Year 1, issue 1

Table of Contents:

To Our Readers

Security Environment

International Processes and Security Policies After 9-11 and the Iraqi Crisis

NАTO in the Spring of 2003

Security Sector

Main Parameters of Strategic Defense Review of the Republic of Bulgaria

The Need for An Integrated Security Sector

Hosting American and NATO Military Bases as a Tool for Modernization of the Security Sector and the Country

By Invitation

Officers and Informants
Atanas Atanasov

Memorandum Submitted to the National Assembly on 14 April 2003 by the Security Sector Reform Coalition

Events

To Our Readers

This newsletter was created as part of the efforts aimed at transforming the security environment and the security sector in South-East Europe and at achieving a better quality of life in the region, specifically in Bulgaria. This goal will be achieved through the "production" of knowledge about the problems and issues of security sector reform; the use of modern information technologies in the sector; regional cooperation in the context of the Euro-Atlantic integration; network building, including the Security Sector Reform Coalition; and, dissemination of knowledge and policy relevance.

More specifically, the newsletter aims to support modern thinking and approaches to security policies. It is created as a venue for discussions of concepts and policies in an area which experienced fundamental change starting even before the end of the Cold War but becoming most conspicuous after the events of 11 September 2001. The newsletter will seek to be one of the main tools for spreading ideas and participation in the agenda setting of the security sector transformation process. It will consist of four sections:

• Security Environment - monitors and analyzes issues in the national and international security environment.
• Security Sector - analyzes the processes in the national security sector and evaluates its reform.
• By Invitation - provides a venue for opinions on current issues.
• Current Events - lists current and upcoming events related to the national security sector.

In the past several years there emerged in Bulgaria substantial non-governmental expertise in the defense and security areas, which has had a significant contribution to the reform efforts in the national security sector. This newsletter, published with the support of the Open Society Foundation-Sofia, was initiated by three NGOs-George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security and Mediapool.bg-with a real influence in the security sector. Our intention is not only to provide analyses and specific recommendations for reform, but also to stimulate debate about key issues in the security sector involving experts as well as all those interested in the country's modernization and prosperity. Hence, we look forward to your comments about the ideas in this publication and welcome your participation in the efforts to attain the newsletter's objectives. To this end, in this issue we invited Major General Atanas Atanasov to share his thoughts about the role of Bulgarian intelligence services in national security within the context of the country's integration in NATO.

You can also read past and current issues of this newsletter at http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/

From the publishers

International Processes and Security Policies After 9-11 and the Iraqi Crisis

9-11 is often said to mark a fundamental change in perceptions of risks, threats, security and the international security system. Arguably, however, long before the fateful date traditional security policies seemed hopelessly inadequate in the post-Cold War environment. The short-lived hope of a new world order spurred by the rare international community's consensus on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91 was soon replaced by traditional international tensions and lack of unity on some of the most important issues in international relations. All states were conscious of the changed world they lived in but had difficulty defining its characteristics and formulating adequate security policies in the new environment.

The end of the Cold War also eliminated the key reason for the 50-year old cohesiveness of the Euro-Atlantic community and brought to the forefront tensions old and new, challenging commitments to the Atlantic idea. NATO expansion and the process of EU enlargement temporary disguised tensions on both sides of the Atlantic, but divergence in interests was gradually becoming more conspicuous, especially concerning security issues. Allied military actions in the Persian Gulf in 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and in the Kosovo crisis made clear the growing gap in military power and technology between the U.S. and its European allies. The gap, although politically acceptable during the Cold War, was threatening Euro-Atlantic cohesiveness and was leading to divergent approaches to key issues of international security. In response to the military gap and in the context of proliferating non-traditional challenges to international security, at the 1997 Washington Summit NATO's leaders decided on a defense capabilities initiative aimed at increasing the Alliance's effectiveness and cohesiveness. Due to various reasons, however, this decision did not come to fruition.

The coming of the George W. Bush administration to the White House further underlined divergences on both sides of the Atlantic. To the Europeans, the American decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the unwillingness to be involved in the International Criminal Court, the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the decision to build and deploy the National Missile Defense was proof that Washington did not take European allies seriously and instead prefers a unilateral foreign policy. To the Americans, the European unwillingness to increase national defense expenditures, the resentment of most states to see NATO take on global missions and operations and at the same time the attempts by some states to formulate an independent-from-NATO European security and defense policy, was proof that Washington had no other choice but to face the new challenges to security on its own.

