist rule. The countries are urged to create commissions whose aims are to analyze and make public the role of governments and societies during the Holocaust and communism. The seven new members are expected to engage in an active dialogue with the other countries, including the U.S., and non-governmental organizations about their willingness to confront the past.

Bulgarian states institutions and specifically the National Assembly should immediately take steps to create such a public commission whose aim will be to analyze comprehensively and systematically this period of modern Bulgarian history and to recommend specific steps proving the readiness of the nation and political class to overcome totalitarian legacies.

The consequences of the Senate resolution along with the widely discussed elsewhere issues related to the control over illegal arms trade, corruption and the integration of Romas in society should provoke detailed and comprehensive discussions in the Foreign Policy, Defense and Security Committee and the Internal Security and Public Order Committee.

Integrated Defense Management Model in the Context of the Strategic Defense Review
Velizar Shalamanov

The problem of creating an integrated Ministry of Defense (IMD) has been debated repeatedly without reaching a final resolution. The issue is directly related to civil-military relations, civilian oversight over armed forces, and the efficient use of defense resources in the public interest. The issue will once again be addressed by the Strategic Defense Review (SDR). The question is mainly related to the good governance of the complex defense system, which must respond adequately to the changes in the strategic environment and to the integration processes. The MO achieves better interaction with the other ministries and the same time preserves its unique expertise in the production and use of force.

The model of IMD is related to the process of restructuring of the Bulgarian armed forces. The armed forces are reintegrated into the state-during the communist rule, the armed forces was a state within the state-and freed from the non-military functions and tasks which are taken by other civilian and civil-military structures. Instead the armed forces focus their military expertise on the planning, training, and conduct of military operations. At the same time, the management of the armed forces and the acquisition of all it needs are left to the civilian administration.

Thus, there are three functional levels of management:

• Strategic management-IMD administration, Council of Ministers, Parliament, President;
• Training, equipment, maintenance-Joint Staff of Armed Forces and respective peacetime commands in cooperation with the administration; and
• Planning and conduct of operations-Joint Operations Command and committed forces.

This is the model existing in all NATO states. In Bulgaria, upon the completion of Plan 2004, within the framework of designing Plan 2008, the implementation of the model could begin with the following elements:
1. Paired management units in the Specialized Administration and the Joint Staff of Armed Forces:
a. Human resources and education - Personnel (J-1)
b. Armaments, infrastructure, and R&D - Logistics (J-4)
c. Security policy and international cooperation - Operations (J-3)
d. Defense planning and budget - Armed forces and strategic planning (J-5)
e. Intelligence (J-2) and Communications and information systems (J-6) have no analogue in the administration.
2. Paired support organizations in the administration and the armed forces:
a. National Defense University - Training Command
b. C4 Agency - Communications and Information Systems Command
c. Acquisition and Infrastructure Agency - Logistics Command
d. Military Clubs and Quality of Life Agency
3. Armed Forces Commands under Join Staff of Armed Forces:
a. Operational Land Forces Command
b. Land Forces Command-East
c. Land Forces Command-West
d. Tactical Air Force Command
e. Operational Navy Command
f. Special Operations Forces Command
g. Air Defense Command

4. Joint Operations Command with Joint Expeditionary Force
This model of armed forces and integrated Ministry of Defense will lead to a higher share of personnel in commands and a lower share in the administration and management structure. In addition, the number of management levels would be reduced and the Ministry would reorient itself towards building capabilities for joint operations and especially for joint expeditionary forces.
The integrated Ministry of Defense would increase its effectiveness in the following areas:
a. The higher quality defense expertise gained through the rotation of experienced officers in the IMD would increase the quality of the civilian decision-making process.
b. Separate operational commands would increase the quality of planning and management.
c. Creating expeditionary forces under a separate operations command would increase the capacity for participation in operations.
d. Creating the Joint Staff of Armed Forces with three support commands: Training Command, Logistics Command, and Communications and Information Systems Command would improve the peace-time functions of the armed forces, including training and equipment.

This model is just one proposal for IMD. Good decision-making, however, requires selection among many models.