9-11 did not fundamentally change the security environment. Instead it dramatically shed light on the destructive consequences of the challenges of which all states were aware as well as on inadequate security policies, which the same states insisted must be transformed. Not surprisingly, in the two key documents published soon after the terrorist attacks-National Security Strategy of the United States and Quadrennial Defense Review-the Americans formulated a security policy in which the traditional strategy of deterrence was substituted for the proactive strategy of prevention. In the American security thinking, the old strategy was unworkable against non-state actors and against states acquiring weapons of mass destruction, who were willing to use it even while confronted with traditional deterrent strategies. It must be noted that the preventive strategies have a long history in military affairs, as attested to by the American actions in Panama in Grenada in the 80s and the nuclear strategies of both superpowers during the Cold War.

While the military action in Afghanistan in 2001 was seen as a legitimate response to a military attack on American soil, the war in Iraq in March 2003 is seen as the first application of the new strategy. Before and during the war, the European states were predictably divided on the use of preemption. While all supported the action in Afghanistan, many on the continent saw the American attack on Iraq as an attempt to impose a new world security order, something they were not ready accept as legitimate.

Ongoing actions indicate the U.S. is willing to formulate and implement a new security policy even if that means doing it alone, while many European states including France, Germany and Russia do not see the need for radical change in national and international approaches to security. Consequently, the divisions persist and the end of war in Iraq does not end the debate about the future of world security order. We are yet to see whether the international institutional order created after World War II will adapt to the new security environment and the new approaches to guaranteeing security.

NАTO in the Spring of 2003

In the spring of 2003 three events will reshape the future of NATO:

• The Iraqi Freedom operation, which gives regional organizations a possible role in the post-war stabilization and administration of Iraq and other conflict zones in the wider Middle East.
• NATO's consultations and the ensuing decision to strengthen Turkey's defense in the weeks before the beginning of the Iraqi Freedom operation.
• Signing the accession protocols to join NATO by seven post-communist countries.

In this context, NATO ought to make several important decisions related to:

• Reconsidering the main elements of the international security order.
• NATO's role in maintaining international peace and security.
• The internal balance of influence among NATO's member-states in decision-making and implementation of policies.

In this moment, which is difficult for the Euro-Atlantic community, there is the need for statespeople, political elites, members of the expert community and the media to engage in a substantive debate and assist the efforts to overcome political confrontation among key allies. Thereby we can address the doubts about NATO's capability to play a leading role in world affairs.

The debate must initially be aimed at overcoming divergent perceptions on what constitutes a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. This debate would be productive if the community is united in its view that the threat is made of a volatile mixture of:

• Stable dictatorial/semi-authoritarian regimes, failed states which have undergone civil wars involving the confrontation between non-democratic groups/tribes/clans, and states whose central authorities are unable to establish law and order over the entire territory of the country.
• The possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by these states or other non-state actors.
• The proliferation of WMD and technology for its production with the active participation of state authorities, its tacit approval, or due to its inability to exercise an effective control over proliferation.
• The dominance of officially sanctioned or unsanctioned anti-Western ideology and propaganda based on religion or ethnicity as well as secular elements (communist/neo-communist).
• The practice of international terrorism or giving sanctuary to terrorist groups.

One of the objectives of the trans-Atlantic debate should be a consensus that the current threats to Euro-Atlantic security are not simply the result of the Cold War's end but also are a logical consequence of the double standards applied before its end. Therefore, the community should reach the understanding that the complete overcoming of Cold War consequences requires more than Europe's institutional union and NATO enlargement. The Cold War and the bloc confrontation will reach their final end when all major regional and global anti-democratic threats are eliminated through Europe and the United States' joint strategy and efforts. These strategies and efforts require a common approach to the assessment and prioritization of key risks and threats facing world peace and security. It also requires the formulation and application of a specific set of policies to be used in different contingencies including:

• Diplomacy, including mediation and constructive engagement.
• A range of political and economic sanctions and incentives.
• Deterrence.
• Dissuasion.
• Peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions and operations
• Preventive military operations.