Information Systems as Tool for Integration of the Security Sector
Velizar Shalamanov

In modern organizations information is a key resource. In the security sector (SS), information is the second most important resources after people. In the SS information is used in three areas-political, administrative, and operations:

• In the political area, information systems facilitate the formulation of objectives, priorities, and main policies.
• In the administrative systems it helps the management of resources in the main programs.
• Information systems for management of forces in training and operations are related to the use of force to attain ends.

In reality all three information systems operate simultaneously and often the political dimension is to be found at the lower two areas. Integrated systems designed to assist the political decision-making process, increase the quality and scope of the final decisions, which in turn determine the effectiveness of management. Integrated resource management systems increase their effectiveness, transparency, accountability and the possibility for civilian control of this sensitive area. Finally, integrated operations management systems enhance operations' effectiveness.

Experts use the term "balkanization" of information systems to define a state wherein systems in one organization are incompatible and do not exchange information, and consequently have low effectiveness and even slow down the management process. It must be noted, however, that interoperability cannot be build at once. Instead, it is achieved in evolutionary manner, often through prototypes and simultaneously in different organizations.

Building integrated information systems requires strategic planning in the context of the main processes in the organization. Strategic planning necessities the application of architectural approach to the use of information systems. This process should be led and controlled by a Chief Information Officer. In this role he is assisted by a planning body, a single systems' operator, and a program managing body. In Bulgaria, the missing body is the C4 Management Agency. This Agency is supposed to manage projects for hundreds of millions of dollars: National Military Command Center, Air and Sea Sovereignty Control Center, Field C2 System of forces, Resource Management System, computer simulation exercises, etc.

Integrating the information systems would increase the effectiveness of the entire security sector. The process of integration requires the introduction of a Chief Information Officer, planning body, operator, and Program Management Agency. The effectiveness of the entire system would be increased if similar approach is applied within every other institution.

The Ministry of Defense has made significant progress in creating such integrated system. Some of the past conflicts mark the difficulties in the process:

• the conflict between communicators and Information Systems specialists leading to the creation of Communication and Information System Department;
• the conflict between communication and information systems (CIS) specialists of different services and branches, leading to the creation of a single Strategic Communication and Information Systems Command;
• the conflict among the numerous financially independent organizations seeking autonomous information systems;
• the still ongoing efforts to institutionalize the office of the Chief Information Officer as high level civilian, responsible for business model of organization and implementation of information technologies (investment) to streamline and optimize the processes;
• the upcoming efforts to create C4 Agency for program management; and
• the efforts for a closer coordination and creation and operation of integrated security sector information systems.

After public debates involving business leaders, administration, Parliament, academia, and NGOs, there emerged consensus on the specific required steps:

• introducing the institution of Chief Information Officer in the security sector;
• the creation of C4 Agency for program management;
• formulating a single action plan in the C4 area of the security sector at the level of government.

These steps are simple and will have an immediate effect as they would limit corruption, increase significantly the effectiveness of resources management, and improve the work of the security sector. It is up to the Government to implement them.

The expert community already made its choice by embracing what is a common policy in the management of the information systems in the Euro-Atlantic community. There is a group of Bulgarian experts who have acquired the needed experience in the National Defense University in the United States, serve in high enough position, and hopefully are up to the challenge of formulating the Bulgarian policies in this area. By the way, the only tool needed is the three basic values of the USAF: Integrity first; Excellence in all we do; and, Service before self. This a real challenge: we need a Little Blue Book that matters to everyone.

What Secrets Does the State Commission for Protection of Information Guard
Atanas Atanasov

The 4th of May marked one year since the Law on the Protection of Classified Information came into force. Initially the draft law designated the National Security Service (NSS), a body within the Ministry of Interior, as the national agency responsible for security. There were several important reasons for this decision including the NSS' experience in protection of classified information and its expertise in background checks. The fact that in most of the NATO countries the national body responsible for the security of information is the counterintelligence service was another significant reason. All of this convinced the authors of the draft law to envisage a single body responsible for both the protection of classified information and the background checks of individuals having access to it.

Upon the election of the current government, the Ministry of Interior withdrew the draft law and amended it. One of the amendments called for the creation of a new body, the State Commission for the Protection of Information (SCPI). The Agency was intended to organize, coordinate, and control activities related to the protection of classified information. SCPI was designed to function in close coordination with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the intelligence services.

However, there was a hidden agenda behind the SCPI's creation: the goal was to eliminate the so-called Andreev Commission, created to open the files of the secret services of the former communist regime. In fact the new law ended the Andreev Commission and created the SCPI with different functions. While the old commission aimed to reveal the truth about the Bulgarian Communist Party's secret power, the new commission was designed to hide part of the country's history claiming that it constitutes "classified information."

Thus the new law legitimized the officers and informants of the old communist secret services as it removed the requirement to check for public servants' past ties to those services. This enabled numerous individuals tied to former secret services to be appointed to prominent positions in the state administration.

The first act of the new government upon the law's enactment was to end the function of the old commission in revealing the secrets of the former security services. The Prime Minister was required by the new law to personally appoint a new commission in a month of its enactment. However, in a breach of the Constitution and despite numerous questions by the opposition in the Parliament, the SCPI was appointed six months after the law was passed, and just days before the NATO Summit in Prague. After the Commission was finally constituted one of its members refused to go through a background check and was dismissed. This, of course, posed the question of the legitimacy of the new commission, a question, which has not yet found its answer. However, the government did not show such indolence in dealing with the old commission; upon the new law's enactment, the Andreev Commission was ended and the information related to the work of the secret services of the communist regime was declared state secret.

It is difficult to evaluate the SCPI's effectiveness as all positions were filled only recently. At the same time, NATO partners have concluded that the Commission possesses a limited administrative capacity and recommended that this problem be solved in a three-month period. One of the Commission's most important functions and responsibility is issuing permits for access to classified information. This function, however, depends mainly on the work of intelligence agencies, which are part of other administrative bodies and whose coordination is not legally defined.

The main product provided by these agencies is information. However, the law does not treat some major issues related to information requested by the SCPI. It is unclear, for example, whether the agencies are obliged to provide information about individuals who are currently working for the agency or individuals who at the time of the request are investigated by the same agency. Currently the agencies' intradepartmental rules forbid the release of such information. On the other hand, the Commission has no legal right to search for information independently. Hence the SCPI's functions are dependent on the intelligence agencies while they are under no obligation to provide the requested information in all cases. This legal shortcoming creates conditions leading to the selective release of information to the Commission and the possibility of taking dangerous to the national security decisions.

The problem is compounded by the fact that some agents and informants in the current intelligence agencies used to work for the security services of the communist regime. Their past ties, which still remain secret, compromise their independence and reliability. The Commission, which ultimately bears the full responsibility, is forced to make decisions based on incomplete information. Conversely, the intelligence agencies, which possess the complete information, have the right to withhold information and are not accountable when wrong decisions are made.

In the light of the issues discussed above, the issue of making background checks on civil servants working in the agencies responsible for security and pubic order appears as a very serious problem. The checks are made by the same agencies, which lead to a paradox--officers have to complete background checks on their superiors and report the findings to them. It is unclear how this procedure is supposed to reveal these superiors' past if they have started their careers in the secret agencies of the communist regime, have graduated from the special schools of the Soviet Union, have married foreign citizens, etc. For today there is no intelligence agency in Bulgaria whose leadership does not include individuals whose careers had begun in the communist secret services. It is logical to conclude that the background check of these individuals is going to be incomplete while the same individuals' access to a wide range of classified information remains unlimited.