The aforementioned general criteria for the effectiveness of the trans-Atlantic dialogue might turn out to be the starting point for assessing NATO cohesiveness as a defense organization. In order to become more adequate in the changing security environment NATO in the next year must:

• Define the optimal burden-sharing arrangement among the allies.
• Achieve a consensus among all allies on the balance between NATO as a defense organization under the traditional conditions of the Cold War and NATO in the changing context of Cold War legacies and new threats to Euro-Atlantic security.
• Increase the effectiveness of decision-making processes in time of crises involving member-states.
• Formulate obligatory minimal requirements for participation in NATO military operations or operations led by NATO or its leading member-states.
• Overcome internal political disagreements on the application of international law in the security environment of the 21st century.
• Assess the role to be played by the new members from Eastern Europe in the Alliance's political, military and organizational transformation.

Only after that would the Alliance be able to avoid the following dangers to Bulgaria and other East European states' security interests:

• Decreasing American commitment to Europe's security and loosening of trans-Atlantic ties.
• The creation of intra-Alliance sub-groups led by the U.S. and ad-hoc allies for participation in out-of-area operations.
• Turning the Alliance into a militarized OSCE or a smaller version of the UN.

Similar hypothetical tendencies would shift the Alliance's focus to crisis management, prevention, and so-called soft-security issues without guaranteeing the vital interests member-states and abandoning the possibility of activating Article 5 when requested by threatened state.

Main Parameters of Strategic Defense Review of the Republic of Bulgaria

The political framework of Bulgaria's Strategic Defense Review (SDR)-hopefully soon to be adopted as a Strategic Review of the Security Sector-a document which, after being adopted by the Parliament or the Government, is to become the basis for the next steps in the transformation of the National Security Concept, Military Doctrine, Plan for Security Sector Development and the Integration Plan (which were developed in 1998-99 into a set of documents formulating the transition by 2008 to a qualitatively new security sector).

The political framework has to formulate society's consensus on:

• The security environment and its long-tem tendencies
• National interests in the new international environment
• Risks, threats, and opportunities to national interests
• Bulgaria's Allies and institutional commitments
• The security sector's main missions and operationsThe security sector's capabilities
• Possible allied presence in Bulgaria and Bulgarian participation in allied structures
• Professionalization of the security sector and specifically of the armed forces
• Security sector modernization and specifically modernization of the armed forces
• Security sector integration, and specifically resource management integration
• Economic and financial transformation
• Civil and democratic control of security sector
• Civil society participation and social support for transformation of security sector

Reaching public consensus is impossible without debate. Debate is impossible without information, time and the participation of a diverse group from the expert community. At the same time after the invitation to join NATO, the quick end to the Iraqi operation, the fast pace of transformation in the American security system, and similar processes in the EC and possibly in the UN impose time constraints on the SDR's timetable. Additional time pressure is imposed by the need for the formulation of Plan 2008 as the next step following the successful completion of Plan 2004. The year 2008 is no coincidence-as 2004 was expected to be the year of the country's NATO membership--as at that time Bulgaria is to become an EC member.

SDR is to take into account Bulgaria's commitments as a member of NATO and the EC while situated in South-East Europe, adjacent to the regions of the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Obviously, Bulgaria lacks the resources to participate in the affairs of all these regions. Therefore the country needs to identify niches, areas of specialization, joint participation in projects involving allies and partners as well as to tie security commitments with economic benefits and the prosperity of Bulgarian citizens.

Upon its discussion in the country, the political framework needs to be consulted upon with our allies in NATO and the EC as well as our partners in the region. That, too, requires time and highly effective diplomacy.

In order to function as a planning tool, the political framework, in addition to providing clear political guidelines, should have specific quantitative parameters related to resources, possible types and places of operations, personnel, types of armaments, specialization, etc. This is impossible to achieve without an intensive modeling of alternatives, their evaluation, comparison and decision-making at the highest level-Government and Parliament. Practically speaking, the most important parameters are related to the size of the various components of the security sector as well as the resources for operations, investments and the transition to long-term planning.

Transparency of security and defense policy is the most important requirement for accountability and civil control over this expensive good-security-provided by the state. In this respect, the test of SDP must avoid the mistakes made in the SS-23, MiG-29, Terem, and Iraq tests.

The Security Focus and Security Sector Watch newsletter is one more instrument in the public debate on the issues to be treated in the SDR and aims to assist the efforts of the Parliament, Government and President in their constitutional obligations to provide more security and to assure the prosperity of Bulgarian citizens. In this respect, one of the most important tests facing Bulgaria is the extent of cooperation between state institutions and the non-governmental Security Sector Reform Coalition.

The process of formulating the political framework of the SDR provides an opportunity to integrate the efforts of governmental institutions, to achieve a greater degree of coordination in Bulgaria's security and defense policy. At the same time, this process, as in the case of domestic politics during the Iraq war, will form a parliamentary coalition for security sector reform.

The Need for An Integrated Security Sector

The security environment, whose main characteristics are discussed in this newsletter, is extremely complex, dynamic and highly uncertain. Responding to the risks, threats, but also the opportunities, forming the environment requires a high degree of coordination in the security sector, precise civil-military relations and the integration of the highly diversified sector into forces capable of executing various types of operations. Furthermore, the process of monitoring, analysis and assessment of the security environment requires a high degree of integration of the intelligence services, both civilian and military.

The first phase of the security sector reform intended to "nationalize" the sector, previously "owned" by the Communist Party and directly guided by Moscow. This process was most successful in the Ministry of Defense and to a much lesser degree in the Ministry of Interior and the intelligence services. Hence there is a great need to reform these institutions along with the implementation of reforms in the justice system. The biggest failure of the first phase of the reform was the inability to remove agents of former national and Soviet intelligence services from key posts in the security sector. The belatedly approved law on the access to the files of the intelligence agencies did not meet pubic expectations and was the first law to be rescinded by the new Parliament. In fact, in the National Assembly there is no political will to tackle this issue as consecutive scandals involving Terem, failure to protect classified information, eavesdropping, investigations of "spying" for the U.S. and Great Britain as well as the continued plundering of the economy by business structures formed by former agents attest to the inability of the present-day security sector to address these problems. As a result, there is widespread corruption, organized crime, constant doubts about the country's ability to protect classified information and an illegal arms trade.

These problems cannot be eliminated without a comprehensive transformation of the security sector guided by a clear concept and a set of laws, possible constitutional amendments, structural changes, a new system for recruitment, education and promotion, the implementation of integrated information systems, and strengthened civilian control.

The security sector reform can be characterized as the three "I" process: integration among the security sector institutions; integration on national level; and, integration on the regional and Euro-Atlantic level. More importantly, transformation is often spoken of today as the management of constant change on several levels with the help of information systems, while the system increases its effectiveness and maintains its integrity. This presents a significant challenge to political elite, expert community and executive branch as well as the public.

The first successful reform in Bulgaria-Plan 2004-is a source of numerous positive and negative experiences yet to be assessed by civilians and military. We need to understand what made this process a success as Bulgaria gained an invitation to join NATO despite seven years of wasted time through 1998, a total change of personnel after the elections in 2001, and the appointment of one of the most conservative generals as the Chief of General Staff.

However, despite the success of the first phase we now face serious difficulties in the SDR process. Of course, there are objective difficulties-the challenge now is not only to implement reform in the armed forces but within the entire security sector including parallel reforms in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Civil Protection, Ministry of Justice and other ministries providing security. The transformation is impossible without a clear vision of an integrated security sector, public support of the model, the capacity to turn the vision into a plan, and a will for systemic implementation of the plan.

This, of course requires leadership and debate in the society and the Parliament as well as making specific decisions. Formulating a vision is more difficult than formulating a position on Iraq, for example. This cannot take place in high offices or in a small bureaucratic circle. Instead it requires a new approach of management based on knowledge, networks, technologies, transparency, accountability, and social participation and support. To a great extent this approach was tested in the non-governmental and academic sector by creating the Security Sector Reform Coalition.

What are the key elements of the integrated security sector? The first element, on the constitutional level, is a clear definition of the national security problem and the responsibilities to guarantee it, especially in emergency situations. The second element is a comprehensive definition of responsibilities and prerogatives in guaranteeing national security, to be formulated in a Law on National Security. The Law should define the functions and structure of a balanced security sector, which, under effective civilian control, holds a monopoly over the use of force; guarantees the country's territorial integrity and independence; protects the population and infrastructure; collects and protects information on national security; and guarantees the rule of law.