The position of the SCPI is untenable as it has significant responsibilities while having no real power to fulfill them. This state of affairs was designed and implemented by the members of the old communist State Security who seek to rehabilitate and reestablish the old mechanism of manipulating government existing until 1997, including the secret mechanism of organized crime designed and led by the communist secret services under Moscow guidelines. At the same time, all pertinent information was designated a state secret while the SCPI was entrusted to guard it. Even more, following suggestions by former State Security agents, the Commission made a proposal for legal changes that would make it a crime punishable by prison for publishing information about the activities of Bulgaria's secret services. The proposal is not specific whether the information is about the Republic of Bulgaria or the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Challenges to Modernization of Bulgarian Armed Forces
Todor Tagarev, Program Director
Center for National Security and Defense Research - BAN

Plan 2004 initiated the reform and modernization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) in the process of preparing for membership in NATO. In the reform process, the Ministry of Defense's investment opportunities gradually increase as, according to projections, after 2004 at least 30 percent of defense budget will be spent on purchase of new and upgrade of existing armaments, equipment, and infrastructure-in other words, on modernization.

Public interest in the modernization of the armed forces is high, not least because the Ministry of Defense's budget is the highest in Bulgaria. It is projected that in a few years up to half a billion leva will be spent annually on modernization.

Frequently public interest is evident only in the search of scandals behind suspicion of corrupt activities in defense acquisition. Although important, this is only one aspect of modernization of the armed forces. Here are some of the most important challenges facing the modernization.

Modernization as an element of defense policy

Modernization must be consistent with the country's defense policy. This policy is legislatively defined and requires preparation for membership in NATO. Bulgaria's membership requires the building of balanced capabilities--for national defense, collective defense, and out-of-area operations--and specialization within NATO. Needs must be prioritized as taxpayer money must be spent on what is most needed. In the last two years, however, most of the financial resources were spent on the modernization of fighter jets, fixed communications and systems for control of artillery units; that is, projects with little relevance to the integration requirements. At the same time, high-ranking representatives in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces complain that the defense budget is insufficient for meeting NATO's partnership goals, i.e. Bulgaria's commitments, and propose direct or indirect increase in the budget.

The expectations that there would be an Armed Forces Modernization Plan were not met. At this point there is intradepartmental paper called the Modernization Plan, which includes 68 projects. One has no choice but to doubt the consistency between existing modernization projects and Bulgaria's defense policy priorities given the sheer number of modernization projects, the lack of formal parliamentary and governmental participation, and the available resources.

Is corruption inevitable?

Defense priorities determine the implementation of modernization projects. To avoid suspicions of corruption and conflict of interests, the implementation of every project must be maximally transparent. This includes at least two components: (1) transparency of decision-making process, and (2) transparency in implementation and control of defense procurement.

The first component includes well-defined, documented, and controlled system of defining operational needs and requirements, systemic and functional requirements, technical requirements, and project price. It is high time to get rid of the so-called "tactical-technical specification" of the hopelessly old VS 2.03 standard, especially in the modernization of the force command system and other communications and information systems. In addition, decisions must be predicated on specific program, defining the building and maintenance of a specific capability including the needed resources. All bigger projects, for example those with a price tag over 100 million leva total, or over 50 million leva annually, should require parliamentary approval. Public interests can be defended better if those elected to the National Assembly by the public create a sub-committee on modernization as part of the Foreign Policy, Defense, and Security Committee, and whose function will be to coordinate all parliamentary acts related to the modernization of the armed forces.

The second component can be implemented through a more public approach to tendering, contracting, implementation and accounting in defense procurement. The willingness of the Ministry of Defense to refer to Article 6 of the Law on Public Contracts in the last years compromises legal requirements for transparency and competitive practice. In its current form, the Law on the Protection of Classified Information makes it impossible to seek greater transparency. One way around this problem is to increase the parliamentary control and involvement along with the requirement that a department or an agency outside the Ministry of Defense, e.g. administratively independent unit, provides opinion on whether a specific tender constitutes a state secret.

Modernization of the armed forces as part of the national security sector

The modernization of the BAF must be viewed as part of the process of security sector development. The security sector must possess capabilities adequate of the challenges facing Republic of Bulgaria in light of its impeding membership in NATO, and, in the near future, the EU. Therefore, armaments, equipment, and infrastructure must be developed while avoiding needles duplication of capabilities and competition and guaranteeing interoperability among organizations in the security sector.