The third element is the development of a system of strategies, white papers and annual reports in order to guarantee security sector's transparency, accountability and effectiveness. The fourth element is the transformation of existing structures including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Civil Protection, National Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice and others into a well-coordinated security sector of the executive branch of government (save the judiciary system), headed by a deputy-Prime Minister or personally by the Prime Minster through his or her Security Council. The Parliament exercises control and oversight over the sector through special committees and subcommittee, and the office of the ombudsman.

The fifth element is building a system for surveillance and use of force. The sixth element is the conduct of preventive, integrated operations guaranteeing the security of Bulgarian citizens. Finally, the seventh element is integrated resource management, both personnel and material.

The events following 9-11, including the operation in Iraq, underline the necessity for an integrated security sector. The question is whether Bulgaria has the capacity to meet the challenges of such project. If not, we will not achieve security, which is a key precondition for achieving other goals, including prosperity.

Hosting American and NATO Military Bases as a Tool for Modernization of the Security Sector and the Country

Information about American intentions to move some of its bases from Germany to NATO's future members in Eastern Europe became public during the recent crisis in relations between Washington and Berlin. In fact, the debate on this issue began even before the Bush Administration came to the White House. Many experts argued that the American armed forces retained posture and capabilities fit to face the challenges of the Cold War and are inadequately prepared to address the non-traditional risks and threats in the new security environment, whose sources are to be found in the Middle East and Asia rather than in Europe. The arguments for change were also supported by the Quadrennial Defense Review. The events of 9-11-2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism led to the formulation of specific transformation concepts and policies and made their implementation politically possible.

As a part of the transformation efforts, the idea of realigning the U.S. military posture in Europe includes the relocation of military bases from Western Europe to the new NATO members. Inevitably, as a country adjacent to volatile regions, Bulgaria, too, was mentioned as a possible candidate to host American military bases. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Solomon Passy and the Minister of Defense Nikolay Svinarov publicly supported the idea.

The debate on the military bases' relocation from Western to Eastern Europe coincides with Bulgaria's upcoming membership in NATO and the process of transformation of the Alliance's structure including command and bases. Potential benefits for Bulgaria if it is selected to host NATO and American military bases are:

• Bulgaria would directly gain more security. As with all small countries, Bulgaria is unable to guarantee its national security on its own and needs additional external capacity to add to its capacity to attain security.
• Bulgarian security depends not only on the country's military power but also on its ability to influence the international security environment. International influence, on its part, is achieved through participation, including participation in allied missions and operations. Therefore, NATO and American military presence in Bulgaria would increase the country's ability to influence the security environment.
• Active participation in NATO requires effective military capabilities. Military capabilities can be achieved by hosting NATO and American bases, which would enable Bulgaria to hold joint military exercises and increase bilateral defense contacts. For example, Romania decided much earlier than Bulgaria to participate in the operations in Afghanistan and sent a unit of Special Forces. The troops were trained and partially equipped with American assistance. Romania currently has at its disposal a unit of effective Special Forces capable of performing in joint operations. In other words, participation in operations and hosting NATO and American military bases could effectively contribute to building Bulgarian military capabilities.
• There are also substantial economic and social benefits. The construction and maintenance of military bases requires the participation of Bulgarian businesses and thus increases employment. In this respect, it is recommended that hosting military bases is tied to strategies for stimulating development in economically depressed regions of the country. To these benefits one must add the direct financial benefits from the bases' rent and military personnel's tourism.
• Military bases' presence must be tied with the security sector's modernization including hosting NATO structures, arms transfers, direct military aid and investments in interoperability.
• Last but not least, the U.S. and allies gain further stakes in the country's stability. No one would want to maintain military base in an unstable state.

In contrast to the Warsaw Pact, NATO is an organization wherein member-states define their roles and functions based on negotiations and consensus. In this respect, it is essential that Bulgaria formulates a clear vision and political position regarding the eventual hosting of American and NATO military bases in the country and tie them to a comprehensive plan for security sector modernization. Utilizing the ongoing Strategic Defense Review Bulgaria must:

• Formulate proposals for hosting NATO training and learning facilities to meet the Alliance's growing demands for such bases.
• Formulate an Interoperability Concept. In close collaboration with NATO partners, initiate a review of the existing force structure and formulate specific policies to meet the Alliance's requirements for participation in joint operations.
• Regarding Bulgaria's specialization, request detailed information about the Alliance's needs and expectations in the context of the Prague Capabilities Commitment and specific mechanisms for negotiating and planning defense capabilities.
• Formulate a position regarding Bulgaria's specialization in the Alliance.
• According to numerous experts the Balkans are becoming the bridgehead to Central Asia and Asia. This will determine the specific infrastructure Bulgaria would be able to offer to NATO. Indeed, one of the decisions taken in Prague in November 2002 was to enhance cooperation with the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Bulgaria is in position to utilize its geographic position to facilitate the connection between NATO and the states in the region.
• Using the American and NATO presence in the country, Bulgaria should formulate strategies for attracting Western investments in the national military-industrial complex.

Officers and Informants: How State Security Survived and is Poised to Enter NATO
Major General Atanas Atanasov

On 25 January 1990, General Atanas Semerdjiev, then Minister of Defense, approved and signed a report proposing "some changes in activities related to departmental archives and control" in light of the "complicated political situation." The document, prepared by General Nanka Serkedjieva, Chief of the Department of Operational Reports and Archives in State Security, was sent to General Savov, then Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, responsible for the First Department of the State Security. This document initiates the process of "cleaning" the archives of the repressive agencies of the communist regime, a process which will have a long-tem impact on Bulgarian political life.

"Complicated political and operation situation"

In what context did General Savov-ironically the first victim of his own crime-report about a complicated situation? At the time, the Bulgarian Communist Party was losing its total control of the state. Article 1 of the Constitution guaranteeing the Party's leading role was rescinded following intense public pressure and protests. In the former German Democratic Republic, crowds of citizens entered the grounds of the STAZI and opened archives. All these circumstances forced the communist leadership to eliminate all evidence of the Party and State Security's total control over the life Bulgarian citizens. The Party needed to preserve the safety of especially valuable informants so that they could be used in the future. In the same token, "exceptionally valuable State Security informants are not required to be registered."

"The Informants"

The document approved by General Semerdjiev suggests that "on proposal of the operation departments" some of the informants' documentation could be preserved. For what individuals and why? Based on evidence provided by individuals working at the State Security at the time, the guidelines order the preservation of those informants' documentation who although formally agreeing to provide information have not remained loyal to the communist regime. The goal was, in the context of democratic changes, to discredit all those who have rejected the regime.

Of interest, too, are the guidelines to save "documentation pertaining to foreign nationals and operations" as well as "documentation relating to foreign legal subjects (embassies, companies, etc)."

The big, sluggish machine of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took off only slowly, hence the need for further guidelines to facilitate the process. According to the personal discretion of leaders and officers, in some departments the process has been overdone while in others many of the documents, which should have been destroyed, have been preserved. That let to serious errors which in our day ushered in the revealing of the so-called registered informants. The destruction of the documentation has been done in the respective operation departments. At the same time, the State Security's Department of Operational Reports and Archives has preserved records of the secret State Security informants. In order to remove all traces of information about informants, various departments have send letters to the Department of Operational Reports and Archives requesting the destruction of records containing the names of secret informants. The Department, however, had been unable to fulfill all requests. Hence, the operational documentation of some "exceptionally valuable informants" had been destroyed but their names have remained on record in the Department of Operational Reports and Archives. Today, when we analyze individuals with their names preserved in the Department we must be aware how valuable they had been in the past, let alone the ones whose names and records have been removed completely.

"The officers"

The most serious effect of what was done in 1990 is that the Bulgarian public lost sight of the responsibilities of the former State Security's officers; the responsibility of individuals empowered by the communist regime to recruit informants.

Following the shift in blame from the communist regime to State Security and the massive layoffs during General Semerdjiev's leadership, there passed a quarantine phase wherein much has been forgotten. Paradoxically, in the wake of the 21st century, twelve years after communism's end, the former State Security's officers are back, following Simeon's footsteps. Some also promote the "exceptionally valuable" informants. Many of the former officers, surviving the various reform phases, remained in various departments in the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense, while seeking rehabilitation of the former State Security and their own legitimacy. Others tried to attain legitimacy by going in politics, publishing, taking on consultancy jobs but never stopping their appeals to rehabilitate the former State Security.