To this end, the implementation of new technologies must be predicated on an institutionalized program approach, which would ensure coherent development of organizational structures, doctrines, training, armaments and equipment systems, infrastructure, and command and control system. It is essential to define a single investment policy, which would guarantee the effectiveness and interoperability in the development of capabilities in the security sector to a much higher degree than the present one. Phasing out old armaments, equipment and infrastructure from the armed forces must be implemented efficiently, with minimum risks to the environment and in strict compliance with existing regimes for control of arms exports. Bulgaria should explore the possibilities for cascading of arms, equipment and infrastructure from the armed forces to other organizations in the security sector.

Modernization, technologies, jobs

The process of armed forces modernization must be tied to the creation of new jobs and technological development. It is essential to formulate a state policy in offsets-mechanisms for compensating the national industry when giving contracts to foreign companies. It is logical to expect that a plan, coordinated by the Foreign Investment Agency, will lead to a legislative definition of a modern offset policy before the beginning of big new modernization projects. The implementation of such offset programs should stimulate the development of advanced technologies and the participation of the national industry while at the same further the integration of the Bulgarian economy in the NATO and EU's defense industrial base.

R&D should facilitate the efficient development of the armed forces, implementation of technologies, and development of the national defense industry, while Bulgarian science continues to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic R&D community. The national scientific, technological and industrial potential must be used in developing modernization program of the security sector based on the capability requirements and within the resource constraints.

Realism in expectations

Due to the ten-year delay in defense reform, all branches of the military need new armaments, equipment and infrastructure. It is unrealistic to modernize all of them in the mid term. A realistic assessment requires that there is a process prioritization, wherein needed capabilities are leading the process of planning for defense modernization. What is needed is a technological level, which is:

• adequate in the armed forces as a whole;
• good for the active components of the armed forces; and,
• excellent in niches in which the armed forces specialize in the framework of the Alliance.

The main challenge is to define the specific areas and levels and consequently to direct the main efforts in direction where the combination of defense, scientific, technological and industrial capabilities would lead to competitiveness on a global scale.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria
In cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Center for National Security and Defense Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

МЕМОRANDUM # 3
9 May 2003, Sofia

As a third Memorandum of the Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria to the Parliament, President and Government (first one was issued on 22.11.2002 to initiate the Strategic Defence Review as result of NATO invitation and the second was issued on 14.04.2003 regarding the proposal to create Bulgarian Expeditionary Task Force for operations in Iraq) to include following points:

1. The Bulgarian Government, supported by the President, to propose to the Parliament a comprehensive national strategy for hosting allied military bases including:

a. Joint air base in Bezmer to be used as a hub by both the U.S. and NATO.

b. Joint naval base in Atia to be used as sea entry point

c. Specialized joint training facilities in Koren and Novo Selo as well as the specialized air-defence training facility in Shabla.

d. Joint arms testing facilities in Zmeevo

e. Joint educational centre for security sector reform and information technologies management at the soon to be vacated SEEBRIG facilities in Plovdiv

f. Information infrastructure to support military presence in Bulgaria and operations in neighbouring countries

g. Coordination of military presence to be managed by a permanent U.S./NATO mission in Plovdiv or Sofia

2. The implementation of the strategy to begin with joint exercises at the Koren and Novo Selo facilities of the Bulgarian Expeditionary Task Force (see Memorandum #2) with American and other allied forces for missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

3. Joint exercises to be used as a tool to cascade experience, concepts, armaments and equipment to the Bulgarian Expeditionary Task Force as well as to form the Force's maintenance fund.

4. Identify civilian and military infrastructure components and mechanisms for their joint use by NATO and Bulgaria

5. Identify possibilities for hosting NATO structures, committees, agencies and working groups as well as for participation in the security sector reform in PfP countries and post-conflict reconstruction areas.

6. Formulate strategies for offset programs in security sector modernization including development of joint infrastructure, outsourcing to Bulgarian business companies, and joint business participation in post-conflict areas' reconstruction projects.

7. Special attention should be paid to designing offset programs in the development of Bulgarian education and science in the defense industry, and the increase of civil society's capacity in this area.

Events