The society is told that the "officers" are "good" because they worked for Bulgaria. The bad guys are the informants and of course those whose handwritten reports are still preserved. Hence the former State Security continued to manage the process.

Bulgaria, the officers and NATO

Bulgaria is about to join NATO. One of NATO' processes is the exchange of classified information. This exchange is mostly between intelligence agencies. The officers working in these agencies will be allowed access to such information upon receiving a clearance. One of the reasons for clearance rejection is the individual's any form of past dependence on the former communist intelligence agencies. At the same the ruling elite and the President are trying to convince the public that that is not valid for the officers of the former State Security. It follows that informants are dependent on their past ties to SS officers, while the officers of the most repressive institution during the totalitarian regime are perceived to have a clear past because "they have worked for Bulgaria" and now are about to "work for NATO."

It is high time this scheme to be destroyed. It is high time for the Bulgarian society to free itself from the myth of the all-powerful State Security and their indispensable former officers. It is high time the Bulgarian society ends the dependence and sends the officers off to retirement.

Security Sector Reform Coalition - Bulgaria
The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and
George C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria
In cooperation with:
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
University of National and World Economy
Institute for Regional and International Studies
Center for National Security and Defense Research - BAS
Institute for Security and International Studies
Society and Information Foundation

МЕМОRANDUM # 2
14 April 2003, Sofia

As a second Memorandum of the Security Sector Reform Coalition (SSRC) to the Parliament, President and Government (first one was issued on 22.11.2002 to initiate SDR as result of NATO invitation on 21.11.2002) to include following points:

• Bulgarian Government, based on its decision of 17.04 and supported by the President to propose to the Parliament a draft-decision, to be voted on no later than 25.04, for the creation of a Free Iraq Expeditionary Task Force (ETF) which is to include:
  a. Joint Special Operation Forces/Gendarme/Police Task Force with helicopter group (300 persons)
  b. Engineer battalion (200) + light infantry (200 persons)
  c. NBC company (100) and Civil Protection team (50 persons)
  d. Field hospital (rapid reaction medical team (50 persons)
  e. Logistics team, to be located at the temporary U.S. Air Force base in Bulgaria and to support and sustain the deployed elements of the ETF (in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia as well as in Iraq in the future, and other areas) (100 persons)
  In order to build the ETF, it is essential to consider the following immediate actions:
• The Bulgarian government should request from the U.S. C4 and force protection equipment for the Task Force in order to provide interoperability and integration with American forces in Iraq (and in future joint deployments), as well as reach-back capability to the NMCC in Sofia.
• The Bulgarian government should freeze wasteful projects including the current project to repair the MiG-29 fleet, Strandja, Vulcan and others and redirect resources to the creation and maintenance of the ETF as the Bulgarian contribution to the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF).
• The existence of the ETF would enable the Bulgarian government to deploy on short notice its various elements. In order to increase the effectiveness of the ETF and the Armed Forces in general, the Ministry of Defense should establish a Joint Operations Command (HQ) around NMCC (linked with ASOC and NSOC) to plan and command the operations of all Bulgarian forces.

Along with the creation of the ETF as an instrument of modernization and transformation of the armed forces there is the need for further steps in the transformation of the security sector, including:

• Bulgaria must commit the facilities of SEEBRIG in Plovdiv to the NATO Transformation Command's efforts in Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) / Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) programs for transformation of the Armed Forces. The Center for National Security and Defense Research (CNSDR) at the Bulgarian Academy of Science (BAS) must be defined as the R&D partner, and the Defense Staff College as the E&T partner of the NATO Transformation Command. With DARPA to arrange set of ATD for transformation of Armed Forces.
• To prepare and propose Joint Action Plan for the support of the Security Sector Reform in PfP countries to include SEE countries, Ukraine, Black Sea countries and Central Asia countries, using its experience and facility in Plovdiv.

This will support multi-variant, flexible, proactive security and economic policy in Bulgaria.

Events